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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, when I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in the
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, there were two women in the
United States Senate.' Nationwide, as of 1997, 19% of seated federal judges
were women. 2 Though the laws protecting against sexual harassment had
been in place since the 1970s,3 a woman's chance of winning a sexual har-
assment lawsuit was a longshot. The United States Supreme Court had heard
only one such case.4 In the United States, women earned about seventy cents
for each dollar a man earned.'
On October 15, 1991, Judge Thomas was confirmed as a justice to the
nation's highest court. 6 Momentum from the hearings indicated that the is-
sues I raised during the hearing were only of passing interest. 7 Observers
were equally certain that no woman would come forward with a sexual har-
* Professor of Law, Social Policy, and Women's Studies, Brandeis University, Heller
School of Policy and Management.
1. U.S. Senate, Art & History-Historical Minutes, "Year of the Woman" (Jan. 3, 1993),
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/year-of the woman.htm.
2. ABA, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN AND THE LAW 1 (1998),
http://www.abanet.org/media/factbooks/womenlaw.pdf.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1965).
4. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
5. Women's Earnings as a Percentage of Men's, 1951-2005, Infoplease.com,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A093820.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
6. Senate Confirms Thomas, 52-48, Ending Week of Bitter Battle: 'Time for Healing,'
Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at Al.
7. Julia Lawlor, Thomas Battle Leaves Doubts in Workplace, USA TODAY, Oct. 16,
1991, at B1.
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assment complaint after viewing the Senate's treatment of the issue.8 In
sum, analysts projected that my appearance before the Senate would have a
chilling effect on women's voices. 9 Fortunately, that projection was wrong.
In the weeks following my testimony, open discussions of the hearings and
the topic of sexual harassment began to reshape public opinion on a variety
of gender-related issues.' 0
Since the events of 1991, I've had the opportunity to participate as a
speaker in hundreds of public forums-some about the hearings, some about
sexual harassment, and some about general racial and gender issues. In ven-
ues all over the country, as well as in Asia, Africa, and Europe, the hearings
still resonate. Far from static, they've evolved and taken on significance as
we face new issues of gender equality. The energy the hearings unleashed
pushed the issue of sexual harassment far beyond its predicted limits and
even beyond the numbers of complaints and amounts of monetary awards. "
Today, sexual harassment is correctly viewed as an assault on women's
rights to participate in the economic mainstream as equals to men.
Beyond the harassment issue, Justice Thomas's confirmation hearings
evoked a new consciousness about gender equality in leadership. 12 We be-
gan to reexamine the role that women's rights play in shaping our society. 13
We knew that women should take a more active role in fashioning public
policy and deciding all the issues of the day, not just those that were seen as
typical gender issues.
In 2006, there were seventy-one women in the United States House of
Representatives and fourteen women in the United States Senate.' 4
Women's earnings improved to 80% of men's.' 5 Since the hearings, corpo-
rations have instituted anti-harassment policies and countless women have
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Susan Deller Ross, Sexual Harassment Law in the Aftermath of the Hill-Thomas
Hearings, in RACE, GENDER, AND POWER iN AMERICA 237-38 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Cole-
man Jordan eds., 1995).
11. Id.at237.
12. See Guy Gugliotta, Year of the Woman Becomes Reality as Record Number Win
Seats, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1992, at A30.
13. See Gwen Ifill, Female Lawmakers Wrestle with New Public Attitude on 'Women s'
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at B7; see also Geraldine A. Ferraro, Women's Issues Are
Now National Issues, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 3, 1992, at 3B.
14. MILDRED L. AMER, Women in the United States Congress: 1917-2006, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS 1 (updated Nov. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL30261 .pdf.
15. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Women Narrow Wage Gap as Men's Earnings Shrink,
DENVER POST, Dec. 4, 2006.
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sought relief using these internal procedures. 16 In 2006, 12,025 sexual har-
assment complaints were filed with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).17 Likewise, 15.4% were filed by men.'8
Monetary relief on those resolved by the EEOC without litigation totaled
$48.8 million.'9
In the courts, women and men are filing sexual harassment complaints
and winning unprecedented awards.20 The United States Supreme Court has
ruled in favor of numerous women in harassment suits and recognized that
men who are harassed are equally entitled to sue under federal law. 21 Cur-
rently, women make up over 20% of the federal judiciary figures; however,
the percentage of people of color on the federal bench is less clear. 22 These
are, in fact, better numbers, but they are not good enough.
I argue that a society committed to equal justice under the law must
demand a judiciary that embodies that belief. Professor Judith Resnik states
the issue clearly: "In the contemporary world, where democratic commit-
ments oblige equal access to power by persons of all colors whatever their
identities, the composition of a judiciary-if all-white or all-male or all-
upper class-becomes a problem of equality and legitimacy. 2 3 Equality and
legitimacy require that we increase the inclusiveness of today's judiciary.
For decades, feminist legal scholars have asked how the law fails to
take into account women's experiences.2 4 Critical race theorists have simi-
larly asked how the "received tradition in law adversely affects people of
16. See Sherman M. Fridman, Avoid Sexual Harassment Lawsuits: Sexual Harassment
Lawsuits Can Hurt Any Firm's Bottom Line, http://www.office.com/templates/
page l.asp?docid=33 (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
17. EEOC, Sexual Harassment, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/sexualharassment.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2007).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See John Vering, State Court Juries Continue Employee-Friendly Verdicts, 16 Mo.
EMP. L. LETTER 1 (Apr. 2006) (reporting a $6.8 million award in a sexual harassment com-
plaint); see also EEOC Wins Big in Chicago on Sexual Harassment Claim, 8 EMP. PRAC.
LIABILITY VERDICTS & SETrLEMENT, Jan. 1, 2007 (reporting a $2.355 million award against an
employer on behalf of three former employers).
21. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
22. See ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, CHARTING OUR PROGRESS: THE
STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION TODAY 5 (2006); see generally Federal Judicial Center,
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2007).
23. Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life
Tenure, 26 CARDOzO L. REv 579, 597 (2005).
24. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 837
(1990).
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color not as individuals but as a group. 25 Critical race theorists appropri-
ately challenge us to consider "[w]hat would the legal landscape look like
today if people of color were the decision-makers? ' 26 The relevance of the
"woman question" and the "race question" today is clear in light of the recent
appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito to the
withdrawal of Harriet Miers' name from consideration. 27 For the first time
since Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg took office in 1993, the United States
Supreme Court had only one female justice. 28 The "race question" is simi-
larly relevant. As we contemplate future judicial appointments, critical con-
sideration must be given to the question of whether, in the twenty-first cen-
tury, the judiciary will be a body that looks more like and reflects the per-
spectives of the population it serves, as well as engages in discussion about
how we can get to a more representative judiciary.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's appointment as the first woman on the
United States Supreme Court was a historical event, 29 as was her resigna-
tion. 30  Her resignation was greeted with widespread public speculation
about the gender of her replacement. 31 Within days of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's resignation, a reporter asked me if her replacement should be a
woman. My response was that the nominee's respect for gender equality was
more important than his or her gender-as though we had to choose between
having a woman and having someone committed to gender equality. My
sincere, but uninspired response barely masked my ambivalence about being
asked whether Justice O'Connor's replacement had to meet a gender litmus
test. My perception was that behind the question was the idea that the
O'Connor seat was the woman's seat-just as many had assumed that the
Thurgood Marshall years on the Court secured a seat for an African Ameri-
can. 32 Few questioned what was behind such a presumption. The idea of
25. Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 85 (1994).
26. Id. at 86.
27. See Anita F. Hill, Why Harriet Miers Mattered, MS. MAG., Winter 2006, available at
http://www.msmagazine.com/winter2006/miers.asp.
28. See Bill Mears, Reporter's Notebook: Fun with Dick and Jane-and John, CNN
WASHINGTON BUREAU, Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/26/scotus.journal/
index.html.
29. See Nat'l Women's Hall of Fame, Women of the Hall: Sandra Day O'Connor, 1995,
http://www.greatwomen.org/women.php?action=viewone&id=l 15 (last visited Apr. 14,
2007).
30. Adam Liptak, O'Connor Leap Moved Women Up the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2005, at AI.
31. See id; Hill, supra note 27.
32. Talk of a "black seat" on the court began even before Justice Marshall announced his
resignation. See Hal Riedl, Editorial, Should Supreme Court Have a Black Seat? ST. Louis
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setting aside a seat for a woman evoked memories of past special protections
for women that often resulted in measures that limited, rather than expanded,
their opportunities. For me, the question hinted that a woman would only be
chosen if she were given special consideration because the vacancy was left
by a woman. Not even the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee
seemed to challenge the assumption. " None were asking that former Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's replacement be a woman.3 4 Few suggested that
it be a woman of color. It was not hard to conclude that, except when a
woman resigned, the likely nominee would be male, and the outcome sug-
gests that it will likely be a white male.
With a total of nine seats at stake, simply setting aside Justice
O'Connor's seat as a woman's seat seemed more likely to restrict women's
interests than to advance them. Both historical experience and contemporary
theory suggest that the key to women's advancement is not setting aside a
single seat for women, but rejecting the practice of setting aside all the others
for men.
The legal profession has come a long way from the time when the only
choice for including women was to have special protections or set-asides.
We have also moved beyond an era where we believed that we had to ignore
the differences in women's and men's experiences in order to treat them eq-
uitably and offer meaningful inclusion. Despite the fact that in 2004 a ma-
jority (59%) of individuals between the ages of forty and fifty-seven (Baby
Boomers) said that the Civil Rights Movement had a "Major Influence" on
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 1990, at 3B. Shortly after he announced his resignation, Justice Mar-
shall advised that President George Bush not use race to justify "picking the wrong Negro and
saying, 'I'm picking him because he's a Negro."' Howard Fineman et al., How Far Right,
NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 19. Although Justice Marshall expressed hope that the nominee
would be "a Negro," according to reported accounts, "he did not think there should be a per-
manent black seat on the high court." Ethan Bronner, Marshall to Retire from High Court,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 1991, at 1. When President George Bush announced Judge Tho-
mas's nomination, he rejected the suggestion that Thomas's race was a factor in his decision.
John Harwood, Bush Selects Black Judge for Supreme Court Seat, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
July 2, 1991, at IA. "I don't think there should be a black seat on the court, or an ethnic seat."
Id. Yet others urged that when President Bush selected Justice Thomas for the Court, he took
race into account and reinforced the idea of a black seat. See Cynthia Tucker, Editorial, Fill-
ing Court Vacancy: Playing Race Politics, ATLANTA CONST., July 6, 1991, at A19.
33. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Democrats Adopt O'Connor as Model for Bush Court
Pick, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at Al; David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Democrats Are Shifting
Focus from Roberts to Other Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A16.
34. See Nagourney, supra note 33; Kirkpatrick, supra note 33.
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their views about governance and politics, 35 the gender and racial make-up of
the courts has changed only incrementally in the past twenty years.3
I argue that for a variety of reasons with regard to substantive changes
in the law as well as perceptions of fairness and the role the judiciary plays in
our society, women judges do make a difference and that race, ethnic, and
gender diversity should be the norm, not the exception. I also assert that
judges, women, and people of color, are making a difference in a variety of
ways, including legal reasoning and public engagement. I offer three exam-
ples: Madam Justice Bertha Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor of the United States Supreme Court, and Chief Justice
Constance Baker Motley of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. They are
aided in doing so by the legal scholarship of feminist, critical race, and inter-
sectionality legal theorists.
The "woman question" is not a new one, even with regard to judges.37
However, in 1982, Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, the first woman to sit on
the Supreme Court of Canada,38 gave that question new prominence. The
title of her widely publicized lecture posed the issue directly: Will Women
Judges Really Make a Difference?39 According to Madam Justice Wilson's
assessment, the life experiences of women and men cause them to think and
approach the law and legal decision-making differently. 0
Madam Justice Wilson's treatment of the question was presented at Os-
goode Hall Law School and, not surprisingly, she approached the question as
one approaches a legal issue.4 She carefully laid out her arguments for how
the appointment of women to the bench would: 1) help "shatter stereotypes
about the role of women in society that are held by male judges and lawyers,
as well as by litigants, jurors, and witnesses;"42 2) help preserve the public
35. Jeffrey Love, Political Behavior and Values Across the Generations: A Summary of
Selected Findings, STRATEGIC ISSUES RESEARCH (AARP), July 2004, at 11,
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/politics-values.pdf.
36. Rorie Spill Solberg, Court Size and Diversity on the Bench: The Ninth Circuit and
Its Sisters, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 247, 248, 253 (2006).
37. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts and Civic and
Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2143, 2145-46 (1993).
38. Mimi Liu, A "Prophet With Honour": An Examination of the Gender Equality Ju-
risprudence of Madam Justice Claire L "Heureux-Dubg of the Supreme Court of Canada, 25
QUEEN'S L.J. 417, 423 n.20 (2000); see The Honourable Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, The
Supreme Court of Canada, http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/wilson/index-e.asp
(last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
39. Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference? 28
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 507, 507 (1990).
40. Id. at 519-22.
41. See id. at 507.
42. Id. at 517.
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trust by fostering perceptions of diverse representation in the judiciary; 43 3)
reduce problems for women counsel; 44 4) alter "the process of judicial deci-
sion-making; ' 45 and 5) reform legal doctrine, particularly in such areas as
tort, criminal, and family law.46
Madam Justice Wilson's conclusions about women's potential to
change the law fell into two categories.47 She first argued that the appoint-
ment of women judges would alter public perceptions.48 In addition, she
argued that the presence of women on the bench would modify law itself.
49
According to Madam Justice Wilson, the presence of women in the role of
judicial decision-makers and leaders would change the way fellow judges, as
well as lawyers and litigants, saw all women in the judicial process." This,
she concluded, would also change the behavior of women and men. 1 So
too, with more women as judges, the public at large would see the justice
system as more representative of diversity and, presumably, more fair. 52
Madam Justice Wilson's conclusions about women's potential to
change the substance and processes of the law proved to be the most contro-
versial of her claims. She argued that because of their gendered experiences,
women were more willing to contextualize the law and its processes than
were men, who were more formalistic in their approach to decision-
making. 3 These assertions drew fire from critics who challenged many of
Madam Justice Wilson's premises.5 4 Her conclusions were understandably
most offensive to those who view the law as gender, race, and class neutral,
notwithstanding the different life experiences of women and men.55 For
those who believe in law's neutrality, Madam Justice Wilson's arguments
raise the question of whether any effort to appoint more women is misguided
if it is done for the sake of adding the female perspective.56 For those with a
particularly traditional view of the law, the appointment of women who are
43. Id. at518.
44. Wilson, supra note 39, at 518-19.
45. Id. at 519.
46. Id. at 516.
47. See id. at 517-18.
48. Id.
49. Wilson, supra note 39, at 519.
50. Id. at 517.
51. Id. at 521-22.
52. Id. at 518.
53. Id. at 519-20.
54. See Robert E. Hawkins & Robert Martin, Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson, 41
McGILL L.J. 1, 34 (1995).
55. Id. at 54.
56. See id. at 55.
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perceived as particularly "feminist" in their approach to the law and deci-
sion-making remains very troublesome.57
Canadian law professor Constance Backhouse chronicles the response
to one such judge-Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, the second
woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.58 Madam Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 came under fire for the concurring opinion she wrote in R.
v. Ewanchuk,59 a criminal case involving the question of whether an alleged
sexual assault was actually consensual sex. 60 Madam Justice L'Heureux-
Dubd's opinion concurred with the full Court's decision to overturn the dis-
missal of the complaint and to enter a conviction of the defendant. 6' The
opinion also criticized her colleague, Justice John Wesley McClung, who
voted to dismiss the conviction, suggesting that the complainant's repeated
"no"'s during the alleged attack were irrelevant.62 He also implied that a
woman who had had a child out of wedlock, while living with a male part-
ner, was not capable of refusing consent. 63  Madam Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6's opinion advised that judges should avoid the use of "language ...
which not only perpetuates archaic myths and stereotypes about the nature of
sexual assaults but also ignores the law."'  Even further, the opinion noted
that judicial bias, such as that suggested in Justice McClung's opinion, ad-
versely affected a complainant's ability "to rely on a system free from myths
and stereotypes" and on a reasonable expectation of judicial impartiality.65
Although her colleague, Justice Charles Doherty Gonthier, also signed
the opinion, Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 received the brunt of the public
criticism. 66 The first came in the form of a letter written by Justice
McClung, which was published in a national newspaper, where he accused
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 of having a "feminist bias" and suggested
that her interjection of "personal invective" into the law could be responsible
"for the disparate (and growing) number of male suicides being reported in
57. See e.g., Lynne Cohen, Gender Irrelevant When Judging a Judge, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
June 2, 1998, at C4.
58. The Honourable Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, The Supreme Court of
Canada, http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/lheureux-dube/index-e.asp (last visited
Apr. 14, 2007); Liu, supra note 38, at 423.
59. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can.).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 68 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 88-89.
63. Id. at 88.
64. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, 95.
65. Id.
66. Janice Tibbetts & Shawn Ohler, Judges Clash Over Landmark Sex-Assault Ruling:
No Definitely Means No, NAT'L POST, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al.
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[Quebec Province]. 67 In the public attacks that followed, lawyers and rep-
resentatives from national organizations criticized Madam Justice
L'Heureux-Dubd for feminist judicial activism. 68 Despite the criticism,
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 did not shy away from the feminist label.
Throughout their careers both Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 and
Madam Justice Wilson expressed opinions that were characterized as femi-
nist, although Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 came under particular scru-
tiny for challenging what she believed were sexist ideas.69 While Madam
Justice Wilson certainly received public criticism for raising the "woman
question," her willingness to do so may have had a notably positive effect.70
At the time this article was written, of the nine justices on the Supreme Court
of Canada, four were women.71 Three of the appointments came between
2002 and 2004.72 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada is
Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin.7 3 In the context of advising President
Bush on the appointment of women to the United States Supreme Court,
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont pointed to the Supreme Court of Canada
as an example of gender equity.74 As many commentators have noted, the
United States has much to learn about diversity on the bench from Canada's
highest court. 75 By raising the question in a convincing and reasoned man-
ner, Madam Justice Wilson began a dialogue among the bar and the public at
large. She urged change that may not have taken place but for her positions.
II. JUST How WILL WOMEN JUDGES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Scholars have identified several dominant theories employed by the
United States Supreme Court in gender discrimination cases that are relevant
to judicial appointments.76  One involves difference theory.77  Though
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, Conversations on Equality, 26 MAN. L.J. 273 (1999).
70. See Hawkins & Martin, supra note 54, at 1.
71. Supreme Court of Canada, Current Judges, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/curjudges-e.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
72. Supreme Court of Canada, Current and Former Puisne Judges, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/curformpuisne/index-e.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
73. Supreme Court of Canada, Current and Former Chief Justices, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/curformchief/index e.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
74. Richard Foot, Canadian Top Court Held as Example in U.S., THE GAZETTE, July 13,
2005, at A 13.
75. Clare Dyer, Law: Where Are the Women? Our Judges Are Still Overwhelmingly
Male, White and Public School Educated, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 2003, at 16.
76. However, the United States Supreme Court has not incorporated difference theory in
its jurisprudence. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Essay, Gender Law, I DUKE J. GENDER
10
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Madam Justice Wilson relied on difference theory to support her position
that women judges would change the law, a review of the research reveals no
definitive evidence to confirm that reliance.78 Empirical and anecdotal ac-
counts do not conclusively establish the idea that individual women or
women as a group judge differently than men. However, at least some re-
search finds gender differences.79 For example, political scientists Elaine
Martin and Barry Pyle studied high courts in all fifty states, concluding that,
in divorce decisions, "a judge's gender [tended] to be the primary predictor
of a judge's vote."' In addition, Brenda Kruse's research has concluded that
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg are also in-
fluenced by their gendered experiences in deciding employment cases.8 1
However, empirical research testing the impact of race on judicial decision-
making is inconclusive.82
There is also considerable evidence that some male judges' perspectives
cause them to view women's experiences very differently than women
might.83 Professor Shirley Wiegand has chronicled numerous examples that
demonstrate a judge's apparently limited vision. 4 One of her examples
comes from the case that served as the basis for the 2005 movie North Coun-
try, a grim and painful, if sometimes fictionalized, account of sexual harass-
ment at a mine in Minnesota. 5 The fictionalized version was apparently no
L. & POL'Y 1 (1994) [hereinafter Bartlett, Gender Law]. The primary theories relied on by the
Court are: 1) separate spheres, which allows different treatment based on cultural expecta-
tions and biological differences; 2) formal equality, which requires that women and men be
treated the same; and 3) substantive equality, which calls for rules such as afflrmative action
that can produce equality in results. Id. at 2-6; Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on
Equality and Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
501, 519-521 (2004).
77. See MARTHA M1NOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
THE AMERICAN LAW 19, 20 (1990); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (1987).
78. Wilson, supra note 39, at 522.
79. For an overview, see KATHERINE BARTLETr & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND
LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (4th ed., 2006).
80. Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, State High Courts and Divorce: The Impact of Judicial
Gender, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 923 (2005).
81. Brenda Kruse, Comment, Women of the Highest Court: Does Gender Bias or Per-
sonal Life Experiences Influence Their Opinions? 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 995, 1021 (2005).
82. Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299,
316 (2004).
83. Kruse, supra note 81, at 996.
84. See generally Shirley A. Wiegand, Deception and Artifice: Thelma, Louise, and the
Legal Hermeneutic, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 25 (1997).
85. NORTH COUNTRY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2005).
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more grim and painful than the real experience the women faced in the mine
or the hostility they faced because of the suit. 6 According to Wiegand,
Judge Patrick McNulty's opinion:
[R]evealed that he could not understand why one woman
was fearful when a man who she said had exposed himself to
her several years earlier began driving his truck in circles, over
and over, around her work area. "This court has difficulty un-
derstanding why the appearance of a suspected flasher outside
the building in which she was working.., would cause great
fear--of something-in a reasonable woman."
The judge also could not understand why a woman would fear
rape simply because "a man who had repeatedly and crudely
propositioned her suddenly lunged at her one night at work with
his arms spread, only stopping when she began screaming.' 87
Yet such decisions and other evidence of male bias do not establish
sweeping gender differences in judging. And considerable evidence suggests
that other factors, such as ideology, are better predictors than sex in account-
ing for judicial decisions.8 s So, for example, commentators who have looked
specifically at Justice O'Connor's and Justice Ginsburg's voting records
generally find that gender is not a compelling factor in their judging.89
Unlike their Canadian counterpart, Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, both
Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsburg reject the notion that their gender
guides their judicial decision-making.9 ° In responding to questions of
"whether women judges speak with a different voice," Justice O'Connor
refers to the lack of "empirical evidence that gender differences lead to dis-
cernible differences in rendering judgments." 9' Moreover, she warns that
86. Wiegand, supra note 84, at 46-47.
87. Id. at 47 (quoting Kirsten Downey Grimsley, Judge Put Small Price on Pain; Dam-
age Award Paled by Litigation Norms, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at A13.). It is worth not-
ing that the trial judge who adopted this language was overturned on appeal some eleven
months later. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1304 (8th Cir. 1997).
88. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 82, at 302-03.
89. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, O'Connor and Ginsburg: Together and Apart, LEGAL TIMES,
June 9, 2003, at 14. Mauro notes that Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsburg voted for the
same result approximately 75% of the time. Id. Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Ken-
nedy 83% of the time, while Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Breyer and Justice Souter in
94% of the decisions. Id.
90. Id.
91. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 190-91 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003).
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such ideas may rely on troubling myths and stereotypes.92 Instead, she sug-
gests that male and female judges alike should seek a collective wisdom
gained through different struggles and different victories.93
Justice Ginsburg draws on her experiences as a judge and as a law
teacher to conclude that there is no discernible difference in the way women
and men reason: "In class or in grading papers.., and now in reading briefs
and listening to [oral] arguments in court . . . , I have detected no reliable
indicator of distinctly male or surely female thinking-or even penman-
ship."94
It is difficult to argue with these two women, in particular, about
whether women judges speak with a different voice, especially given that
there is no clear definition of what a "different voice" means. Moreover,
difference theory is not without its feminist critics. 95 Some feminists advo-
cate for gender equity under the theory of substantive equality. 96 Rather than
look at whether a rule or law treats women and men the same or differently,
substantive equality theory questions whether a law or rule has the effect of
disadvantaging individuals due to their gender.97 Thus, substantive equality
frameworks acknowledge differences, but with the goal of eliminating or
leveling them to encourage more equal outcomes. 98 Affirmative action and
pay equity are the kinds of strategies that advocates of substantive equality
support. 99
Instead of focusing on the question of whether men and women are dif-
ferent, non-subordination theory looks at what meaning society attributes to
those differences. " Assuming that the consequences of male power are
more significant than gender similarities or differences, non-subordination
frameworks concentrate on eliminating power imbalances. 1 ' According to
the theory's major proponent, Catharine A. MacKinnon:
[A] rule or practice is discriminatory . . . if it participates in the
systemic social deprivation of one sex because of sex. The only
question for litigation is whether the policy or practice in question
92. Id. at 192.
93. Id. at 193.
94. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for California Women Lawyers, September
22, 1994, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 5 (1994) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Remarks].
95. See Bartlett, Gender Law, supra note 76, at 11- 13.
96. Id. at 4-6.
97. Id. at4.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Bartlett, Gender Law, supra note 76, at 6.
101. See id.
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integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a de-
prived position because of gender status. '02
For example, under non-subordination theory, sexual harassment vio-
lates principles of equality and should be prohibited because it reinforces
men's power over women." 3 The violation flows from the domination it
supports-not the boorish, bad, or even assaultive behavior itself.' 04
Despite the opportunities that difference and non-subordination theories
offer for positive change, they are not without their feminist critics. Some
commentators, Justice Ginsburg among them, argue that difference theory
risks reinforcing gender-based stereotypes that perpetuate gender-based ine-
quality. 05 By attempting to articulate an all-encompassing meta-narrative,
both theories are criticized for denying class, racial, sexual orientation, and
religious differences among women, making the experiences of white, mid-
dle-class women the model.'0 6 In addition to criticizing MacKinnon's theory
on the grounds that it promotes what amounts to gender "essentialism," some
feminists criticize Catharine MacKinnon for what they call "gender imperial-
ism," namely the assumption that gender is the most important source of
oppression. 107
Critical race theorists have similarly questioned the ways in which the
"received tradition in law adversely affects people of color not as individuals
but as a group."'0 8 Critical race theorists appropriately challenge us to con-
sider: "What would the legal landscape look like today if people of color
were the decision-makers?"' 0 9 Critical race theorists point to similar modes
of racial justice, including one based on ideas of racial pluralism, and another
based on racial diversity."0 Moreover, they have a "'vision of legal knowl-
edge that includes the perspectives and experiences of oppressed people in
the critique and reformulation of legal doctrine"' and eschews the notion that
law is value neutral.l"' But they too are susceptible to criticism by Black
102. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Ginsburg, Remarks, supra note 94, at 4-5.
106. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 585, 590 (1990); see also BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 79, at 15.
107. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 106, at 585; Bartlett, Gender Law, supra note 76, at 16.
108. Brooks, supra note 25, at 85.
109. Id. at 86.
110. See id. at 92-93.
111. Id. at 96 (quoting Linda S. Greene, "Breaking Form". 44 STAN. L. REv. 909, 922
(1992)).
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women and Latina scholars for racial essentialism and neglecting the role of
class and gender in their analysis.
However, failure to reach a consensus about whether women and racial
minority jurists reach different conclusions or even reason differently does
not resolve the question of whether there should be more women on the
bench. Whether women judges will make a difference is a larger question
than whether women and men will reach different outcomes in particular
cases. Whether women judges make a difference depends on the role that
judges and judging play in our legal system and must take into account a
variety of professional and community activities in which judges participate.
As the research from various judicial task forces suggests, judging involves
collegiality and a diverse bench enables members to influence each other. 12
In addition, the role of a judge also has significance in terms of percep-
tions about representation. The face of judging, in an emblematic way, mat-
ters as a reflection of access to justice; the diversity of the bench affects pub-
lic perceptions of fairness. Finally, diversity among judges is a reflection of
how power is distributed in the justice system.
Political constituents in the United States rely on several forms of repre-
sentation, including anticipatory representation, introspective representation,
and surrogate representation."' The concept of anticipatory representation is
best explained by the idea that constituents in today's political climate make
selections based on the achievement of specific outcomes rather than "policy
preferences" of representatives. "' In the introspective representation model,
representatives rely on "a set of principles and commitments that derive
partly from their own ideals and partly from their commitment to the collec-
tive decisions of the party" in making decisions. "' Surrogate representation
is a form of non-territorial representation." 6 Thus, an individual without a
certain characteristic or perspective may serve as a representative for "the
interests and perspectives" of others with the same characteristic or perspec-
tive, "even when members of these groups do not constitute a large fraction
of their constituents."'"1 7 Though typically applied to elected political offi-
cials, the ideas behind these forms of representation can be applied to the
judiciary and can serve as a basis for arguing for greater diversity and inclu-
112. See infra notes 130-32.
113. Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 515, 515 (2003).
114. Id. at 517 (citingR. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 17
(1990)).
115. Id. at 521.
116. Id. at 522.
117. Id. at 523.
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sion. 118 As judicial selection becomes more openly ideological and political,
it is time for a more open discussion about what representation can legiti-
mately be sought in the courts. Yet, many of us are uncomfortable with ag-
gressively pursuing diversity in the judiciary given the lack of confidence in,
and outright discomfort with, the idea of different outcomes based on race
and gender.
However, there are other reasons for supporting judicial diversity. I call
the model which I would choose for including women and people of color on
the bench the representative perspective frame. My model borrows ideas
from both difference and non-subordination theories and attempts to address
some of the criticisms of racial and gender essentialism and gender imperial-
ism. As applied to the appointment of judges, my representative perspective
theory rests on three premises: 1) that gender, racial, and ethnic experiences
influence perspectives and worldviews, including one's sense of justice and
how it should be achieved; 2) that the contribution of representative perspec-
tives is substantial and reaffirms the promise of equality under the law by
suggesting that all citizens have the chance to take part in democracy; and 3)
that the failure to have a broad array of perspectives represented undermines
judicial integrity and contributes to false ideas about intellect and compe-
tency.
III. JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND THE INCLUSIVE COURT
Theories of equality, as well as the law adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in recent years, support greater inclusion in the judiciary.
Despite the fact that Justice O'Connor has been labeled a conservative by
some, and denies that her gender influences her reasoning, she has provided
some important language to support the idea of greater gender inclusion on
the judiciary. 1 9
"A basic tenet of [feminist thinking] is that perspective matters ...
[meaning] understanding women's life experiences requires a different lens"
and a point of view that comes "from living life as a woman and developing
[a gendered] consciousness."' 0 Critical race theorists argue that people of
color develop a race consciousness as well. 121
118. See generally Mansbridge, supra note 113, at 521-27.
119. See Kruse, supra note 81, at 996-98
120. Jon D. Hanson & Adam Benforado, The Drifters: Why the Supreme Court Makes
Justices More Liberal, BOSTON REV. (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at http://bostonreview.net/
BR3 1. 1/hansonbenforado.html.
121. See id.; see also Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil
Rights in the New Millennium? 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 20 (2002).
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Perspectives and experiences may influence the outcome, but that influ-
ence is not limited to outcome in terms of which party prevails. It can have
other influences on the overall direction the law takes. As Justice O'Connor
stated in her concurring opinion in J E. B v. Alabama ex rel. T B., 122 a case
which challenged the exclusion of women from juries, "one need not be a
sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and result-
ing life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case .... Indi-
viduals are not expected to ignore as jurors what they know as men--or
women."'' 23  The idea that perspective matters is not limited to feminist
scholars or female jurists.' 4 Jon Hanson and Adam Benforado made pre-
cisely that point in their recent Boston Review article, stating that "[m]ost
legal scholars recognize that a judge's antecedent presumptions and perspec-
tives often influence judicial decisions as much or more than her purported
principles and precedents."1 25 As noted earlier, gender is only one of the
antecedents that influence judicial decisions and decision making; race, class,
and sexual orientation, as well as previous areas of practice, are others. 126
Even conservative supporters of Justice Samuel Alito recognized the
importance of a judge's perspective.127  During his confirmation hearing,
they argued that his experience as the son of an Italian immigrant father
would be a positive influence on his ability to relate to the little guy in cases
that might come before him as a United States Supreme Court Justice. 12 8 It
is hard to imagine that the experience of being an immigrant's son could be
any more influential than the experience of being a man is for now eight of
the nine members of the Court.
In addressing whether women judges will make a difference, we also
should not overlook the symbolic and representational role that members of
the judiciary play. Beginning in the 1970s, the federal and state judicial sys-
tems launched initiatives on racial and gender bias. 129 To date, numerous
states and members of the federal circuit courts have taken steps to respond
to bias. 3 ' The need for responses is well documented in task force re-
122. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
123. Id. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. See Hanson & Benforado, supra note 120.
125. Id.
126. See supra Part II.
127. See Hanson & Benforado, supra note 120.
128. See Patty Reinert, Confirmation Hearings: Alito Vows No "Agenda", HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 10, 2006, at 1.
129. E.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (2000).
130. See Marcia Coyle, How Deep Is the Poolfor Supreme Court Picks? FULTON COuNTY
DAILY REPORT, Sept. 28, 2005.
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ports."'3 They found bias in a broad range of substantive areas such as fam-
ily law, domestic violence, and criminal law, as well as in administrative
areas such as the appointment and election of judges. 13 2
It is hard to deny, though perhaps impossible to measure, how bias
against women and people of color undermines the integrity of the American
judicial system. However, a measurement of the actual impact is not neces-
sary. Justice O'Connor herself recognized that even the perception of bias
injures the judicial system. As she wrote in the introduction to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals task force: "When people perceive . . . bias in a
legal system, whether they suffer from it or not, they lose respect for that
system, as well as for the law."'3 Virtually all of the task forces concluded
that at least some reforms were necessary to reduce the potential for gender
bias and better serve the ultimate objective of equal justice under the law.'34
In particular, many of the task force reports advocate measures that will in-
crease the number of women on the bench.'35 These reports cite the educa-
tional role women judges play with their male counterparts in addition to the
greater public confidence in the judiciary that come from more diverse repre-
sentation on the bench. 1
36
Given the history of gender and racial bias in our legal system, the over-
representation of white, male perspectives on the United States Supreme
Court undermines the integrity of the American judicial system. Law profes-
sor Lani Guinier has argued that United States Supreme Court appointments
have carried important symbolic messages. 137 In Grutter v. Bollinger,' the
Court affirmed, recognizing that a university had a compelling interest in a
racially diverse student body. 13 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
concluded that for "legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that
131. See generally John H. Doyle et al., Report of the Working Committees to the Second
Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 117 (1997).
132. See, e.g., THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMM. (1990), reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REv. 733, 733 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMM.]; see Doyle et al., supra note 131, at 168-77; Report of Missouri Task
Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L. REV. 485, 687-704 (1993).
133. JUDGE DOROTHY W. NELSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE
(1993), reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 731, 760 (1994).
134. See id. at 760-61.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See generally Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardi-
ans at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REv. 113 (2003).
138. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
138. Id. at 333.
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the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and [all] qualified individu-
als of every race and ethnicity."'40 Professor Guinier argues that the same is
said for leadership in the judiciary; and that it too must be open regardless of
race, ethnicity, and gender. 4' Professor Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas argues that
the Grutter decision goes further and demands a critical mass of minority
judges.'42 The Court itself recognized in J. E. B. v. Alabama that exclusion
of women and people of color from juries "causes harm to the litigants, the
community, and the individual jurors" who are excluded.' 43  Similarly, the
failure to include diverse perspectives on the bench has an adverse impact on
litigants, the community, and the underrepresented groups that are excluded.
Throughout this essay, I have been asking the "woman question." How
does the judicial selection process disadvantage women or disregard their
experiences? Perhaps one way to answer that question is to ask the "man
question." How do the judicial selection process and unchallenged selection
standards advantage typically white male experiences and perspectives? In
this context it is important to note that most legal experts believe that there is
an ample number of women and people of color who are qualified to sit on
the Court.'" Of course, that depends on how one determines qualifications.
Much was made of Chief Justice John Roberts' United States Supreme Court
clerkship'45 and Justice Samuel Alito's long experience on the federal
bench,'46 in addition to both men's Ivy League education and law review
experiences. 147 But surely state court experience or other forms of service to
the profession and to the public constitutes equally valuable qualifications.
Had the qualities that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito brought to the
nomination process been the primary criteria in 1983, Justice O'Connor
would not have been nominated to the Court. 148 Her distinguished service
140. Id. at 332.
141. See Guinier, supra note 137, at 175.
142. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law That Is Inclu-
sive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE
&L. 101, 143 (2004).
143. 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).
144. See Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 935,
955-59 (1998); Coyle, supra note 130.
145. The Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter Supreme Court Biographies].
146. Id.
147. The White House, Judicial Nominations, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocous/judicialnominees/roberts.html, (last visited Mar. 24.
2007); The White House, Judicial Nominations, Justice Samuel A. Alito,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocous/judicialnominees/alito.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
148. Supreme Court Biographies, supra note 145.
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makes clear that other, less traditional backgrounds are equally valuable.
The judicial process, in fact and in appearance, is strengthened by members
with diverse talents, backgrounds, and perspectives. '49
IV. JUDGE CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY: EMBRACING RACE AND GENDER
Will women judges make a difference? In fact, they already have. Ma-
dam Justice Bertha Wilson made a difference by raising the question and by
unapologetically answering it in the affirmative.' 50 An example of true lead-
ership, her answer moved the discussion of women's inclusion in the judici-
ary forward in an unprecedented manner. Also, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's legal opinions and public addresses provide language and ideas
that legal scholars will continue to draw upon to support gender and racial
inclusion in the courts. Other women judges provide similar inspiration.
Judge Constance Baker Motley, the first African American woman selected
for the federal judiciary, is a fitting example on which to close. 5 '
In 1946, just out of Columbia Law School, Judge Motley began her le-
gal career in New York as an attorney with what is now the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and
Education Fund.'52 She was the sole female attorney among those who as-
sisted Justice Thurgood Marshall in Brown v. Board of Education.'53 She
also argued successfully in several higher education integration cases, in-
cluding the integration of the University of Mississippi and the University of
Alabama. 5 4 When President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed her to the bench
in 1966, she had appeared before the United States Supreme Court ten times
and won nine of those cases. " Her contributions to my appreciation of the
role of judges is numerous, but perhaps her most famous decision came when
she refused to excuse herself from a gender discrimination case involving an
African American woman plaintiff. 15 6 In rejecting the defendants' claim that
her general background and status as an African American female somehow
149. See, e.g., Wilson Ray Huhn, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Sandra Day
O'Connor: A Refusal to "Foreclose the Unanticipated", 39 AKRON L. REv. 373, 398 (2006).
150. See Wilson, supra note 39, at 517-22.
151. See Columbia University, C250 Celebrates Columbians Ahead of Their Time: Con-
stance Baker Motley, http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkablecolumbians/
constance motley.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
152. Id.
153. 349 U.S. 294, 296 (1955).
154. Mary L. Clark, One Man 's Token Is Another Woman's Breakthrough? The Appoint-
ment of the First Women Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REv. 487, 515 (2004).
155. See id at 515.
156. See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 2-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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prejudiced her in the matter, Judge Motley noted that she was not the only
member of the judiciary who possessed both race and gender:
It is beyond dispute that for much of my legal career I worked on
behalf of blacks who suffered race discrimination. I am a woman,
and before being elevated to the bench, was a woman lawyer.
These obvious facts, however, clearly do not, ipso facto, indicate
or even suggest [heightened] personal bias or prejudice .... In-
deed, if background or sex or race of each judge were, by defini-
tion, sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could
hear this case .... 157
To her credit, Judge Motley unapologetically embraced both her race
and her gender as well as the wisdom she had gained through her particular
struggles as a civil rights advocate. 58 In a tribute to Judge Motley before the
American Bar Association, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said of her,
I count it my great good fortune to be among the legions whose
lives Judge Motley touched. She taught me and others of my gen-
eration that law and courts could become positive forces in achiev-
ing our nation's high aspiration-as carved above the entrance to
the U.S. Supreme Court-Equal Justice under Law. 59
Judge Motley embodied our country's high aspirations in her role as lawyer
as well as in her role as a jurist, making her an example for the public at
large, practicing attorneys, and members of the judiciary. In addition to her
personification of the high ideals of the United States Supreme Court, per-
haps no one spoke more persuasively about the need for diversity in the judi-
ciary than Judge Motley:
There is a need for more women and more minorities in the federal
judiciary, but not because I think they bring something totally dif-
ferent to the bench than white men. I don't think women and mi-
norities have a particular view on contract law that's totally differ-
ent from white men. Rather, I believe that having more women
and minorities in the federal judiciary-and the federal courts are a
major part of the national government-builds confidence in the
government. It makes people feel that the government is fair, in
that it includes people from all segments of the population. It says
157. Id. at4.
158. See id.
159. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Tribute to Constance Baker Motley, 32 HuM. RTs. 26,
26(2005).
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that the courts are fair, in that women, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians,
and other minorities are included among the judges. It says that
the court system is not an all-white male institution as it once
was. 160
V. CONCLUSION
Madam Justice Wilson, and Justice O'Connor, like Judge Motley, are
notable examples of how women judges, in different ways, make a differ-
ence. They give us a greater appreciation for having women as members of
the judiciary and bring us further along the path of achieving a judiciary
which reflects the equality principles we espouse and the legitimacy to which
we aspire. The question of whether we will have the courage to follow their
leadership remains.
160. Clark, supra note 154, at 518-19.
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GOODWIN INTRODUCTION
INSPIRATION, ANTICIPATION, AND CELEBRATION:
THE 10TH ANNUAL LEO GOODWIN LECTURE SERIES
TILTING THE SCALES: THE CHANGING ROLES OF WOMEN IN
THE LA WAND LEGAL PRACTICE'
STEPHANIE FELDMAN ALEONG
OLYMPIA DUHART
linda f. harrison
INSPIRATION: WHY TALK ABOUT WOMEN AND THE LAW IN 2006?2
How does a law school choose a topic interesting enough and worthy of
commemorating ten years of excellence and the support of a wonderful
Foundation? We faced the daunting task of answering the dilemma when we
began dreaming of taking on the challenge of planning the 10th Annual Leo
Goodwin Lecture Series. With the resignation of the first female Supreme
Court Justice, Sandra Day O'Connor in the summer of 2005, 3 the death of
noted feminist Betty Friedan in February of 2006,4 and the recognition that
having three female law school professors all gathered together to take on
this type of charge probably would not have happened just twenty years ear-
lier; it would be fair to say that "women were on our minds."
1. The 10th Annual Goodwin Lecture Series was led by three co-chairs, Associate Dean
and Professor linda f. harrison, Professor Stephanie Feldman Aleong, and Professor Olympia
Duhart. We would like to extend warm gratitude and appreciation to the Leo Goodwin Foun-
dation, Dean Joseph Harbaugh, and the entire Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad
Law Center community for making this series such a success.
2. This section was written by Professor Stephanie Feldman Aleong, Assistant Professor
of Law and Director of the Masters of Science in Health Law Program at Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad Law Center. She is a graduate of Vanderbilt University School of
Law, and received her undergraduate degree from Vanderbilt University.
3. William Branigin et al., Supreme Court Justice O'Connor Resigns, WASH. POST, July
1, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/
AR2005070100653.html.
4. National Women's Hall of Fame, Women of the Hall: Betty Friedan,
http://www.greatwomen.org/women.php?action=viewone&id=62 (last visited May 24, 2007).
Ms. Friedan died at the age of 85. Id. Her writings in FEMININE MYSTIQuE had global impact
that is still felt today. Id.
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From the first woman lawyer in America, Margaret Breed, who arrived
in the colonies in 1638,' to the hundreds of women law students currently
enrolled in the law schools across the nation, women have changed the law.
Women fought to have an equal voice in governance, turning their quest into
a Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution which gave women the right to
vote in 1919.6 More than fifty years later, female attorney Sarah Wedding-
ton argued brilliantly before the Supreme Court to establish a Constitutional
right of privacy, emanating from the penumbras of our Constitution and its
litany of Amendments-documents drafted by men.7 In fact, the recognition
of sexual harassment as a form of sexual discrimination prohibited by Title
VII of the Civil Rights of Act of 1964 only took root in this country's juris-
prudence when Professor Catharine MacKinnon's writings and advocacy
cried out for the Court's recognition of this truism.8 Other marginalized sec-
tions of society, facing discrimination based on race or sexual orientation,
continue to draw their arguments for equality from the legal principles estab-
lished by the feminist legal movement.9
While women seemed to be making great strides "on paper" to achiev-
ing equality in the pages of legal doctrine, women still labor on an unequal
playing field in the legal profession. When considering how much improved
women lawyers' status was in the 1990s compared to what their position had
been in the 1980s, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein wrote, "[s]ide by side with these
improvements in the status of women in the law, pockets of resistance to
women's equality in the profession remained."'" In 2006 not only had we
seen that statement remain to be true in our own work experiences," but the
top stories of the day in the legal profession also reflected that gap. 12 Ac-
5. KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMEN LAWYER IN AMERICA:
1638 TO PRESENT 3 (1986).
6. The First Century, Women Who Led the Way,
http://www.umsl.edu/services/library/womenstudies/Istcent.htm (last visited May 24, 2007)
(detailing contributions of female attorneys and other suffragettes in Missouri in their efforts
to get access to the right to vote and social equality).
7. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
8. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
9. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 1-15 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing "the five opening moves" of feminist legal theory and how that theory has given
rise to critical race theory and the gay rights' movement).
10. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW ix (2d ed. 1993).
11. Professor Aleong was a prosecutor before becoming a professor; Professor Duhart
was a reporter for The Miami Herald, a high school teacher, and an associate at a large law
firm before becoming a professor; and Professor harrison was also a prosecutor before becom-
ing an academic.
12. A reporter for the ABA Journal examined the alarming trend of how women of color
are fleeing large law firms because they are being overlooked and undervalued, Jill Schachner
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knowledging and tackling the plain truth that entering the legal profession
poses different constraints, dilemmas, and inequality, three female attorneys
set out to advise new women lawyers on how to survive in the male-
dominated profession. 3 Certainly, we felt the topic of how women had
changed the legal profession and how the profession continued to change the
roles of women attorneys still was fertile ground to explore. So, we turned
our attention to focus on the challenge and pleasure of deciding which schol-
ars to invite to the law center to discuss the impact women have had on the
law and legal profession and to outline what challenges lay ahead.
ANTICIPATION: BRINGING THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 14
They were our wish list.
In compiling a list of speakers to represent our Goodwin theme-Tilting
the Scales: The Changing Roles of Women in the Law and Legal Practice-
our goal was quite simple. Bring the best and the brightest.
In essence, we needed to bring women to the law center who could ar-
ticulate the expansive view of women and the law we envisioned. We
wanted to highlight the wide-sweeping relationship between women and the
law. The speakers we selected needed to be the best in their respective fields
to address women's impact on law, the influence of women on the judicial
process, and the persistently disparate treatment of women by the law. We
also wanted to take a fresh look at some of the contemporary legal issues
facing women in the courtroom and beyond.
Hard work, we knew. Fortunately, our speakers made it all look easy.
When discussing the development of sexual harassment law in the United
States, the natural starting point is, of course, Catharine MacKinnon.15 The
noted feminist and legal scholar has dedicated her life's work to using the
lives of women to "cast a bright critical light on laws constructed by men."' 6
Chanen, Early Exits, ABA JOURNAL, Aug. 2006, at 33; the president of the NALP Foundation
for Research and Education discussed the continuing occupational barriers and gender segre-
gation women continued to face in the new millennium, Paula A. Patton, Women Lawyers,
Their Status, Influence and Retention in the Legal Profession, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 173 (2005).
13. See generally LISA G. SHERMAN ET. AL, SISTERS-IN-LAW: AN UNCENSORED GUIDE FOR
WOMEN PRACTICING LAW IN THE REAL WORLD (2004).
14. This section was written by Professor Olympia Duhart, Assistant Professor of Law,
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. Professor Duhart received her
J.D. from Nova Southeastern University and her B.A. from the University of Miami.
15. Professor MacKinnon is an Elizabeth A. Long Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan and a long-term visitor at the University of Chicago.
16. CATHARINE MAcKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 1 (2005).
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Professor MacKinnon's pioneering analysis of sexual harassment as sex dis-
crimination was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 198617 and
has spread worldwide. Her work has transformed the working woman's
world and set the stage for a global approach to anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. She has succeeded in pushing sex equality issues to the forefront of
dialogues on topics ranging from hate propaganda to pornography. She has
also, in several meaningful ways, transformed her theories into real-life re-
sults for the women around her.' s Professor MacKinnon also co-founded
The Law Project of Equality Now, an international non-governmental or-
ganization to promote women's equality under international law. She
launched our symposium with an informative, if somewhat sobering, exami-
nation of the current state of sexual harassment law. Professor MacKinnon
traced how courts have secured and undermined civil rights in this area. 19
Our next visitor was Anita Hill, the activist and writer who commanded
the public eye in 1991 during the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court
nominee Clarence Thomas. The Hill-Thomas hearing, by all accounts a wa-
tershed in American politics, gave a human face to the sexual harassment
that continues to pervade American culture. More importantly, the Hill-
Thomas hearing signaled the convergence of gender, race, and politics in a
national forum. It also provided a pivotal impetus for the countless women
who had struggled silently through sexual harassment; emboldened by the
steady witness with unyielding resolve, other women emerged in an effort to
confront sexual harassment head on.2"
A Yale Law School graduate born on a small farm in Oklahoma, Pro-
fessor Hill has focused her career on civil rights, academics, and social pol-
icy. Her commentary has appeared in several major newspapers and maga-
zines. She is also the author of Speaking Truth to Power,21 a biographical
work. Currently on the faculty at the Heller Graduate School at Brandeis
University, Professor Hill addressed the influence women have on the judici-
17. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986).
18. Representing Bosnian women survivors of Serbian genocidal sexual atrocities, she
won with co-counsel a damage award of $745 million in August 2000 in Kadic v. Karadzic,
which first recognized rape as an act of genocide. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1996).
19. See infra pp. 225-36.
20. On the heels of her testimony, Professor Hill began receiving scores of letters a day
from supporters, and some from critics. ANITA HILL, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 4-5 (1997).
"Many had experienced sexual harassment firsthand. Many more related to sexual harassment
as a violation of basic human dignity. Some decried the way that politics had pervaded the
judicial appointment process." Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 1.
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ary. 22 Her visit to the law school was almost fifteen years to the day that she
first garnered the national spotlight when she bravely shared her story with
the world.
While Professor Hill addressed the value of women's impact on the ju-
diciary, our third speaker, Judge Deanell Reece Tacha, literally brought the
message to life. Appointed by President Ronald Reagan to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1985, Judge Tacha became Chief
Judge of the Tenth Circuit on January 1, 2001.23 This native of Scandia,
Kansas has had a remarkable career in both higher education and the federal
judiciary.2 4
Judge Tacha's resume reveals her accomplishments, but belies the diffi-
cult balancing act that often marked her journey as a married woman with
children25 on such an amazing trajectory. Among some of Judge Tacha's
accomplishments: White House fellow, associate law school dean, Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs, member of the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, and national Trustee of the American Inns of Court Foundation. 26 With
ease and amazing candor, Judge Tacha shared with the students her personal
road from Kansas to the Federal Bench.27 Significantly, she also shared the
optimism that continues to fuel this affable Midwesterner who demonstrates
that with dedication and drive you can, it seems, have it all.
Finally, we brought the struggle for women's rights full circle with our
last guest, Nadine Strossen.28 Professor Strossen has served as president of
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) since 1991.29 She is the first
woman to head the nation's largest and oldest civil liberties organization."0
Twice named as one of "The 100 Most Influential Lawyers in Amer-
ica," Professor Strossen is a prolific writer and lecturer a.3  Her work in the
areas of constitutional law, civil liberties and international human rights is
22. See infra pp. 237-57.
23. Judge Deanell Reece Tacha, Biography, http://www.ku.edu/about/tacha.shtmi (last
visited May 24, 2007).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Judge Tacha is only one of three women who serve as Chief Judge for a federal cir-
cuit. See News Release: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Funding and Electroni-
cAccess Top Judicial Conference Agenda (Mar. 16, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/judconf031604.pdf.
28. Professor Strossen is Professor of Law at New York Law School.
29. American Civil Liberties Union: Nadine Strossen, President of the ACLU (Feb. 11,
2002), http://www.aclu.org/about/staff/I13278res20020211.html.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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unparalleled. 32  As president of the ACLU, Professor Strossen has made
more than 200 public presentations per year.33 She carved out time to join us
to share her examination of current legal obstacles for women. In the post-
9/11 climate, the threat to civil liberties presents special concerns for women.
Professor Strossen shared powerful cautionary tales with us that highlighted
the need to refocus attention on the limitations that continue to characterize
women and the law. Her presence-and the presence of similar trailblazers
Tacha, Hill and MacKinnon-also reminded us of the boundless potential
presented by women in the law.
For the 2006 Goodwin Symposium, our goal was simple; bring the best
and the brightest. We got our wish list.
CELEBRATION: FOUR PHENOMENAL WOMEN, FOUR PHENOMENAL
EVENINGS
34
Having secured four of the most important women in the American le-
gal community to be scholars-in-residence at Nova Southeastern University
to help us commemorate the 10th Annual Leo Goodwin Lecture Series elated
us beyond belief. From the beginning, this series was about two things: the
series itself and recognizing the Goodwin Foundation. The 10th anniversary
of this event marked an important milestone, and we wanted to show the
Foundation how important this series is to the life of the law school.35
Clearly these Goodwin scholars would be able to represent to the Foundation
this level of importance and our gratitude for its continued sponsorship.
We also had as our goal to set a new benchmark for the Goodwin series.
We wanted to personally respond to the challenge the Foundation offered
Nova to increase the visibility of this event. 36 The caliber of speakers we
attracted made this task an easy one to fulfill.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. This section was written by Associate Dean and Professor linda f. harrison. Dean
harrison is associate dean of the Critical Skills Program at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. She is a graduate of American University Washington College of
Law. Prof. harrison would like to thank Professors Aleong and Duhart for accepting her invi-
tation to co-chair this year's Goodwin Lecture series with her.
35. During the last decade of Goodwin Symposiums, the law center has enjoyed the
privilege of hosting such outstanding scholars as: Peter Irons; Ira Glasser; Michael Asimow;
Oscar Arias Sanchez; Louis W. Sullivan; Anthony Lewis; David Boies; Mia Amor Motley;
and Richard Pildes.
36. The Foundation's Board of Trustees wanted the Lecture Series to move beyond in-
volving just the legal community of the law school to include the larger legal community in
the tri-county area. For the first time, the Goodwin Lecture Series provided lawyers with the
opportunity to earn Continuing Legal Education credit for attendance.
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Each Goodwin scholar's appearance created much excitement and an-
ticipation among the faculty and students at the law school. Early September
brought Catharine MacKinnon. As word of her appearance spread, we were
hopeful that we would be able to break attendance records and garner the
attention of the legal community outside of the law school. We were not
disappointed. The law school was filled to capacity.37 We had the same
response for additional speakers, Anita Hill, Judge Tacha, and Nadine
Strossen. Professor MacKinnon's focus on the changing standards of Title
VII litigation set an appropriate tone for our series.3 8 Professor Hill illumi-
nated the real impact women have on the judiciary by their inclusion on the
bench in more than token numbers.39 Judge Tacha demonstrated Professor
Hill's premise in her insightful comments about how her presence has made
a difference in specific ways. She also openly discussed the choices women
in the law make vis-A-vis family obligations and how those choices impacted
and guided her journey.40 Lastly, Professor Strossen reminded us that the
scales of change sometimes tilt against women as well as in their favor.4'
Nonetheless, after each public lecture, the law school was filled with pro-
vocative conversation fueled by each scholar's remarks. This conversation
carried into classrooms and faculty discussions. Each speaker taught in the
Goodwin Seminar and participated in a faculty colloquium as part of their
residence. The students enrolled in the Goodwin seminar openly engaged in
these topics and were thrilled to have such guest lecturers of note.42
Did we reach our goals? We think we did. At each presentation, every
facet of the community was represented-the law school, the university, and
the community at large. Beyond reaching lawyers and law students, these
four phenomenal women attracted members of the community from all walks
of life, some of whom had never before set foot in a law school.
Building on the fantastic legacy of the nine years that preceded us, we
think we have set a new benchmark for the Goodwin Lecture Series. On
behalf of all our colleagues at Nova Southeastern University, we express
sincere gratitude to our scholars-in-residence, the law school administration,
faculty and staff, our law students, and the members of the community who
37. For her presentation as well as for the others', we had several overflow video-feed
rooms for the crowd.
38. See infra pp. 225-36.
39. See infra pp. 237-57.
40. See infra pp. 259-78.
41. See infra pp. 279-314.
42. Two of the student-authored scholarly papers produced as a result of this seminar are
published in this journal. See infra pp. 339-53, 355-74.
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DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
CATHARINE A. MACKNNON °
The large arc of sexual harassment law, from thirty-years' distance, has
been as much influenced by political events, and media coverage of those
events, as by litigation and legislation. Particularly influential in crystalliz-
ing, shaping, and advancing legal developments in this area were the Hill-
Thomas hearings in 1991 and the Clinton-Jones affair of the late 1990s.
Both situations revolved around a crucial dynamic that sexual harassment
law substantially strengthened: men with power-varying amounts but
nonetheless substantial-being challenged for sexual mistreatment by
women with less power, often far less. On my reading, the repercussions of
those two events profoundly affected the trajectory of sexual harassment law
in the United States.
My concern-you will decide if you agree-is that what Professor
Hill's challenge did for the sexual harassment claim, the national and inter-
national consciousness that developed in the wake of those hearings,' is be-
ing partly reversed, surely undermined, by the Clinton and Jones events and
their unrolling aftermath and undertow. Those who took courage from Pro-
fessor Hill's example to challenge sexual power were discouraged by the
treatment of Paula Jones and her claim. Those who experienced sexual har-
assment at least as serious as what Professor Hill said was done to her, espe-
cially women who identified with her and her experience-both her credibil-
ity in articulating the injury and its harm and the dignity and presence she
brought to the process-even if they couldn't meet her standard, thought if
she could go through that and survive it, they could too. Women wanted to
be with her, on her side of the line. She inspired survivors with self-respect
© 2007 Catharine A. MacKinnon.
* Elizabeth A. Long, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Until
giving the Goodwin Lecture, of which this is an edited transcript, I thought the notion of
Southern hospitality was another overdone regional myth, Dean linda f. harrison and Profes-
sor Olympia Duhart gave my visit to Nova special warmth and substance, as did Dean Joseph
Harbaugh, with his efficient and generous arrangements and beautiful Florida flowers, and the
faculty and students as a whole, with their welcoming reception and intelligent engagement.
The volume edited by Reva B. Siegel and me, DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
(2004), celebrating the original publication of C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979), was very helpful in preparing for this lecture, as was research by
Maureen Pettibone.
1. See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., pt. 4,
36-41 (1991).
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to complain in public about their own abuse. Thousands did; the claims at
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and locally sky-
rocketed.2 This happened even though Professor Hill did not say she was
sexually harassed, the hearings were not a lawsuit, and Justice Clarence
Thomas might be said to have won because he was placed on the Supreme
Court by the Senate. By contrast, Paula Jones' claims against President Bill
Clinton were an actual lawsuit for behavior that was termed sexual harass-
ment.3 Many women saw that what was done to them at work was nowhere
near as serious as what Paula Jones claimed Bill Clinton did to her. Al-
though Clinton was eventually impeached, Paula Jones lost in that the courts
told her the facts of her situation were legally insufficient to state a claim for
hostile environment sexual harassment.
Will those who took heart from Professor Hill's challenge be disheart-
ened by how the legal system and the media treated Paula Jones and give up
before they even start fighting back? Has Clinton v. Jones made victims
think they will not be treated as credible, will not be taken seriously, will not
get relief? It would be small wonder if they did.4 At the very least, the is-
sues framed by this concern, with others no less important but less noticed
because they were not squarely invoked in these watershed experiences, have
contributed to the social and legal image of what real sexual harassment
looks like. This image has precursors and consequences.
Neither of these events would have produced the political firestorm they
did, far less had the long-term impact they had, if sexual harassment had not
previously been recognized as a legal claim. In 1976, Paulette Barnes, an
African-American woman, first successfully claimed in an appellate court
that being sexually harassed at work was a practice of sex-based discrimina-
tion.5 Mechelle Vinson, also an African-American woman, who said that
she had been raped for two-and-a-half years by her supervisor, 6 had her ex-
perience recognized as stating a claim for a sexual harassment hostile envi-
ronment in violation of her rights as a woman to sex equality in the work-
place by the U.S. Supreme Court a decade later.7 Without them, the term
sexual harassment would likely not have existed; it would have had no legal
2. See EEOC, Harassment Charges, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harassment.
html (last visited June 14, 2007).
3. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
4. On why most sexual harassment is not reported, see Louise Fitzgerald et al., Why
Didn't She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women's Re-
sponses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 117, 119-21 (1995).
5. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
6. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
7. Id.
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clout, even in the background. Recognition of unwelcome sexual pressure
because one is a woman or a man, often a woman or a man of particular race
or ethnicity or sexual orientation salient to the abuse, puts the treatment in a
collective context, with ground, human rights resonance, and links to other
forms of unequal treatment. Had sexual harassment not been framed as a
form of sex-based discrimination-that is, as a violation of equality rights,
situated on that more potent social, political, and legal level-neither event
would have resonated politically and socially in the ways they did. Had
these women and others not sued and won, it is doubtful that the Hill-
Thomas hearings or the Clinton-Jones episode would have developed as they
did, if indeed they had surfaced in public at all.
Equally evident, the idea of sexual harassment as sex discrimination did
not exist until woman lawyers existed. As this legal claim continues to fight
for its life as a sex equality claim rather than being made piecemeal into a
tort or a crime, it is worth noting that both of these other approaches date
from a time when not only were there no women lawyers; women were not
even allowed to vote. Both tort and criminal approaches still tend not to be
adapted to the realities of women's group inequality to men, yet continue to
be attempted to be used to drag sexual harassment law back to a time before
women had a voice in the legal system. Putting sexual harassment on legal
equality ground-calling it in law what it is in life--continues to be impor-
tant for principled and practical reasons alike. In reality, people are sexually
harassed because they are women or men. Proof of their claims is facilitated
by legal recognition of this fact at the point at which principle and practical-
ity converge. Many of the developments in sexual harassment law's direc-
tion that are least favorable to plaintiffs are accordingly throwbacks or at-
tempts to reroute the law backwards to a time when legal equality claims did
not exist.
Both Hill-Thomas and Clinton-Jones centrally alleged hostile environ-
ments. The core of the account was that, due to unwanted sexual pressure or
attention (Clinton-Jones also alleged physical contact), life at work was un-
equal; it was hostile and unbearable. What distinguishes the hostile envi-
ronment cases is that no particular index of the job is disturbed: You still
have the job, have not lost a promotion, have not been fired. Both settings
were taken to pose the question of whether the alleged behavior was suffi-
ciently serious to be illegal under existing legal standards for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment. In this context, although Professor Hill did not
sue, it is worth asking whether what she said Justice Clarence Thomas did to
her was legally actionable. Did her allegations that she was pressured for
dates, subjected to intrusive sexual discussions by her superior at work that
included particularly humiliating graphic descriptions of pornography, state a
hostile environment claim? At the time, her decision not to sue was well
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taken. The hostile environment claim had barely been recognized-it was
new, fragile, and untested.8 After her testimony and for a considerable pe-
riod of time, however, and recognizing divergences between circuits and
judges, in my view she would have had a colorable claim that her harassment
was sufficiently sex-based and abusive to be actionable. I think her testimony
had something to do with this change. During that period, a hostile environ-
ment did not have to be the years of rape that Mechelle Vinson was subjected
to, for example.
Since the late 1990s, however, the abusiveness that hostile workplace
environment cases are required to allege to survive summary judgment has
observably become more extreme, generally speaking. In my view, whether
cited or not (usually not), the Clinton-Jones affair has strongly contributed to
this reversal of direction, although it had started before that ruling. Not only
was then Governor Clinton said to say sexual things to Paula Jones and to
have asked for a sexual interaction with her; he was also described as locking
the door, engaging in indecent exposure, touching her thigh and neck, asking
her to kiss his penis, and when she refused ("I'm not that kind of girl."), sug-
gesting she better keep this to herself. That single incident, as it has been
termed, was found insufficiently severe to constitute a hostile working envi-
ronment. One wonders, if he did each of these things on separate days,
would that have been several incidents, hence potentially sufficient? Given
that there is no severity meter out there to provide an objective standard of
gravity, and no fixed number of incidents or density requirement to say how
much or how often makes for pervasiveness, I think that that result, given the
high visibility and strong salience of the case, has strongly contributed to the
desensitized climate within which hostile environment cases are evaluated.
Thankfully, Clinton v. Jones9 did not make what I call "the and mis-
take," common now in several circuits that requires sexual harassment be
both severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile working environment.'0
The United States Supreme Court, by contrast, has only required that it be
either severe or pervasive."' The change from the disjunct to the conjunct
substantially elevates the threshold and virtually precludes a single incident,
8. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections on the Develop-
ment of Sexual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813, 830 (2002) (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) as "the closest controlling case in the D.C. Circuit").
9. 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
10. See, e.g., Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 833 (10th Cir. 2005); Hockman v.
Westward Commc'n, 407 F.3d 317, 326 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Shepherd v. Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999)); Singleton v. Dep't of Corr. Educ., 115
Fed. App'x 119, 122 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (emphasis added).
11. Harrisv. ForkliftSys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
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regardless of severity, from being enough, even as the Supreme Court clearly
permits a disjunctive standard. For examples of this problem: "the conduct
[complained of], though boorish and offensive, is more comparable to the
kind of rude behavior, teasing, and offhand comments that we have held are
not sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute actionable sexual harass-
ment.""2 At the same time, much judicial language has hastened to distin-
guish the "boorish" and "offensive" behavior in Clinton from abusive lan-
guage and gender-related jokes that are considered actionable.' 3 More and
more, courts seem to be asking whether behavior is bad enough by moral
standards, or some meter in judges' heads, requiring that harassment be
worse and more frequent, rather than measuring the behavior by equality
standards, asking whether the treatment is unequal on the basis of sex.
During the same period, the question of point of view entered the juris-
prudence. We were told by the Supreme Court that the treatment alleged, to
be a sexually harassing hostile environment, had to disturb the working place
for the reasonable person. 4 Why victims suddenly had to be reasonable was
not explained. Not to say that they should be able to be unreasonable, but
whether the victim is reasonable is the wrong question-whether their treat-
ment is unequal is the question. Usually, it is perpetrators who have to be
reasonable. After the reasonable victim requirement was invented, putting
the victim on trial, much litigation followed concerning whose standards for
reasonableness would control. Eventually, after several cases in the circuits
explicitly turning on the issue, 5 the Court appears to have more or less re-
solved it in dictum.' 6 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,' in
which a man accused several men of sexual aggression against him on an oil
rig, the Supreme Court simply said that the perspective of a reasonable vic-
tim in the position of this particular victim was the perspective from which
reasonableness would be assessed.' 8 This injected particularity of perspec-
tive into the assessment, bringing the inequality context into the cases.
My sense is that more and more aggression in working places is being
found insufficiently severe to be actionable. Just to give you a flavor of a
few of these: supervisor stroking a plaintiffs leg on one occasion, grabbing
her buttocks on a separate occasion, telling her he found her attractive, twice
12. Singleton, 115 Fed. App'x at 122 (emphasis added).
13. See id at 122-23.
14. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 20.
15. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
16. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
17. Id. at 75.
18. Id. at 81.
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asking her out on dates-not actionable;' 9 calling a subordinate a "dumb
blonde," placing "I love you signs" in the work area, asking her for dates,
putting his hand on her shoulder and attempting to kiss her-not action-
able;2" making inappropriate sexual remarks, kissing the plaintiff repeatedly,
touching the plaintiff and chasing her around a forest reserve-not action-
able;2 employee attempting to kiss plaintiff, making lewd remarks about her
appearance, following her around the office, giving unsolicited neck rubs,
hand holding-insufficiently severe or pervasive; 22 supervisor asking plain-
tiff about her interest in a romantic relationship, for a kiss, staring at her, and
following her around-not actionable; 23 supervisor touching plaintiffs
breast and hair, kicking her in the buttocks, and making lewd remarks di-
rected specifically at her-not actionable. 24 The general drift in these cases
actually decided after Hill and Thomas and before Clinton and Jones-cases
that, I think, would likely have been actionable in the late '80s-also shows
how mistaken the assertion is that sexual acts at work are readily found ille-
gal just by virtue of being sexual. After a while, lawyers just won't file these
cases. And if your ultimate superior at work can then walk into your office
any day and take out his penis and jump you, and that is not seen as severe, a
lot of sexual aggression is acceptable at work.
The quid pro quo claim has been affected as well. In addition to a hos-
tile environment, Paula Jones alleged a quid pro quo-an exchange of sex for
something at the job, this for that, where the 'this' is the sex and the 'that' is
the workplace benefit. 25 Although it was not well-argued, in my opinion,
Paula Jones' quid pro quo claim was that, had she accepted the sexual condi-
tions that then Governor Bill Clinton imposed on her in that so-called single
incident, she would have received favorable job consideration. She would
not have been transferred to a position with no window, doing boring work
that led nowhere, or no work at all, as she was after the incident. Support for
her theory could have been found in Gennifer Flowers' deposition, who said
she had a sexual affair with Bill Clinton and her job was enhanced. The rec-
ognition of this kind of sexual harassment claim, the tacit quid pro quo, has
gone nowhere since that case.
19. Koelsch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1995).
20. Weiss v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333,337 (7th Cir. 1993).
21. Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993).
22. Stoeckel v. Envtl. Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1106, 1114 (D.D.C. 1995).
23. Ballou v Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 871 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (D. Kan. 1994).
24. Gearhart v. Eye Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 814, 825 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
25. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 664, 666 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
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Indeed it eroded further since the ruling in Kim Ellerth's case in 1998.26
Kim Ellerth was told by her superior, in the course of various intrusive sex-
ual advances, verbal and physical, that "I [can] make ... life ... hard or...
easy [for you] at Burlington. 2 7 She rejected him sexually and he made
things hard for her at Burlington.28 Again, the claim was not well-argued.
The Supreme Court saw this situation not as a quid pro quo, but as a threat of
a quid pro quo. 29 Unlamented by most commentators, Ellerth wrote submis-
sion cases out of the canon and eliminated what, at least since 1980s EEOC
Guidelines,3" has been a quid pro quo in itself. Saying if you deliver sexu-
ally, I will make life good for you at work, proposes a quid pro quo, i.e. it is
a quid pro quo incident. Because the Supreme Court majority saw it as a
threat that was not carried through on, not a threat that is harm in itself (even
though it actually was, in addition, carried through upon) this kind of inci-
dent became either sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile
environment, or nothing. As a single incident, by Clinton-Jones standards,
do you think it would be sufficiently severe? Again, the workplace was not
measured by equality standards.
Ellerth was centrally litigated as an employer liability case. Once the
fighting stopped in the mid-eighties over whether sexual harassment would
be actionable as sex-based discrimination, and it was accepted that sexual
harassment is an equality claim, the conflict shifted to whether, and by what
standard, anybody was going to be held responsible for it. With discrimina-
tion law generally, say hiring, if you are not hired for a discriminatory rea-
son, the company, not the person who does the hiring, is liable. Sexual har-
assment was initially treated that way too-like discrimination. Then liabil-
ity for it started being called "vicarious liability," referring to something
someone else did for which the employer was then arguably liable. Most
discrimination does not occur on a majority vote of the Board of Directors,
so virtually all discrimination, under a legal structure that does not yet permit
individuals to be sued for discrimination, is for acts that someone in the
company does, as the company. But it was with sexual harassment that this
was considered "vicarious," rather than just liability, resulting in a whole
separate set of employer liability standards only for harassment cases. In-
26. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
27. Id. at 748.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 751,772.
30. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2006). "Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition
of an individual's employment .. " Id.
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stead of employer liability flowing directly from a finding of sexual harass-
ment, as occurs with every other kind of discrimination, the upshot is that a
person can be sexually harassed as a matter of law and no one will be held
liable for it: back to sexual harassment as personal, as private, as individual.
In Faragher,3 1 the companion employer liability case to Ellerth, the
Court did not explicitly distinguish between hostile environment and quid
pro quo for employer liability purposes,32 as some earlier cases in lower
courts and EEOC approaches did that had made employer liability automatic
for quid pro quo and contingent for hostile environment. Instead, they dis-
tinguished between situations in which what they called a tangible job detri-
ment occurred and when it did not. With sexual harassment where the target
is not hired, is fired, is demoted, is paid less, is not promoted and so on, em-
ployer liability is assumed. Where there is no such tangible job loss, there
are further hurdles for the plaintiff before the employer will be held liable,
including an affirmative defense if the employee bringing the claim unrea-
sonably failed to use available avenues of complaint. This Faragher/Ellerth
approach builds on one view of the agency relation; that is, it comes from
tort law. It supposes that, with hostile environment sexual harassment, it is
not known if the employer is involved so a form of notice is built in. But it
draws the identical line that distinguishes quid pro quo from hostile envi-
ronment, just in different words, since the tangible job detriment is what dis-
tinguishes the quid pro quo from the hostile environment, least until con-
structive discharge occurs. Then the Suders33 case treated constructive dis-
charge as not a tangible employment action, even though the job is very tan-
gibly lost.3 4 The real issue is what employers are going to be considered to
have actually done, hence be held responsible for. In this process, quid pro
quo is made to be the real sexual harassment, for which employers are liable,
and hostile environment without more, to be something less, even if workers
lose their jobs because of it. With hostile environment, it is as if the Court
sees the effect as not on work but just on her, when equality law is interested
not only in the job but in equality for people in and at work.
Most of the cases that have received focused public attention have in-
volved heterosexual harassment, producing little judicial theorizing of the
connection between sexuality and gender in the "based on sex" dimension of
these cases. They have largely contented themselves with asking, if it is sex-
ual, what other than sex could it be based on? If this man is doing something
sexual to this woman, if it has nothing to do with the fact that she is a woman
31. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
32. See id. at 788-92.
33. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
34. See id.
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that is up to him to prove. Enter the presumption of heterosexuality, here to
the benefit of the conclusion that sexual harassment is based on sex, which in
fact is almost always is, even if it is not always heterosexual. Cases of har-
assment based on gender that is not sexual have rarely produced problems
being recognized as actionable for that reason, although it has happened.
Nonsexual gender-based harassment has been covered by the courts under
Title VI1 5 almost since its inception, although some courts are under the
misimpression that if treatment of an employee is not sexual in the way it
was in Thomas-Hill or Clinton-Jones, it is not covered, just as they some-
times do not recognize the severity of harassment when it is sexual. Usually
the source of the problem is the lack of application of equality standards, not
a more serious approach to gender-based treatment that is sexual than to
gender-based treatment that is not sexual.
But the under-theorization of the sexuality-gender connection does pro-
duce difficulties in same-sex cases, where courts flail around trying to figure
out how abusive treatment can be sex-based when it is not heterosexual.
Where so-called bisexual harassment is alleged, equal opportunity sexual
harassment imagined to be a defense to harassment being sex-based, courts
have seen through the ruse. The man who calls himself "just a handsy
guy"-saying he puts his hands all over everyone without regard to sex-is
usually seen through handily. In few cases is the treatment actually equal. It
is also usually based on the sex of the parties. In Oncale, the Supreme Court
did understand that men attacking another man could be based on sex. Foot-
ball player fanny-patting had to be protected at all costs from the perception
that anything sexual is involved, however. Lower courts still tend to
wrongly assimilate men-on-men claims to gay claims, whether or not those
subject to the advances are gay, finding them not actionable, although some
such claims have been allowed.36 Many courts want to make such harass-
ment sexual orientation harassment, rather than sex-based harassment, as if
sexual orientation is not sex-based. If sexual orientation is not based on sex,
what is it based on? Same-sex orientation is an orientation toward people of
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (2000).
36. Compare Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002), and Cen-
tola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002), with Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center,
453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006), and Martin v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d
434 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). Under California state law, see Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 116 (Ct. App. 1993).
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the same sex: it is based on sex. Perhaps this is too simple for courts to get
their minds around, although, again, a few have.37
Similarly, race-and-sex combined claims, although recognized, are of-
ten not treated appropriately. Many people are sexually harassed based on a
combination of their race/ethnicity and sex. A lot of the most common epi-
thets directed against women of color in particular are inseparably both race
and sex-based. Many courts still disaggregate them, even though there are
solid precedents in some circuits against that.38 This problem reminds me of
the approach to understanding the nature of life that begins with killing the
frog: To see if there is inequality inside, cut it apart, dissect it, put the race
here, the sex there. The method of answering the question eliminates the very
thing it's asking about., then wonders why it doesn't find it. Plaintiffs often
lose on both grounds because the inequality to which they were subjected
inheres in the symbiotic inseparability of the two, something that does not
appear, does not even exist, when they are separated.
In neither Clinton-Jones nor Hill-Thomas was it directly said that these
men had a free speech right to say what they allegedly said. That did not
pass the "straight face test." Here, the equality frame on the issue, as op-
posed to the First Amendment frame, has held up reasonably well. Pornogra-
phy at work has, amazingly, been encompassed in sexual harassment prohi-
bitions,39 although the hostile environment standards mean that the pornog-
raphy has had to be increasingly violent to get their attention. But the fact
that pornography at work is seen as actionable inequality rather than pro-
tected speech is a major miracle, given that there are two First Amendments,
one for adult pornography, which is protected almost entirely, and another
for any other kind of speech that does harm, which is not axiomatically pro-
tected. What this has meant is that the only place in law that pornography is
effectively able to be addressed is sexual harassment law, in the limited
equality settings of work and school where it applies.
There have been a lot of increasingly close calls on this issue. The clos-
est call yet is the case of Aamani Lyle.4" A writer on Friends, Ms. Lyle is an
African American woman who was hired to take notes at writers' meetings.
37. See, e.g., Rene, 305 F.3d at 1063-64; Centola, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (D. Mass.
2002) ("[T]he line between discrimination because of sexual orientation and discrimination
because of sex is hardly clear.").
38. See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994); Jefferies v. Harris
County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
39. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
40. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2006). For prior excel-
lent analysis, see Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999).
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According to Warner Brothers' defense, the men who wrote Friends had to
express sexual fantasies about the actresses by name, engage in simulated
masturbation by gyrating in their chairs to get their creative juices flowing so
they could think and write their episode. Warner Brothers termed theirs a
"creative workplace," giving rise to an absolute First Amendment defense to
this and all the other sexual language and abusive interaction to which Ms.
Lyle was subjected. The Supreme Court of California held that the fact that
this is a creative workplace had to be taken into account as part of the "total-
ity of the circumstances" in which the sexual harassment claim is assessed
under California law.4 Granted, the kind of workplace it is, is part of the
totality of the circumstances, but whether that should permit it to be unequal
is the question. The full-on First Amendment defense registered in a strong
dissent. We have not heard the last of this defense, I suspect, under which
there would be no equality standards for sexual treatment in "creative" work-
places.
So, in the last thirty years, the experience of sexual harassment has been
named. Injuries have been given the status of a civil rights violation, raising
the human status of its survivors. A lot of people who are subjected to un-
wanted sexual advances and propositions under unequal conditions feel able
to express them more openly and are given some more public respect. A lot
of women feel more valid and powerful when they turn down sex that they
don't want in unequal settings. Where sex discrimination law applies-and
there are many places it does not apply-there is often someone to go to, to
complain. The law may respond, whether the person refuses a sexual bar-
gain and resists the sexualized environment or complies with sexual demands
they cannot avoid. But nothing in sexual harassment law's direction is ad-
dressing the facts that sexual harassment is still not actionable in a lot of
places where it happens; that resistance to it is not safe and is far from cost-
less; that women subjected to it are often not believed; and that perpetrators
often protect one another. Institutions are often reluctant to take responsibil-
ity and are often absolved of liability-particularly when they can say that
they were oblivious to what was going on, which is astonishing. See no evil,
hear no evil, incur no liability. This encourages not knowing what is happen-
ing in one's own shop. Victims seldom receive the support they deserve.
Even if complaining about sexual harassment can be more self-respecting
than suffering with it in silence, complaining can be more injurious than try-
ing to ignore it, which is what most women do.
There is a lot of hope as sexual harassment law has gone international.
General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW Committee in 1992 recognized
41. Lyle, 132 P.3d at 228-29.
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sexual harassment at work as gender specific violence under the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, with
hostile work environment and retaliation claims.42 Many parts of the world
are developing their own sexual harassment jurisprudence based on indige-
nous experience drawing on international developments, for example, the
Supreme Court of India in the Vishaka43 and Chopra" cases. In Japan,
where sexual harassment began as a tort, it is now understood as sex-based.45
In France, where it was originally a crime of quid pro quo only, the idea has
morphed into harclement morale, a prohibition on anyone harassing anyone
on any ground. 46 Israel has passed and applied a detailed civil code provi-
sion against sexual harassment.47
But the biggest move in the history of this claim was taking the injury
from the private to the public, from the personal to the legal, from just life to
civil rights violation. That change, women lawyers both participated in and
benefit from. For many individuals, women and many men, and for many
dimensions of politics as a whole, that change has made all the difference in
the world.
42. See generally Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Violence Against Women, General Recommendation 19, U.N. Doc. A/47/38
(1992).
43. See generally Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 S.C.C. 24 (India).
44. Apparel Export Promotion Council v. Chopra, (1999) 1 LRI 13 (India).
45. For tracing of this history, see Yukiko Tsunoda, Sexual Harassment in Japan, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 618 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel
eds., 2004).
46. Code Pnal [C. Pdn.] art. 222-33-2 (Fr.) is the original provision. "Serious pressure"
was added in 1997. Id. The provision was further modified to apply to coworkers as well as
hierarchical superiors in 2002. Harcrlement morale was added at C. Trav., Art. L. 122-29
(Fr.).
47. Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 5758-1958 (1998) (Isr.).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, when I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in the
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, there were two women in the
United States Senate.' Nationwide, as of 1997, 19% of seated federal judges
were women. 2 Though the laws protecting against sexual harassment had
been in place since the 1970s,3 a woman's chance of winning a sexual har-
assment lawsuit was a longshot. The United States Supreme Court had heard
only one such case.4 In the United States, women earned about seventy cents
for each dollar a man earned.'
On October 15, 1991, Judge Thomas was confirmed as a justice to the
nation's highest court. 6 Momentum from the hearings indicated that the is-
sues I raised during the hearing were only of passing interest. 7 Observers
were equally certain that no woman would come forward with a sexual har-
* Professor of Law, Social Policy, and Women's Studies, Brandeis University, Heller
School of Policy and Management.
1. U.S. Senate, Art & History-Historical Minutes, "Year of the Woman" (Jan. 3, 1993),
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/year-of the woman.htm.
2. ABA, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN AND THE LAW 1 (1998),
http://www.abanet.org/media/factbooks/womenlaw.pdf.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1965).
4. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
5. Women's Earnings as a Percentage of Men's, 1951-2005, Infoplease.com,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A093820.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
6. Senate Confirms Thomas, 52-48, Ending Week of Bitter Battle: 'Time for Healing,'
Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at Al.
7. Julia Lawlor, Thomas Battle Leaves Doubts in Workplace, USA TODAY, Oct. 16,
1991, at B1.
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assment complaint after viewing the Senate's treatment of the issue.8 In
sum, analysts projected that my appearance before the Senate would have a
chilling effect on women's voices. 9 Fortunately, that projection was wrong.
In the weeks following my testimony, open discussions of the hearings and
the topic of sexual harassment began to reshape public opinion on a variety
of gender-related issues.' 0
Since the events of 1991, I've had the opportunity to participate as a
speaker in hundreds of public forums-some about the hearings, some about
sexual harassment, and some about general racial and gender issues. In ven-
ues all over the country, as well as in Asia, Africa, and Europe, the hearings
still resonate. Far from static, they've evolved and taken on significance as
we face new issues of gender equality. The energy the hearings unleashed
pushed the issue of sexual harassment far beyond its predicted limits and
even beyond the numbers of complaints and amounts of monetary awards. "
Today, sexual harassment is correctly viewed as an assault on women's
rights to participate in the economic mainstream as equals to men.
Beyond the harassment issue, Justice Thomas's confirmation hearings
evoked a new consciousness about gender equality in leadership. 12 We be-
gan to reexamine the role that women's rights play in shaping our society. 13
We knew that women should take a more active role in fashioning public
policy and deciding all the issues of the day, not just those that were seen as
typical gender issues.
In 2006, there were seventy-one women in the United States House of
Representatives and fourteen women in the United States Senate.' 4
Women's earnings improved to 80% of men's.' 5 Since the hearings, corpo-
rations have instituted anti-harassment policies and countless women have
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Susan Deller Ross, Sexual Harassment Law in the Aftermath of the Hill-Thomas
Hearings, in RACE, GENDER, AND POWER iN AMERICA 237-38 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Cole-
man Jordan eds., 1995).
11. Id.at237.
12. See Guy Gugliotta, Year of the Woman Becomes Reality as Record Number Win
Seats, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1992, at A30.
13. See Gwen Ifill, Female Lawmakers Wrestle with New Public Attitude on 'Women s'
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at B7; see also Geraldine A. Ferraro, Women's Issues Are
Now National Issues, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 3, 1992, at 3B.
14. MILDRED L. AMER, Women in the United States Congress: 1917-2006, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS 1 (updated Nov. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL30261 .pdf.
15. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Women Narrow Wage Gap as Men's Earnings Shrink,
DENVER POST, Dec. 4, 2006.
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sought relief using these internal procedures. 16 In 2006, 12,025 sexual har-
assment complaints were filed with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).17 Likewise, 15.4% were filed by men.'8
Monetary relief on those resolved by the EEOC without litigation totaled
$48.8 million.'9
In the courts, women and men are filing sexual harassment complaints
and winning unprecedented awards.20 The United States Supreme Court has
ruled in favor of numerous women in harassment suits and recognized that
men who are harassed are equally entitled to sue under federal law. 21 Cur-
rently, women make up over 20% of the federal judiciary figures; however,
the percentage of people of color on the federal bench is less clear. 22 These
are, in fact, better numbers, but they are not good enough.
I argue that a society committed to equal justice under the law must
demand a judiciary that embodies that belief. Professor Judith Resnik states
the issue clearly: "In the contemporary world, where democratic commit-
ments oblige equal access to power by persons of all colors whatever their
identities, the composition of a judiciary-if all-white or all-male or all-
upper class-becomes a problem of equality and legitimacy. 2 3 Equality and
legitimacy require that we increase the inclusiveness of today's judiciary.
For decades, feminist legal scholars have asked how the law fails to
take into account women's experiences.2 4 Critical race theorists have simi-
larly asked how the "received tradition in law adversely affects people of
16. See Sherman M. Fridman, Avoid Sexual Harassment Lawsuits: Sexual Harassment
Lawsuits Can Hurt Any Firm's Bottom Line, http://www.office.com/templates/
page l.asp?docid=33 (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
17. EEOC, Sexual Harassment, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/sexualharassment.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2007).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See John Vering, State Court Juries Continue Employee-Friendly Verdicts, 16 Mo.
EMP. L. LETTER 1 (Apr. 2006) (reporting a $6.8 million award in a sexual harassment com-
plaint); see also EEOC Wins Big in Chicago on Sexual Harassment Claim, 8 EMP. PRAC.
LIABILITY VERDICTS & SETrLEMENT, Jan. 1, 2007 (reporting a $2.355 million award against an
employer on behalf of three former employers).
21. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
22. See ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, CHARTING OUR PROGRESS: THE
STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION TODAY 5 (2006); see generally Federal Judicial Center,
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2007).
23. Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life
Tenure, 26 CARDOzO L. REv 579, 597 (2005).
24. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 837
(1990).
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color not as individuals but as a group. 25 Critical race theorists appropri-
ately challenge us to consider "[w]hat would the legal landscape look like
today if people of color were the decision-makers? ' 26 The relevance of the
"woman question" and the "race question" today is clear in light of the recent
appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito to the
withdrawal of Harriet Miers' name from consideration. 27 For the first time
since Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg took office in 1993, the United States
Supreme Court had only one female justice. 28 The "race question" is simi-
larly relevant. As we contemplate future judicial appointments, critical con-
sideration must be given to the question of whether, in the twenty-first cen-
tury, the judiciary will be a body that looks more like and reflects the per-
spectives of the population it serves, as well as engages in discussion about
how we can get to a more representative judiciary.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's appointment as the first woman on the
United States Supreme Court was a historical event, 29 as was her resigna-
tion. 30  Her resignation was greeted with widespread public speculation
about the gender of her replacement. 31 Within days of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's resignation, a reporter asked me if her replacement should be a
woman. My response was that the nominee's respect for gender equality was
more important than his or her gender-as though we had to choose between
having a woman and having someone committed to gender equality. My
sincere, but uninspired response barely masked my ambivalence about being
asked whether Justice O'Connor's replacement had to meet a gender litmus
test. My perception was that behind the question was the idea that the
O'Connor seat was the woman's seat-just as many had assumed that the
Thurgood Marshall years on the Court secured a seat for an African Ameri-
can. 32 Few questioned what was behind such a presumption. The idea of
25. Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 85 (1994).
26. Id. at 86.
27. See Anita F. Hill, Why Harriet Miers Mattered, MS. MAG., Winter 2006, available at
http://www.msmagazine.com/winter2006/miers.asp.
28. See Bill Mears, Reporter's Notebook: Fun with Dick and Jane-and John, CNN
WASHINGTON BUREAU, Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/26/scotus.journal/
index.html.
29. See Nat'l Women's Hall of Fame, Women of the Hall: Sandra Day O'Connor, 1995,
http://www.greatwomen.org/women.php?action=viewone&id=l 15 (last visited Apr. 14,
2007).
30. Adam Liptak, O'Connor Leap Moved Women Up the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2005, at AI.
31. See id; Hill, supra note 27.
32. Talk of a "black seat" on the court began even before Justice Marshall announced his
resignation. See Hal Riedl, Editorial, Should Supreme Court Have a Black Seat? ST. Louis
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setting aside a seat for a woman evoked memories of past special protections
for women that often resulted in measures that limited, rather than expanded,
their opportunities. For me, the question hinted that a woman would only be
chosen if she were given special consideration because the vacancy was left
by a woman. Not even the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee
seemed to challenge the assumption. " None were asking that former Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's replacement be a woman.3 4 Few suggested that
it be a woman of color. It was not hard to conclude that, except when a
woman resigned, the likely nominee would be male, and the outcome sug-
gests that it will likely be a white male.
With a total of nine seats at stake, simply setting aside Justice
O'Connor's seat as a woman's seat seemed more likely to restrict women's
interests than to advance them. Both historical experience and contemporary
theory suggest that the key to women's advancement is not setting aside a
single seat for women, but rejecting the practice of setting aside all the others
for men.
The legal profession has come a long way from the time when the only
choice for including women was to have special protections or set-asides.
We have also moved beyond an era where we believed that we had to ignore
the differences in women's and men's experiences in order to treat them eq-
uitably and offer meaningful inclusion. Despite the fact that in 2004 a ma-
jority (59%) of individuals between the ages of forty and fifty-seven (Baby
Boomers) said that the Civil Rights Movement had a "Major Influence" on
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 1990, at 3B. Shortly after he announced his resignation, Justice Mar-
shall advised that President George Bush not use race to justify "picking the wrong Negro and
saying, 'I'm picking him because he's a Negro."' Howard Fineman et al., How Far Right,
NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 19. Although Justice Marshall expressed hope that the nominee
would be "a Negro," according to reported accounts, "he did not think there should be a per-
manent black seat on the high court." Ethan Bronner, Marshall to Retire from High Court,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 1991, at 1. When President George Bush announced Judge Tho-
mas's nomination, he rejected the suggestion that Thomas's race was a factor in his decision.
John Harwood, Bush Selects Black Judge for Supreme Court Seat, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
July 2, 1991, at IA. "I don't think there should be a black seat on the court, or an ethnic seat."
Id. Yet others urged that when President Bush selected Justice Thomas for the Court, he took
race into account and reinforced the idea of a black seat. See Cynthia Tucker, Editorial, Fill-
ing Court Vacancy: Playing Race Politics, ATLANTA CONST., July 6, 1991, at A19.
33. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Democrats Adopt O'Connor as Model for Bush Court
Pick, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at Al; David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Democrats Are Shifting
Focus from Roberts to Other Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A16.
34. See Nagourney, supra note 33; Kirkpatrick, supra note 33.
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their views about governance and politics, 35 the gender and racial make-up of
the courts has changed only incrementally in the past twenty years.3
I argue that for a variety of reasons with regard to substantive changes
in the law as well as perceptions of fairness and the role the judiciary plays in
our society, women judges do make a difference and that race, ethnic, and
gender diversity should be the norm, not the exception. I also assert that
judges, women, and people of color, are making a difference in a variety of
ways, including legal reasoning and public engagement. I offer three exam-
ples: Madam Justice Bertha Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor of the United States Supreme Court, and Chief Justice
Constance Baker Motley of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. They are
aided in doing so by the legal scholarship of feminist, critical race, and inter-
sectionality legal theorists.
The "woman question" is not a new one, even with regard to judges.37
However, in 1982, Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, the first woman to sit on
the Supreme Court of Canada,38 gave that question new prominence. The
title of her widely publicized lecture posed the issue directly: Will Women
Judges Really Make a Difference?39 According to Madam Justice Wilson's
assessment, the life experiences of women and men cause them to think and
approach the law and legal decision-making differently. 0
Madam Justice Wilson's treatment of the question was presented at Os-
goode Hall Law School and, not surprisingly, she approached the question as
one approaches a legal issue.4 She carefully laid out her arguments for how
the appointment of women to the bench would: 1) help "shatter stereotypes
about the role of women in society that are held by male judges and lawyers,
as well as by litigants, jurors, and witnesses;"42 2) help preserve the public
35. Jeffrey Love, Political Behavior and Values Across the Generations: A Summary of
Selected Findings, STRATEGIC ISSUES RESEARCH (AARP), July 2004, at 11,
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/politics-values.pdf.
36. Rorie Spill Solberg, Court Size and Diversity on the Bench: The Ninth Circuit and
Its Sisters, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 247, 248, 253 (2006).
37. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts and Civic and
Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2143, 2145-46 (1993).
38. Mimi Liu, A "Prophet With Honour": An Examination of the Gender Equality Ju-
risprudence of Madam Justice Claire L "Heureux-Dubg of the Supreme Court of Canada, 25
QUEEN'S L.J. 417, 423 n.20 (2000); see The Honourable Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, The
Supreme Court of Canada, http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/wilson/index-e.asp
(last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
39. Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference? 28
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 507, 507 (1990).
40. Id. at 519-22.
41. See id. at 507.
42. Id. at 517.
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trust by fostering perceptions of diverse representation in the judiciary; 43 3)
reduce problems for women counsel; 44 4) alter "the process of judicial deci-
sion-making; ' 45 and 5) reform legal doctrine, particularly in such areas as
tort, criminal, and family law.46
Madam Justice Wilson's conclusions about women's potential to
change the law fell into two categories.47 She first argued that the appoint-
ment of women judges would alter public perceptions.48 In addition, she
argued that the presence of women on the bench would modify law itself.
49
According to Madam Justice Wilson, the presence of women in the role of
judicial decision-makers and leaders would change the way fellow judges, as
well as lawyers and litigants, saw all women in the judicial process." This,
she concluded, would also change the behavior of women and men. 1 So
too, with more women as judges, the public at large would see the justice
system as more representative of diversity and, presumably, more fair. 52
Madam Justice Wilson's conclusions about women's potential to
change the substance and processes of the law proved to be the most contro-
versial of her claims. She argued that because of their gendered experiences,
women were more willing to contextualize the law and its processes than
were men, who were more formalistic in their approach to decision-
making. 3 These assertions drew fire from critics who challenged many of
Madam Justice Wilson's premises.5 4 Her conclusions were understandably
most offensive to those who view the law as gender, race, and class neutral,
notwithstanding the different life experiences of women and men.55 For
those who believe in law's neutrality, Madam Justice Wilson's arguments
raise the question of whether any effort to appoint more women is misguided
if it is done for the sake of adding the female perspective.56 For those with a
particularly traditional view of the law, the appointment of women who are
43. Id. at518.
44. Wilson, supra note 39, at 518-19.
45. Id. at 519.
46. Id. at 516.
47. See id. at 517-18.
48. Id.
49. Wilson, supra note 39, at 519.
50. Id. at 517.
51. Id. at 521-22.
52. Id. at 518.
53. Id. at 519-20.
54. See Robert E. Hawkins & Robert Martin, Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson, 41
McGILL L.J. 1, 34 (1995).
55. Id. at 54.
56. See id. at 55.
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perceived as particularly "feminist" in their approach to the law and deci-
sion-making remains very troublesome.57
Canadian law professor Constance Backhouse chronicles the response
to one such judge-Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, the second
woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.58 Madam Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 came under fire for the concurring opinion she wrote in R.
v. Ewanchuk,59 a criminal case involving the question of whether an alleged
sexual assault was actually consensual sex. 60 Madam Justice L'Heureux-
Dubd's opinion concurred with the full Court's decision to overturn the dis-
missal of the complaint and to enter a conviction of the defendant. 6' The
opinion also criticized her colleague, Justice John Wesley McClung, who
voted to dismiss the conviction, suggesting that the complainant's repeated
"no"'s during the alleged attack were irrelevant.62 He also implied that a
woman who had had a child out of wedlock, while living with a male part-
ner, was not capable of refusing consent. 63  Madam Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6's opinion advised that judges should avoid the use of "language ...
which not only perpetuates archaic myths and stereotypes about the nature of
sexual assaults but also ignores the law."'  Even further, the opinion noted
that judicial bias, such as that suggested in Justice McClung's opinion, ad-
versely affected a complainant's ability "to rely on a system free from myths
and stereotypes" and on a reasonable expectation of judicial impartiality.65
Although her colleague, Justice Charles Doherty Gonthier, also signed
the opinion, Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 received the brunt of the public
criticism. 66 The first came in the form of a letter written by Justice
McClung, which was published in a national newspaper, where he accused
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 of having a "feminist bias" and suggested
that her interjection of "personal invective" into the law could be responsible
"for the disparate (and growing) number of male suicides being reported in
57. See e.g., Lynne Cohen, Gender Irrelevant When Judging a Judge, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
June 2, 1998, at C4.
58. The Honourable Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, The Supreme Court of
Canada, http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/lheureux-dube/index-e.asp (last visited
Apr. 14, 2007); Liu, supra note 38, at 423.
59. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can.).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 68 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 88-89.
63. Id. at 88.
64. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, 95.
65. Id.
66. Janice Tibbetts & Shawn Ohler, Judges Clash Over Landmark Sex-Assault Ruling:
No Definitely Means No, NAT'L POST, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al.
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[Quebec Province]. 67 In the public attacks that followed, lawyers and rep-
resentatives from national organizations criticized Madam Justice
L'Heureux-Dubd for feminist judicial activism. 68 Despite the criticism,
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 did not shy away from the feminist label.
Throughout their careers both Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 and
Madam Justice Wilson expressed opinions that were characterized as femi-
nist, although Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 came under particular scru-
tiny for challenging what she believed were sexist ideas.69 While Madam
Justice Wilson certainly received public criticism for raising the "woman
question," her willingness to do so may have had a notably positive effect.70
At the time this article was written, of the nine justices on the Supreme Court
of Canada, four were women.71 Three of the appointments came between
2002 and 2004.72 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada is
Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin.7 3 In the context of advising President
Bush on the appointment of women to the United States Supreme Court,
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont pointed to the Supreme Court of Canada
as an example of gender equity.74 As many commentators have noted, the
United States has much to learn about diversity on the bench from Canada's
highest court. 75 By raising the question in a convincing and reasoned man-
ner, Madam Justice Wilson began a dialogue among the bar and the public at
large. She urged change that may not have taken place but for her positions.
II. JUST How WILL WOMEN JUDGES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Scholars have identified several dominant theories employed by the
United States Supreme Court in gender discrimination cases that are relevant
to judicial appointments.76  One involves difference theory.77  Though
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, Conversations on Equality, 26 MAN. L.J. 273 (1999).
70. See Hawkins & Martin, supra note 54, at 1.
71. Supreme Court of Canada, Current Judges, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/curjudges-e.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
72. Supreme Court of Canada, Current and Former Puisne Judges, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/curformpuisne/index-e.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
73. Supreme Court of Canada, Current and Former Chief Justices, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/curformchief/index e.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
74. Richard Foot, Canadian Top Court Held as Example in U.S., THE GAZETTE, July 13,
2005, at A 13.
75. Clare Dyer, Law: Where Are the Women? Our Judges Are Still Overwhelmingly
Male, White and Public School Educated, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 2003, at 16.
76. However, the United States Supreme Court has not incorporated difference theory in
its jurisprudence. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Essay, Gender Law, I DUKE J. GENDER
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Madam Justice Wilson relied on difference theory to support her position
that women judges would change the law, a review of the research reveals no
definitive evidence to confirm that reliance.78 Empirical and anecdotal ac-
counts do not conclusively establish the idea that individual women or
women as a group judge differently than men. However, at least some re-
search finds gender differences.79 For example, political scientists Elaine
Martin and Barry Pyle studied high courts in all fifty states, concluding that,
in divorce decisions, "a judge's gender [tended] to be the primary predictor
of a judge's vote."' In addition, Brenda Kruse's research has concluded that
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg are also in-
fluenced by their gendered experiences in deciding employment cases.8 1
However, empirical research testing the impact of race on judicial decision-
making is inconclusive.82
There is also considerable evidence that some male judges' perspectives
cause them to view women's experiences very differently than women
might.83 Professor Shirley Wiegand has chronicled numerous examples that
demonstrate a judge's apparently limited vision. 4 One of her examples
comes from the case that served as the basis for the 2005 movie North Coun-
try, a grim and painful, if sometimes fictionalized, account of sexual harass-
ment at a mine in Minnesota. 5 The fictionalized version was apparently no
L. & POL'Y 1 (1994) [hereinafter Bartlett, Gender Law]. The primary theories relied on by the
Court are: 1) separate spheres, which allows different treatment based on cultural expecta-
tions and biological differences; 2) formal equality, which requires that women and men be
treated the same; and 3) substantive equality, which calls for rules such as afflrmative action
that can produce equality in results. Id. at 2-6; Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on
Equality and Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
501, 519-521 (2004).
77. See MARTHA M1NOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
THE AMERICAN LAW 19, 20 (1990); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (1987).
78. Wilson, supra note 39, at 522.
79. For an overview, see KATHERINE BARTLETr & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND
LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (4th ed., 2006).
80. Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, State High Courts and Divorce: The Impact of Judicial
Gender, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 923 (2005).
81. Brenda Kruse, Comment, Women of the Highest Court: Does Gender Bias or Per-
sonal Life Experiences Influence Their Opinions? 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 995, 1021 (2005).
82. Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299,
316 (2004).
83. Kruse, supra note 81, at 996.
84. See generally Shirley A. Wiegand, Deception and Artifice: Thelma, Louise, and the
Legal Hermeneutic, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 25 (1997).
85. NORTH COUNTRY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2005).
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more grim and painful than the real experience the women faced in the mine
or the hostility they faced because of the suit. 6 According to Wiegand,
Judge Patrick McNulty's opinion:
[R]evealed that he could not understand why one woman
was fearful when a man who she said had exposed himself to
her several years earlier began driving his truck in circles, over
and over, around her work area. "This court has difficulty un-
derstanding why the appearance of a suspected flasher outside
the building in which she was working.., would cause great
fear--of something-in a reasonable woman."
The judge also could not understand why a woman would fear
rape simply because "a man who had repeatedly and crudely
propositioned her suddenly lunged at her one night at work with
his arms spread, only stopping when she began screaming.' 87
Yet such decisions and other evidence of male bias do not establish
sweeping gender differences in judging. And considerable evidence suggests
that other factors, such as ideology, are better predictors than sex in account-
ing for judicial decisions.8 s So, for example, commentators who have looked
specifically at Justice O'Connor's and Justice Ginsburg's voting records
generally find that gender is not a compelling factor in their judging.89
Unlike their Canadian counterpart, Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, both
Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsburg reject the notion that their gender
guides their judicial decision-making.9 ° In responding to questions of
"whether women judges speak with a different voice," Justice O'Connor
refers to the lack of "empirical evidence that gender differences lead to dis-
cernible differences in rendering judgments." 9' Moreover, she warns that
86. Wiegand, supra note 84, at 46-47.
87. Id. at 47 (quoting Kirsten Downey Grimsley, Judge Put Small Price on Pain; Dam-
age Award Paled by Litigation Norms, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at A13.). It is worth not-
ing that the trial judge who adopted this language was overturned on appeal some eleven
months later. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1304 (8th Cir. 1997).
88. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 82, at 302-03.
89. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, O'Connor and Ginsburg: Together and Apart, LEGAL TIMES,
June 9, 2003, at 14. Mauro notes that Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsburg voted for the
same result approximately 75% of the time. Id. Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Ken-
nedy 83% of the time, while Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Breyer and Justice Souter in
94% of the decisions. Id.
90. Id.
91. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 190-91 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003).
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such ideas may rely on troubling myths and stereotypes.92 Instead, she sug-
gests that male and female judges alike should seek a collective wisdom
gained through different struggles and different victories.93
Justice Ginsburg draws on her experiences as a judge and as a law
teacher to conclude that there is no discernible difference in the way women
and men reason: "In class or in grading papers.., and now in reading briefs
and listening to [oral] arguments in court . . . , I have detected no reliable
indicator of distinctly male or surely female thinking-or even penman-
ship."94
It is difficult to argue with these two women, in particular, about
whether women judges speak with a different voice, especially given that
there is no clear definition of what a "different voice" means. Moreover,
difference theory is not without its feminist critics. 95 Some feminists advo-
cate for gender equity under the theory of substantive equality. 96 Rather than
look at whether a rule or law treats women and men the same or differently,
substantive equality theory questions whether a law or rule has the effect of
disadvantaging individuals due to their gender.97 Thus, substantive equality
frameworks acknowledge differences, but with the goal of eliminating or
leveling them to encourage more equal outcomes. 98 Affirmative action and
pay equity are the kinds of strategies that advocates of substantive equality
support. 99
Instead of focusing on the question of whether men and women are dif-
ferent, non-subordination theory looks at what meaning society attributes to
those differences. " Assuming that the consequences of male power are
more significant than gender similarities or differences, non-subordination
frameworks concentrate on eliminating power imbalances. 1 ' According to
the theory's major proponent, Catharine A. MacKinnon:
[A] rule or practice is discriminatory . . . if it participates in the
systemic social deprivation of one sex because of sex. The only
question for litigation is whether the policy or practice in question
92. Id. at 192.
93. Id. at 193.
94. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for California Women Lawyers, September
22, 1994, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 5 (1994) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Remarks].
95. See Bartlett, Gender Law, supra note 76, at 11- 13.
96. Id. at 4-6.
97. Id. at4.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Bartlett, Gender Law, supra note 76, at 6.
101. See id.
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integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a de-
prived position because of gender status. '02
For example, under non-subordination theory, sexual harassment vio-
lates principles of equality and should be prohibited because it reinforces
men's power over women." 3 The violation flows from the domination it
supports-not the boorish, bad, or even assaultive behavior itself.' 04
Despite the opportunities that difference and non-subordination theories
offer for positive change, they are not without their feminist critics. Some
commentators, Justice Ginsburg among them, argue that difference theory
risks reinforcing gender-based stereotypes that perpetuate gender-based ine-
quality. 05 By attempting to articulate an all-encompassing meta-narrative,
both theories are criticized for denying class, racial, sexual orientation, and
religious differences among women, making the experiences of white, mid-
dle-class women the model.'0 6 In addition to criticizing MacKinnon's theory
on the grounds that it promotes what amounts to gender "essentialism," some
feminists criticize Catharine MacKinnon for what they call "gender imperial-
ism," namely the assumption that gender is the most important source of
oppression. 107
Critical race theorists have similarly questioned the ways in which the
"received tradition in law adversely affects people of color not as individuals
but as a group."'0 8 Critical race theorists appropriately challenge us to con-
sider: "What would the legal landscape look like today if people of color
were the decision-makers?"' 0 9 Critical race theorists point to similar modes
of racial justice, including one based on ideas of racial pluralism, and another
based on racial diversity."0 Moreover, they have a "'vision of legal knowl-
edge that includes the perspectives and experiences of oppressed people in
the critique and reformulation of legal doctrine"' and eschews the notion that
law is value neutral.l"' But they too are susceptible to criticism by Black
102. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Ginsburg, Remarks, supra note 94, at 4-5.
106. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 585, 590 (1990); see also BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 79, at 15.
107. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 106, at 585; Bartlett, Gender Law, supra note 76, at 16.
108. Brooks, supra note 25, at 85.
109. Id. at 86.
110. See id. at 92-93.
111. Id. at 96 (quoting Linda S. Greene, "Breaking Form". 44 STAN. L. REv. 909, 922
(1992)).
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women and Latina scholars for racial essentialism and neglecting the role of
class and gender in their analysis.
However, failure to reach a consensus about whether women and racial
minority jurists reach different conclusions or even reason differently does
not resolve the question of whether there should be more women on the
bench. Whether women judges will make a difference is a larger question
than whether women and men will reach different outcomes in particular
cases. Whether women judges make a difference depends on the role that
judges and judging play in our legal system and must take into account a
variety of professional and community activities in which judges participate.
As the research from various judicial task forces suggests, judging involves
collegiality and a diverse bench enables members to influence each other. 12
In addition, the role of a judge also has significance in terms of percep-
tions about representation. The face of judging, in an emblematic way, mat-
ters as a reflection of access to justice; the diversity of the bench affects pub-
lic perceptions of fairness. Finally, diversity among judges is a reflection of
how power is distributed in the justice system.
Political constituents in the United States rely on several forms of repre-
sentation, including anticipatory representation, introspective representation,
and surrogate representation."' The concept of anticipatory representation is
best explained by the idea that constituents in today's political climate make
selections based on the achievement of specific outcomes rather than "policy
preferences" of representatives. "' In the introspective representation model,
representatives rely on "a set of principles and commitments that derive
partly from their own ideals and partly from their commitment to the collec-
tive decisions of the party" in making decisions. "' Surrogate representation
is a form of non-territorial representation." 6 Thus, an individual without a
certain characteristic or perspective may serve as a representative for "the
interests and perspectives" of others with the same characteristic or perspec-
tive, "even when members of these groups do not constitute a large fraction
of their constituents."'"1 7 Though typically applied to elected political offi-
cials, the ideas behind these forms of representation can be applied to the
judiciary and can serve as a basis for arguing for greater diversity and inclu-
112. See infra notes 130-32.
113. Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 515, 515 (2003).
114. Id. at 517 (citingR. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 17
(1990)).
115. Id. at 521.
116. Id. at 522.
117. Id. at 523.
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sion. 118 As judicial selection becomes more openly ideological and political,
it is time for a more open discussion about what representation can legiti-
mately be sought in the courts. Yet, many of us are uncomfortable with ag-
gressively pursuing diversity in the judiciary given the lack of confidence in,
and outright discomfort with, the idea of different outcomes based on race
and gender.
However, there are other reasons for supporting judicial diversity. I call
the model which I would choose for including women and people of color on
the bench the representative perspective frame. My model borrows ideas
from both difference and non-subordination theories and attempts to address
some of the criticisms of racial and gender essentialism and gender imperial-
ism. As applied to the appointment of judges, my representative perspective
theory rests on three premises: 1) that gender, racial, and ethnic experiences
influence perspectives and worldviews, including one's sense of justice and
how it should be achieved; 2) that the contribution of representative perspec-
tives is substantial and reaffirms the promise of equality under the law by
suggesting that all citizens have the chance to take part in democracy; and 3)
that the failure to have a broad array of perspectives represented undermines
judicial integrity and contributes to false ideas about intellect and compe-
tency.
III. JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND THE INCLUSIVE COURT
Theories of equality, as well as the law adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in recent years, support greater inclusion in the judiciary.
Despite the fact that Justice O'Connor has been labeled a conservative by
some, and denies that her gender influences her reasoning, she has provided
some important language to support the idea of greater gender inclusion on
the judiciary. 1 9
"A basic tenet of [feminist thinking] is that perspective matters ...
[meaning] understanding women's life experiences requires a different lens"
and a point of view that comes "from living life as a woman and developing
[a gendered] consciousness."' 0 Critical race theorists argue that people of
color develop a race consciousness as well. 121
118. See generally Mansbridge, supra note 113, at 521-27.
119. See Kruse, supra note 81, at 996-98
120. Jon D. Hanson & Adam Benforado, The Drifters: Why the Supreme Court Makes
Justices More Liberal, BOSTON REV. (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at http://bostonreview.net/
BR3 1. 1/hansonbenforado.html.
121. See id.; see also Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil
Rights in the New Millennium? 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 20 (2002).
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Perspectives and experiences may influence the outcome, but that influ-
ence is not limited to outcome in terms of which party prevails. It can have
other influences on the overall direction the law takes. As Justice O'Connor
stated in her concurring opinion in J E. B v. Alabama ex rel. T B., 122 a case
which challenged the exclusion of women from juries, "one need not be a
sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and result-
ing life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case .... Indi-
viduals are not expected to ignore as jurors what they know as men--or
women."'' 23  The idea that perspective matters is not limited to feminist
scholars or female jurists.' 4 Jon Hanson and Adam Benforado made pre-
cisely that point in their recent Boston Review article, stating that "[m]ost
legal scholars recognize that a judge's antecedent presumptions and perspec-
tives often influence judicial decisions as much or more than her purported
principles and precedents."1 25 As noted earlier, gender is only one of the
antecedents that influence judicial decisions and decision making; race, class,
and sexual orientation, as well as previous areas of practice, are others. 126
Even conservative supporters of Justice Samuel Alito recognized the
importance of a judge's perspective.127  During his confirmation hearing,
they argued that his experience as the son of an Italian immigrant father
would be a positive influence on his ability to relate to the little guy in cases
that might come before him as a United States Supreme Court Justice. 12 8 It
is hard to imagine that the experience of being an immigrant's son could be
any more influential than the experience of being a man is for now eight of
the nine members of the Court.
In addressing whether women judges will make a difference, we also
should not overlook the symbolic and representational role that members of
the judiciary play. Beginning in the 1970s, the federal and state judicial sys-
tems launched initiatives on racial and gender bias. 129 To date, numerous
states and members of the federal circuit courts have taken steps to respond
to bias. 3 ' The need for responses is well documented in task force re-
122. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
123. Id. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. See Hanson & Benforado, supra note 120.
125. Id.
126. See supra Part II.
127. See Hanson & Benforado, supra note 120.
128. See Patty Reinert, Confirmation Hearings: Alito Vows No "Agenda", HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 10, 2006, at 1.
129. E.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (2000).
130. See Marcia Coyle, How Deep Is the Poolfor Supreme Court Picks? FULTON COuNTY
DAILY REPORT, Sept. 28, 2005.
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ports."'3 They found bias in a broad range of substantive areas such as fam-
ily law, domestic violence, and criminal law, as well as in administrative
areas such as the appointment and election of judges. 13 2
It is hard to deny, though perhaps impossible to measure, how bias
against women and people of color undermines the integrity of the American
judicial system. However, a measurement of the actual impact is not neces-
sary. Justice O'Connor herself recognized that even the perception of bias
injures the judicial system. As she wrote in the introduction to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals task force: "When people perceive . . . bias in a
legal system, whether they suffer from it or not, they lose respect for that
system, as well as for the law."'3 Virtually all of the task forces concluded
that at least some reforms were necessary to reduce the potential for gender
bias and better serve the ultimate objective of equal justice under the law.'34
In particular, many of the task force reports advocate measures that will in-
crease the number of women on the bench.'35 These reports cite the educa-
tional role women judges play with their male counterparts in addition to the
greater public confidence in the judiciary that come from more diverse repre-
sentation on the bench. 1
36
Given the history of gender and racial bias in our legal system, the over-
representation of white, male perspectives on the United States Supreme
Court undermines the integrity of the American judicial system. Law profes-
sor Lani Guinier has argued that United States Supreme Court appointments
have carried important symbolic messages. 137 In Grutter v. Bollinger,' the
Court affirmed, recognizing that a university had a compelling interest in a
racially diverse student body. 13 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
concluded that for "legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that
131. See generally John H. Doyle et al., Report of the Working Committees to the Second
Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 117 (1997).
132. See, e.g., THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMM. (1990), reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REv. 733, 733 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMM.]; see Doyle et al., supra note 131, at 168-77; Report of Missouri Task
Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L. REV. 485, 687-704 (1993).
133. JUDGE DOROTHY W. NELSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE
(1993), reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 731, 760 (1994).
134. See id. at 760-61.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See generally Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardi-
ans at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REv. 113 (2003).
138. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
138. Id. at 333.
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the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and [all] qualified individu-
als of every race and ethnicity."'40 Professor Guinier argues that the same is
said for leadership in the judiciary; and that it too must be open regardless of
race, ethnicity, and gender. 4' Professor Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas argues that
the Grutter decision goes further and demands a critical mass of minority
judges.'42 The Court itself recognized in J. E. B. v. Alabama that exclusion
of women and people of color from juries "causes harm to the litigants, the
community, and the individual jurors" who are excluded.' 43  Similarly, the
failure to include diverse perspectives on the bench has an adverse impact on
litigants, the community, and the underrepresented groups that are excluded.
Throughout this essay, I have been asking the "woman question." How
does the judicial selection process disadvantage women or disregard their
experiences? Perhaps one way to answer that question is to ask the "man
question." How do the judicial selection process and unchallenged selection
standards advantage typically white male experiences and perspectives? In
this context it is important to note that most legal experts believe that there is
an ample number of women and people of color who are qualified to sit on
the Court.'" Of course, that depends on how one determines qualifications.
Much was made of Chief Justice John Roberts' United States Supreme Court
clerkship'45 and Justice Samuel Alito's long experience on the federal
bench,'46 in addition to both men's Ivy League education and law review
experiences. 147 But surely state court experience or other forms of service to
the profession and to the public constitutes equally valuable qualifications.
Had the qualities that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito brought to the
nomination process been the primary criteria in 1983, Justice O'Connor
would not have been nominated to the Court. 148 Her distinguished service
140. Id. at 332.
141. See Guinier, supra note 137, at 175.
142. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law That Is Inclu-
sive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE
&L. 101, 143 (2004).
143. 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).
144. See Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 935,
955-59 (1998); Coyle, supra note 130.
145. The Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter Supreme Court Biographies].
146. Id.
147. The White House, Judicial Nominations, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocous/judicialnominees/roberts.html, (last visited Mar. 24.
2007); The White House, Judicial Nominations, Justice Samuel A. Alito,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocous/judicialnominees/alito.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
148. Supreme Court Biographies, supra note 145.
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makes clear that other, less traditional backgrounds are equally valuable.
The judicial process, in fact and in appearance, is strengthened by members
with diverse talents, backgrounds, and perspectives. '49
IV. JUDGE CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY: EMBRACING RACE AND GENDER
Will women judges make a difference? In fact, they already have. Ma-
dam Justice Bertha Wilson made a difference by raising the question and by
unapologetically answering it in the affirmative.' 50 An example of true lead-
ership, her answer moved the discussion of women's inclusion in the judici-
ary forward in an unprecedented manner. Also, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's legal opinions and public addresses provide language and ideas
that legal scholars will continue to draw upon to support gender and racial
inclusion in the courts. Other women judges provide similar inspiration.
Judge Constance Baker Motley, the first African American woman selected
for the federal judiciary, is a fitting example on which to close. 5 '
In 1946, just out of Columbia Law School, Judge Motley began her le-
gal career in New York as an attorney with what is now the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and
Education Fund.'52 She was the sole female attorney among those who as-
sisted Justice Thurgood Marshall in Brown v. Board of Education.'53 She
also argued successfully in several higher education integration cases, in-
cluding the integration of the University of Mississippi and the University of
Alabama. 5 4 When President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed her to the bench
in 1966, she had appeared before the United States Supreme Court ten times
and won nine of those cases. " Her contributions to my appreciation of the
role of judges is numerous, but perhaps her most famous decision came when
she refused to excuse herself from a gender discrimination case involving an
African American woman plaintiff. 15 6 In rejecting the defendants' claim that
her general background and status as an African American female somehow
149. See, e.g., Wilson Ray Huhn, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Sandra Day
O'Connor: A Refusal to "Foreclose the Unanticipated", 39 AKRON L. REv. 373, 398 (2006).
150. See Wilson, supra note 39, at 517-22.
151. See Columbia University, C250 Celebrates Columbians Ahead of Their Time: Con-
stance Baker Motley, http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkablecolumbians/
constance motley.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
152. Id.
153. 349 U.S. 294, 296 (1955).
154. Mary L. Clark, One Man 's Token Is Another Woman's Breakthrough? The Appoint-
ment of the First Women Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REv. 487, 515 (2004).
155. See id at 515.
156. See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 2-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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prejudiced her in the matter, Judge Motley noted that she was not the only
member of the judiciary who possessed both race and gender:
It is beyond dispute that for much of my legal career I worked on
behalf of blacks who suffered race discrimination. I am a woman,
and before being elevated to the bench, was a woman lawyer.
These obvious facts, however, clearly do not, ipso facto, indicate
or even suggest [heightened] personal bias or prejudice .... In-
deed, if background or sex or race of each judge were, by defini-
tion, sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could
hear this case .... 157
To her credit, Judge Motley unapologetically embraced both her race
and her gender as well as the wisdom she had gained through her particular
struggles as a civil rights advocate. 58 In a tribute to Judge Motley before the
American Bar Association, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said of her,
I count it my great good fortune to be among the legions whose
lives Judge Motley touched. She taught me and others of my gen-
eration that law and courts could become positive forces in achiev-
ing our nation's high aspiration-as carved above the entrance to
the U.S. Supreme Court-Equal Justice under Law. 59
Judge Motley embodied our country's high aspirations in her role as lawyer
as well as in her role as a jurist, making her an example for the public at
large, practicing attorneys, and members of the judiciary. In addition to her
personification of the high ideals of the United States Supreme Court, per-
haps no one spoke more persuasively about the need for diversity in the judi-
ciary than Judge Motley:
There is a need for more women and more minorities in the federal
judiciary, but not because I think they bring something totally dif-
ferent to the bench than white men. I don't think women and mi-
norities have a particular view on contract law that's totally differ-
ent from white men. Rather, I believe that having more women
and minorities in the federal judiciary-and the federal courts are a
major part of the national government-builds confidence in the
government. It makes people feel that the government is fair, in
that it includes people from all segments of the population. It says
157. Id. at4.
158. See id.
159. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Tribute to Constance Baker Motley, 32 HuM. RTs. 26,
26(2005).
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that the courts are fair, in that women, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians,
and other minorities are included among the judges. It says that
the court system is not an all-white male institution as it once
was. 160
V. CONCLUSION
Madam Justice Wilson, and Justice O'Connor, like Judge Motley, are
notable examples of how women judges, in different ways, make a differ-
ence. They give us a greater appreciation for having women as members of
the judiciary and bring us further along the path of achieving a judiciary
which reflects the equality principles we espouse and the legitimacy to which
we aspire. The question of whether we will have the courage to follow their
leadership remains.
160. Clark, supra note 154, at 518-19.
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In 1872, United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley offered
the following rationale for why Illinois could properly refuse Myra Bradwell
a license to practice law:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life ....
* * * The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the
general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon excep-
tional cases.'
Myra Bradwell, like countless women before and after her, had to chal-
lenge not only the laws of the state,2 but also the laws of history and society,
laws that seemed natural and universal-in Justice Bradley's words, the "law
of the Creator."3 In tracing the place of women in the legal profession, we
* This essay is an expanded version of two lectures delivered at the Shepard Broad
Law Center of Nova Southeastern University as part of the Leo Goodwin Distinguished Lec-
ture Series.
+ Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
1. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
2. Within five years after state courts denied law licenses to women, including Brad-
well, state and federal legislatures began authorizing admission. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE
AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 23 (1989) [hereinafter RHODE, JUSTICE AND
GENDER]. "[F]ive women lawyers ... were practicing in the United States" in 1870, but they
numbered just over a thousand by the turn of the century as twenty states admitted women to
their bars. Id.
3. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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are, therefore, talking about more than strictly legal change. Changes in our
laws and public policies are part of the larger struggle to change the way we
think and how we relate to one another in our everyday lives. Moreover,
while women in the legal profession have not always agreed on the role law
can and should play in this larger struggle, they have historically agreed that
law is an important element in the struggle for social equality.
In light of Justice Bradley's remarks, we should not be surprised that
women have recognized law as a powerful force, shaping the reality of their
everyday lives. Myra Bradwell was denied a license to practice law because,
in Justice Bradley's words, she "had no legal existence separate from her
husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social
state."4 Without a legally recognized separate identity, she could not form
contracts on her own. The law reflected the belief that a woman belonged in
the private sphere of home and family; she simply had no place in public life.
Indeed, this rigid notion of private and public spheres, of separate spheres for
women and men, is at the heart of women's experiences of subordination.
And the story of women and law over the last century is largely the story of
women's many challenges to entrenched notions of what is public and what
is private and how the law should understand this distinction or, perhaps
more accurately, what role the law should play in breaking down this distinc-
tion.'
The brief historical overview in the first part of this essay highlights
women's impact on the law and legal profession. In particular, it traces how,
once women gained access to and recognition under the law, they began con-
testing the law from the inside by transforming its underlying assumptions
and using it as a tool for broader social change. Because of their efforts,
gender stereotypes and assumptions that once seemed "natural" and universal
are no longer acceptable bases for our laws. We now aspire to construct laws
and institutions more representative of the diverse society in which we live.
Moreover, as I argue in the second part of the essay, as lawyers and judges,
we should draw upon our diversity and resist the temptation to replace old
generalizations with new ones. That is, rather than asking how a distinctly
"female" presence, or voice, has changed the legal profession and the judici-
ary, we should ask how the legal profession can better recognize and incor-
porate the range of styles women have to offer. By embracing our differ-
ences, rather than seeking a unified voice, we honor the contributions of gen-
erations of women activists and scholars.
4. Id.
5. See infra Section I.
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I. WOMEN'S IMPACT ON THE LAW: BREAKING DOWN STEREOTYPES,
CREATING POSSIBILITIES
Before women could use the law as a force for change, they had to fight
it on its own terms. In other words, they sought to be recognized under the
law in the same way men were. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was
first proposed by the National Women's Party in 1921.6 To the extent the
law reinforced the idea that women had no place in public life, the ERA was
designed to change this by guaranteeing their equal access-for example,
their rights to control property, to contract, to sue, and to serve on juries.7 In
the 1960s, building on the civil rights movement, women continued this fight
for formal equality, a fight that resulted in landmark legislation: the Equal
Pay Act of 19638 and Title VII,9 which prohibit discrimination by employers
on the basis of sex. In addition, once the laws were enacted, women made
sure they were implemented. For example, when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) failed to enforce Title VII, women formed
the National Organization of Women to monitor the agency and advocate for
serious enforcement of claims. '0
Because of women's efforts, the law finally began to recognize women
as equal members of public society. Of course, formal changes in the law
did not translate into immediate social change. Statistics from then and now
illustrate how slowly change occurs. Fewer than 5% of lawyers were women
in the 1960s 1" and fewer than 2% of all law professors were women. 2 De-
spite the fact that law schools began abandoning their male-only admissions
policies in the 1970s, only 13% of lawyers were women in 1984."3 Today,
6. Jo Freeman, Social Revolution and the ERA, 3 SOC. F. 145, 145 (1988) [hereinafter
Freeman, Social Revolution]; see also RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 35 (not-
ing that advocates of the amendment introduced a version of it in every congressional session
from 1923 to 1972).
7. Freeman, Social Revolution, supra note 6, at 145.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (2000).
10. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 198 (1989-90); see also Jo Freeman, From Suffrage to Women's Libera-
tion: Feminism in Twentieth-Century America, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 513 (Jo
Freeman ed., 5th ed. 1995).
11. Different Voices, Different Choices? The Impact of More Women Lawyers and
Judges on the Justice System, 74 JUDICATURE 138, 140 tbl.2 (1990) [hereinafter Different
Voices].
12. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 219 tbl. 12.1 (2d ed. 1993).
13. Id. at 220-21; Different Voices, supra note 11, at 138.
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women make up only about 30% of the profession. 4 Although the percent-
age of female judges in the federal judiciary doubled in the 1990s, today,
women make up only about 24% of the federal bench.' 5 And by recent esti-
mates, only about 29% of the judges on state courts of last resort are
women. 6 In addition, although women now make up more than half of en-
tering law school classes, only about 20% of full law professors are
women,17 and a little over 17% of law firm partners are women. The num-
bers are even less encouraging for women of color, who constitute only 5%
of the total number of full law professors.' 9 As recently as 2005, "81% of
[minority female associates had left] their law firms within five years of be-
ing hired."" °
Yet, even in small numbers, women lawyers and law professors have
had an enormous impact on formal laws and their enforcement. Beginning in
1971, with Ruth Bader Ginsburg's United States Supreme Court victory in
Reed v. Reed,2' women lawyers successfully challenged discriminatory laws
and practices on equal protection grounds. It is quite fitting that, twenty-five
years later, Justice Ginsburg would author the opinion in United States v.
Virginia,22 emphasizing that-in her words--'"generalizations about 'the way
women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer jus-
tify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them
14. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED
AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 13 (2001) [hereinafter RHODE, UNFINISHED
AGENDA].
15. See ABA Comn'n on Women in the Profession, A Current Glance at Women in the
Law 2006 4, http://www.abanet.org/women/CurrentGlanceStatistics2006.pdf [hereinafter
Current Glance at Women in the Law]; see also Kate Zernike, Pool of Female Judges Has
Boomed in 24 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at AlO (recognizing that 24% is a notable
increase from 6% in 1981 when Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was nominated by President
Ronald Reagan).
16. Current Glance at Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 4; see also Lynn Hecht Scha-
fran, Not from Central Casting: The Amazing Rise of Women in the American Judiciary, 36 U.
TOL. L. REv. 953, 954-56 (2004) (discussing the number of women in the federal and state
judiciaries).
17. RHODE, UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 14, at 13, 27.
18. Current Glance at Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 2.
19. RHODE, UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 14, at 27.
20. Paulette Brown & Cathy Fleming, 'Invisible' Attorneys Seek Notice, THE NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 23, 2006, available at http://www.eapdlaw.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?news=742 (click
on "PDF & Printable Article" hyperlink); see also ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS 9 (2006),
http://www.abanet.org/women/Visiblelnvisibility-ExecSummary.pdf (providing an in-depth
study of the experiences of women of color in private law firms).
21. 404 U.S. 71(1971).
22. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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outside the average description. 23 Indeed, estimates of what was considered
appropriate for most women are what prompted Justice Bradley to conclude
that women's exclusion from public life followed from the natural law of the
creator.
But women in the early 1970s challenged this assumption. Building on
the approach used in race discrimination cases, they argued that laws should
not distinguish between men and women who are similarly situated.24 At
that time, plenty of state laws included sex-specific distinctions, which the
Supreme Court had routinely upheld. For example, in 1961, in Hoyt v. Flor-
ida,25 the Court upheld a state statute excluding women from juror rolls,
unless they specifically asked to be included.26 But in 1971, the Court
changed its approach in Reed.27 Persuaded by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
other attorneys working for the ACLU's Women's Rights Project, the Court
struck down an Idaho statute that gave preference to men over women as
administrators of estates.28 Idaho justified the distinction as a reasonable
means of resolving a tie between two individuals equally qualified by their
relationship to the decedent. 29 The state argued that men should be preferred
because they generally have more business experience than women.3' The
Court rejected this argument, describing the male preference as "the very
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause"
of the Constitution.3'
Other United States Supreme Court victories followed the Reed deci-
sion. But although the Court struck down many sex-specific distinctions on
equal protection grounds, it did not adopt the approach advanced by
women's rights activists and litigators. Women had argued that the courts
should apply a standard of strict scrutiny, the same level of scrutiny already
applied to classifications based on race and the toughest test under the Con-
stitution's Equal Protection Clause. 32 But in light of the far-reaching impli-
23. Id. at 550 (emphasis in original).
24. See generally Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate of Discrimination": Race-
Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001) (discussing
the historical emergence and development of the analogy to race in feminist thought and activ-
ism).
25. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
26. Id. at 69.
27. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
28. Id. at 77.
29. Brief for Respondent at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
30. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
31. Id. at76.
32. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 86-92 (discussing the
United States Supreme Court's "search for standards" in cases involving sex-based classifica-
tions).
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cations of this kind of test-for example, how could women's exclusion
from the draft survive?-the Court stopped short of strict scrutiny.33 When
women's rights activists realized the Court would not adopt this stringent
test, they made a strategic choice to focus on contesting sex-based classifica-
tions that disadvantaged men. 34  They hoped this strategy would steadily
weaken the stereotypes and generalizations that made women second-class
citizens.35
The strategy resulted in some success. For example, in Craig v.
Boren,36 the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the "sale of
3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to [women] under the age of
18 .,,3 The Court also invalidated social security laws that treated widows
more favorably than widowers.38 It held that alimony after divorce should be
awarded on a gender-neutral basis.39 And it struck down a state statute ex-
cluding men from a state-supported nursing school.4 °
Largely because of these early efforts, law was transformed into a stra-
tegic tool for undermining long-held stereotypes and assumptions regarding
sex. Law is, however, an imperfect tool. As a product of history and social
context, it is undoubtedly lopsided. Guarantees of formal equality could not
erase the law's foundations in male-centered assumptions and standards,
such as the division of the public from the private.41 For years, laws had
33. Id.
34. MARGARET A. BERGER, LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF WOMEN: A REVIEW FOR THE FORD
FOUNDATION 18-19 (1980).
35. Id. at 19.
36. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing intermediate scrutiny standard for sex classi-
fications).
37. Id. at 191-92.
38. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201-02, 217 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 637-39, 653 (1975).
39. Off v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270-71, 283 (1979).
40. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719, 723 (1982). The Court did,
however, uphold some distinctions compensating women for historical disadvantage. See
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1977) (upholding social security provisions al-
lowing women to exclude three more low-earning years than men when calculating base-
period income); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508-10 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 352, 355-56 (1974) (upholding state statute giving widows a $500 annual exemp-
tion in property taxes).
41. See Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847-48 (2000) (noting that "attacking the public/private line has
been one of the primary concerns (if not the primary concern) of feminist legal theorizing for
over two decades" and arguing that the distinction has continued value for feminist theory).
These critiques of the public-private dichotomy are part of a larger body of literature discuss-
ing how seemingly neutral and universal legal concepts subordinate women. See, e.g., Fran-
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governed the public sphere and treated the private sphere of home and family
as inviolate.
Formal equality, the idea that women should be treated the same as
men, therefore, created the illusion of choice for many women. It granted
women access to the legal profession without ensuring a workplace free of
sexual harassment. It mandated that the state affirmatively treat women the
same as men, guaranteeing them equal protection of the laws, without ex-
tending the reach of the law into the private sphere where women frequently
endured sexual and physical violence. It prohibited discrimination in em-
ployment, but did not recognize different treatment of pregnant women as
sex-based discrimination. After a long, hard fight for access to the public
sphere, women realized that the rigid separation of public and private had
itself to be challenged-a critique that resonates in the 1970s slogan "the
personal is political. 42
As feminist scholars and activists in the 1970s and 1980s turned their
attention to the reality of women's private lives, they focused especially on
the ways in which women's lives differed from men's. Some feminists cele-
brated this difference, often credited to women's experiences as mothers and
caretakers, and argued that society should recognize women's "different
voice" as equal rather than inferior to the male voice.43 Others argued that
women's difference was a result of the underlying structural imbalance in
power between men and women in society." Differences in this view are a
result of men's dominance, not women's inherent nature, a perspective re-
flected in Catharine MacKinnon's frequently quoted statement: "Women
value care because men have valued us according to the care we give
them."45
ces E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1497 (1983).
42. For further discussion of the public-private distinction, see Carole Pateman, Feminist
Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281 (S.I.
Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983); Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1289, 1289-1608 (1982).
43. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 613-616 (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Dif-
ferent Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39,
63 (1985); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 173-74 (1982).
44. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 39 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; Ann Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1376-80 (1986); Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1003, 1007 (1986).
45. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 44, at 39.
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Professor MacKinnon's "inequality approach" to sex discrimination
was particularly influential.4 6  It called into question the idea that laws
should treat men and women the same, that is, as if they are similarly situ-
ated. In her landmark book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, Profes-
sor MacKinnon argues that the "only question for litigation is whether the
policy or practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an
underclass or a deprived position because of gender status."47 This approach
to sex discrimination and its application to employment practices helped lead
to the Supreme Court's recognition of sexual harassment as a violation of
Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.48 Following the consen-
sus of the appellate courts and the EEOC, the Supreme Court held that sexual
harassment creating a hostile work environment violates Title VII, even
when the victim does not suffer an economic injury. 9
About the time Meritor was decided in the 1980s, women were also en-
gaged in legal battles to decide how the law should handle the fact that only
women give birth to children. 0  In 1974, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 5 1 the Su-
preme Court upheld, under the Equal Protection Clause, a California statute
excluding pregnancy from its list of covered disabilities. 52 According to the
Court, the statute did not exclude any individual on the basis of sex; rather, it
simply did not cover a particular disability (i.e., pregnancy) that affects some
but not all women. 3 A couple years after Geduldig, the Court followed the
same reasoning in deciding a case under Title VII. 54  Congress disagreed,
46. In addition to Professor MacKinnon, many other feminist theorists and scholars in-
fluenced legal practice and helped inspire political change. See generally Cynthia Grant
Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the
Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249 (1998) (discussing the interrelated nature of femi-
nist theory and practice).
47. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 117-18 (1979).
48. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
49. Id. at 67-68. In addition to changing employment laws, feminists advocated the
reform of criminal laws (for example, rape and domestic violence laws) that failed to redress
women's injuries. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 237-52.
These legal changes chipped away at the standards and assumptions that placed sexuality and
sexual conduct outside the reach of the law as something private and personal and therefore
not actionable. See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557,
558 (2006) (discussing feminist critique of the public-private dichotomy and its significance
to the domestic violence movement).
50. See generally Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat-
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985).
51. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
52. See id. at 495-97.
53. Id.
54. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
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however, and overturned this decision by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act (PDA), an amendment to Title VII that makes discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy unlawful sex discrimination."5 Although feminists in
the 1 980s agreed that pregnant women deserve protection under the law, they
disagreed about how the law should approach the issue.56 While some femi-
nists argued that pregnancy should be treated like any other disability (an
equal treatment approach), others pushed for laws that would give pregnant
women special benefits (a special treatment approach).57
In one important Supreme Court case,58 feminists actually argued both
in favor of and against a California statute requiring that employers provide
leave to employees disabled by pregnancy, but not to employees disabled for
other reasons.5 9 The statute was challenged as contrary to the PDA, which
requires that pregnancy be treated like other temporary disabilities in the
employment context.60  Some feminists argued that the statute was pre-
empted by the PDA;61 others argued that the statute should be upheld as long
as employers are required to provide the same leave to other temporarily
disabled employees; 6 and a third group argued that the statute should stand
because it enables women to exercise their procreative rights on equal terms
with men.63 In the end, the Court held that the PDA was intended to prohibit
discrimination against pregnancy, not prevent states from enacting laws that
benefit pregnant workers. 4 It did not, therefore, preempt the California stat-
ute, and employers did not have to extend the same benefits to other disabled
employees.65
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
56. See RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 38-46.
57. Id. This debate over sameness versus difference did not begin in the 1980s. It has a
long history. For example, throughout the first part of the twentieth century, feminists fought
both for and against labor legislation that treated women differently from men (e.g., by re-
stricting the number of hours they could work). Id.
58. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (feminist scholars and
groups filed three different amicus briefs).
59. Id. at 290-92.
60. Id. at 292-94 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. See Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 48-49, Ca. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494), 1986 WL 728369.
62. Brief for the Nat'l Org. for Women et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
11, Ca. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, Inc. 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494), 1986 WL
728368.
63. Brief for the Coal. for Reprod. Equal. in the Workplace et al. as Amici Curiae for
Respondent at 35-36, Ca. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, Inc., 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No.
85-494), 1986 WL 728372.
64. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 287.
65. Id. at 292.
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Not surprisingly, the Court's decision did not settle the larger issue.
Feminists continued to debate how the law should treat men and women in
contexts where they are inescapably different.66 Although this debate is fre-
quently described as a disagreement that weakened the women's movement,
we could also understand it as a logical step in the struggle to further social
equality. After all, how could women be heard as lawyers, activists, and law
professors without the openings provided by formal equality? Once women
gained access to legal institutions, they could more easily critique them. We
should not be surprised that they offered different critiques.
Of course, the debate regarding women's difference was not really new.
As soon as women began fighting for legal change, they began disagreeing
over how the law could improve the quality of women's lives. Even as the
National Women's Party advocated the Equal Rights Amendment, other
women's organizations vigorously opposed it, fearing it would mean the end
of protective labor laws that set maximum hours and wages and governed
working conditions for women.6 7 While ERA advocates argued such laws
were paternalistic mechanisms used to deny women desirable jobs and the
pay they deserved, proponents of protective legislation argued that laws
should recognize the reality of women's everyday lives-as mothers and
caretakers of home and family.68 In their view, treating women and men as
"similarly situated" was a fiction that ignored the ways in which women's
lives were undeniably different.69 In particular, they argued that motherhood
deserved special protection.7°
The Supreme Court embraced a similar view of motherhood for many
years.71 According to the Court, women's childbearing responsibilities not
only placed them at a disadvantage, but also made them the proper wards of
the public interest and, therefore, the state.72 In 1908, the Court reasoned:
"[T]he physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race., 73 Even as
the civil rights movement was underway in the 1960s, the Court was still
66. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2.
67. See Freeman, Social Revolution, supra note 6, at 145. Women's groups opposed the
addition of "sex" to Title VII for the same reasons. See JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND
INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 233-34 (1991).
68. See RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 35-37.
69. See id. at 37.
70. Id.
71. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
72. Id.
73. Id. (upholding as constitutional protective labor laws limiting the working hours of
women).
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referring to the "special responsibilities" women have "as the center of home
and family life."74
While proponents of formal equality eventually won the battle over pro-
tective legislation, the critique of liberal equality continued.75 The idea that
the law should enable individuals to pursue their own, self-interested choices
on equal terms assumes that individuals enjoy the same freedom to choose.
But our choices are undoubtedly constrained by a range of factors, over
which we have little control-for example, our gender, our race, and our
socioeconomic circumstances.76 Formal equality has helped some women,
while failing to address the needs of others.77
Indeed, as contemporary feminist theorists have emphasized, accounts
of women's experiences are all too frequently based on the experiences of
white middle-class women.78 These accounts can ignore the ways in which
some women are subjected to multiple forms of discrimination, as well as the
ways in which some women participate in the subordination of other women.
For example, formal equality may give a relatively privileged white woman
access to professional employment opportunities, while doing very little for
the woman she hires to care for her home and children. 79 Hence, the crucial
question is: How do women use their collective strength to continue fighting
for an egalitarian society, while at the same time recognizing the diversity of
women's experiences?
I think diversity can actually be our collective strength. Once we leave
behind the rigid view of a world divided between essential categories of
"woman" and "man" and recognize the messy reality in all its diversity, we
74. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (upholding a state statute permitting, but not
requiring, women to serve on juries).
75. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis,
63 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1984). Not all feminists, however, rejected the liberal rights discourse.
Some theorists articulated feminist approaches to the liberal discourse of individual rights.
See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Equality Across Difference: A Place for Rights Discourse, 3
WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1987); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals
from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987). For an overview of three
generations of feminist thought, see Adelaide H. Villmoare, Feminist Jurisprudence and Po-
litical Vision, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 443 (1999).
76. See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L.
REv. 431, 438 (1990).
77. See Catherine Albiston, Anti-Essentialism and the Work/Family Dilemma, 20
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 30, 36 (2005) (arguing that the "master narratives" surround-
ing work and family (e.g., family leave policies) leave out the interests of less privileged
women).
78. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
79. Albiston, supra note 77, at 36-37.
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may be in a better position to attack the underlying structures that further
inequality-that is, to question Law, with a capital L, or what Justice Bradley
called the "law of the Creator."8 In truth, this has always been the real tar-
get. The debate regarding difference reflected in the disagreement over
equal versus special treatment is really a debate about short-term solutions.
Fortunately, most of us agree on the long-term goal, and thankfully, we do
seem closer to that goal today than we were when I began my legal career.
Rather than using the law to protect women so that they are able to
carry out their domestic duties, our Supreme Court now speaks in terms of
the law as a remedial and forward-looking device.8 Recently, in discussing
the virtues of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),82 which gives
both men and women the right to family and medical leave in some cases,
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained how gender stereotypes contribute to so-
cial inequality.83 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by paral-
lel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for
men. Because employers continued to regard the family as the
woman's domain, they often denied men similar accommodations
or discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually reinforc-
ing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that
forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family
caregiver, and fostered employers' stereotypical views about
women's commitment to work and their value as employees.
84
These words leave little doubt that women have made significant pro-
gress. There is nothing natural about a woman's historically inferior posi-
tion, and consequently, the law should break down rather than build up
stereotypes. It is a tool in the larger struggle to give individuals more
choices in how they order their lives. As Deborah Rhode explains, we
should empower individuals and improve the quality of life for both women
and men: "Our priority should be to empower women as well as men to re-
80. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
81. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that state
employees may sue the states for failure to comply with the FMLA).
82. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-2619, 2631-
2636, 2651-2654 (2000).
83. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 538 U.S. at 736.
84. Id.
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shape the institutions that are shaping them. At issue is not simply equality
between the sexes, but the quality of life for both of them.,
85
II. WOMEN'S IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY: SHARED STORIES, DIFFERENT
VOICES
After a century of tireless advocacy and remarkable change, generaliza-
tions about women are no longer accepted as legitimate foundations for our
laws or legal theories. But although we have rejected gender stereotypes as
an appropriate basis for our laws and institutions, empirical studies have con-
tinued to focus on the possibility of difference by asking whether women
think differently or speak in a "different voice."86 Scientists continue to ask
whether women and men are hardwired differently.87 And studies in the
social sciences frequently look for evidence of this theoretical difference-
85. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 2, at 320. Nowhere is this desire for a
better quality of life more apparent than in the daily struggle to balance work and family.
Largely because of the efforts of women in the legal profession, the FMLA is a reality. It
requires employers with more than fifty employees to give both men and women equal
amounts (twelve weeks) of unpaid leave for specified family and medical reasons. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 2611-2612 (2000). Moreover, there is growing evidence that women are right
about the need for this gender-neutral law governing the work-family balance. E.g.,
CATALYST, WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY ISN'T JUST A WOMAN'S ISSUE 1 (Aug. 2003),
http://www.catalystwomen.org/files/view/Workplace%20Flexibility%20Isn't%2Just%20a%2
OWomen's%20Issue.pdf. Recent studies report that men and women alike desire more flexi-
ble work options. Id. For instance, 92% of United States workers report that they do not have
enough flexibility to take care of personal responsibilities, such as caring for sick children or
parents. GEO. UNIV. LAW CTR., MEETING THE NEEDS OF TODAY'S FAMILIES: THE ROLE OF
WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 6, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/workplaceflexibil-
ity2010/documents/FF BW FI Fact.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). Unfortunately, many
workers are still not covered by laws, such as the FMLA, or by employment policies guaran-
teeing leave. Id. For example, only 30% of workers are covered by policies allowing them to
take time off to care for sick children. Id.
Men and women also express the same desire to work fewer hours. See CATALYST,
supra at 1. Dissatisfaction with work-life balance is particularly prevalent in the legal profes-
sion. Id. A 2003 study reported that two-thirds of law graduates, both men and women, said
they have difficulty balancing their personal and professional lives. Id This is particularly
true of young lawyers in large firms. See BRIAN MELENDEZ, ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION
SURVEY: CAREER SATISFACTION, http://www.abanet.org/yld/satisfaction_800.doc (last visited
May 25, 2007). A 2000 ABA study found that nearly 81% of the young lawyers in these
firms might consider leaving their firms. Id. Although the legal profession has helped create
the conditions for change, as an institution, the profession itself is very resistant to change.
One of the most pressing questions for the profession today is whether it will lead or follow in
meeting demands for a work environment that recognizes both women and men as individuals
with personal and family responsibilities.
86. See generally supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN 1-9 (2006).
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for example, do women in the judiciary decide cases differently from men?8"
The best answer to this question is that we do not know because the studies,
as a whole, are inconclusive.89 More important, however, are the implica-
tions of these studies. In my view, we should be asking why we continue to
pose this question.
I am not suggesting that we stop paying attention to how many women
are serving as members of state and federal judiciaries. If we are to be a rep-
resentative democracy, our governmental institutions must reflect the diverse
membership of our society, and we should work especially toward ensuring
access for members of historically excluded groups, such as women and ra-
cial minorities. We should also encourage the changes diversity inevitably
brings. Women in the judiciary have certainly had a positive effect on soci-
ety in general and the legal profession specifically.90 For example, their
presence has encouraged young women to pursue legal careers, and they
have raised awareness of gender bias in the court system. 91 Indeed, in my
experience, the presence of women in judicial roles has raised awareness
within the judiciary concerning the subtle, but powerful, implications of lan-
88. See, e.g., Sarah Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited:
The Data Since 1994, 92 GEO. L.J. 689 (2004); Linda S. Maule, A Different Voice: The Femi-
nine Jurisprudence of the Minnesota State Supreme Court, 9 BUFF. WOMEN's L.J. 295 (2001);
Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on the Michigan Supreme Court,
63 ALB. L. REv. 1205 (2000); see also Theresa M. Beiner, Female Judging, 36 U. TOL. L.
REv. 821, 821 nn.2-9 (2005) (citing studies by social scientists).
89. See Heather Elliott, The Difference Women Judges Make: Stare Decisis, Norms of
Collegiality, and "Feminine Jurisprudence" A Research Proposal, 16 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 41,
43-44 (2001). There is, however, some support for difference in sex discrimination cases.
Beiner, supra note 88, at 824 (citing John Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The
Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 67
JUDICATURE 165, 171-72 (1983); and Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race
on Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 1981-1996 (1999) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author)).
90. See generally Mary L. Clark, One Man's Token Is Another Woman's Breakthrough?
The Appointment of the First Women Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REv. 487 (2004) (providing
history of the first women federal judges and discussing the social significance of women
judges).
91. See Hope Viner Samborn, Gender Bias in the Courts: Working Toward Change,
PERSP., Winter/Spring 2002, at 4, 6, available at http://www.abanet.org/women/perspectives/
PSPGenderBias2.pdf. The National Association of Women Judges has supported programs to
educate judges about gender bias in decision-making and courtroom interaction and suggest
ways to further gender fairness. Id. In addition, the International Association of Women
Judges sponsored a program that provided training to more than 600 judges and other profes-
sionals on the application of international and regional human rights conventions in cases
involving discrimination or violence against women. See International Association of Women
Judges, http://www.iawj.org/what/jep.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) (describing the "Jurispru-
dence of Equality Program").
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guage and the use of particular words in judicial writing. More than once, as
a member of an appellate panel, I have requested very minor changes in
opinion language to avoid disparaging sex-based connotations. Thus, the
involvement of women in the judicial process certainly has some effect, al-
though it is often invisible to litigants and the public.
In addition, women clearly have different experiences to draw upon
from their male colleagues. As Justice O'Connor often notes, after graduat-
ing at the top of her law school class, she was offered a job as a legal secre-
tary,92 an experience her male peers did not share. I, like all women lawyers
of my generation, have similar stories, such as the time a partner at a law
school interview said to me: "Deanell, you have a very good record, but
don't you know that you have to be better than the men to get hired?" After
law school, I ran into similar barriers. For example, when I returned to Kan-
sas after working in securities law in Washington, I discovered that a re-
spected Kansas corporation was seeking an attorney to assist the general
counsel as the company embarked upon some securities transactions. The
company's offices were in a small town within driving distance of where I
planned to live. I doubted then, and doubt today, that anyone else with my
level of experience was interested in that position. After two very positive
interview days, I never heard another word from the company, not even a
rejection letter. Many years later, I heard-through a rumor mill-that I was
not hired because of concerns about a woman accompanying company offi-
cials to New York to prepare for the public offering. I have no idea whether
this is true, but it was, at the very least, a plausible explanation in the minds
of some individuals. Unfortunately, many women in the legal profession
have similar stories to tell.
In light of these stories, it is no surprise that 81% of the women judges
surveyed in a 1990 study said sex discrimination was a problem, but none of
the male judges identified it as a problem. 9' Women have experienced their
gender in ways men have not, and these experiences no doubt influence how
they see the world. But does this mean women think or reason in a distinctly
feminine way? The fact that the empirical studies are inconclusive does not
mean we have yet to find the answer. The answer may simply be that we
cannot generalize about sex differences. And, I would add, we should not.
This is dangerous business.
To see how it is dangerous, just consider the implications of a conclu-
sive answer. What if a study concludes that women on average do in fact
92. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1549
(1991).
93. Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive La Difference? 73 JUDICATURE
204, 207 (1990).
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decide cases differently from men? This begs the question of why women
decide cases differently. The typical answer-one grounded in both feminist
theories of cultural difference and anti-feminist theories of difference-is
that women reason from an ethic of care and connectedness, rather than an
abstract and hierarchical logic of rules.94 That is, women value obligation
and responsibility over rights and rules, and they care more about preserving
relationships than playing by the rules.95
Responding to these theories of difference, many women have cau-
tioned that a view of women as caring and men as rational sounds very much
like the myth of "true womanhood" used to perpetuate women's inferior
status. 96 Generalizations about the way women are and think have been used
throughout history to exclude women from the law and other professions.
And this continues to be a danger today. We all remember the controversy
surrounding the remarks of Harvard's president almost two years ago. 97 He
suggested that the lack of women in the hard sciences may be a result of in-
trinsic differences between women and men. 98 Many people expressed con-
cern that the notion of intrinsic differences could be used to explain and ex-
cuse women's absence from the sciences. 99 In other words, generalizations
about difference threaten to close more doors than they open. Moreover,
they simply do not hold true in reality. We can always find exceptions.
In fact, studies that find some support for a difference in male and fe-
male judging also show how frequently men and women agree. For exam-
94. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 43, at 47-48; Sherry, supra note 43, at 543;
see also Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988) (exploring the ways in which feminist theory may
inform the tradition ofjudging).
95. For a discussion and critique of the idea of "gender-based styles of lawyering," see
Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992). Cahn argues for a con-
textual approach leading to a feminist, rather than feminine, lawyering process. Id. at 1039-
42. Instead of labeling style by gender, she encourages feminist theory to examine different
styles to gain insights that can be used to challenge dominant practices and create new ap-
proaches to lawyering. See id.
96. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 92, at 1553. Over two centuries ago, Mary Woll-
stonecraft eloquently warned against this view of women's nature: "It would be an endless
task to trace the variety of meanness, cares, and sorrows into which women are plunged by the
prevailing opinion that they were created rather to feel than reason, and that all the power they
obtain must be obtained by their charms and weakness." MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A
VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN WITH STRICTURES ON POLITICAL AND MORAL
SUBJECTS 50 (1792), available at http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Wollstone-
craft 0730.pdf.
97. See Sam Dillon & Sara Rimer, No Break in the Storm over Harvard President's
Words, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A14.
98. See id.
99. Id.
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ple, a 1993 study of appellate judges found that "[m]ore than 63% of the
votes cast by women supported" plaintiffs' discrimination claims, while 46%
of the men's votes favored plaintiffs.'00 This is a statistically significant dif-
ference, showing some support for the theory that women decide discrimina-
tion cases differently from men.' But this can be misleading. What about
the nearly 37% of the female votes cast against discrimination claims and the
46% of the male votes cast in favor of such claims?10 2 Significant numbers
of men and women cast votes not predicted by the theory, leaving us to won-
der why the statistically significant difference matters. We have rejected
stereotypes and generalizations as proper foundations for the law. So, what
would we do if we did find some empirical support for these stereotypes?
Real or not, generalizations always exclude some people. We know this
because, for every generalization, we can think of a story-our own or
someone else's-that undermines it. Interestingly, although feminist legal
theory contains many different viewpoints and approaches, scholars and ac-
tivists have shared a belief in the power of narrative for some time.' 3 From
the consciousness-raising efforts of the 1970s to contemporary postmodern
critiques, feminists have recognized the power of storytelling."°  Stories
validate individual experience. They help us understand the concrete reality
of individuals' lives. Moreover, they help us make connections. These con-
nections are formed when we hear elements of own experience in the stories
of others. But they are also formed when we hear stories that are radically
different from our own experience. They help us realize the diversity of hu-
man experience and encourage us to see the world from a different perspec-
tive. 0
100. Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77
JUDICATURE 129, 131 (1993).
101. See id
102. See id
103. See Mario L. Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the
Power of Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 941, 948-49 (2006); Linda E. Fisher, I Know It
When I See It, or What Makes Scholarship Feminist: A Cautionary Tale, 12 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 439, 439-40 (2003); Jean C. Love, Commentary: The Value of Narrative in
Legal Scholarship and Teaching, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 87, 87 (1998); Kathryn Abrams,
Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 973 (1991); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 863-67 (1990); Patricia Williams, On Being the Ob-
ject of Property, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CUL. SOC. 5 (1988).
104. See Bartlett, supra note 103, at 863-67; Abrams, supra note 103, at 973.
105. Instead of abstract generalizations, our difference is what we have in common: "The
human universal becomes difference itself. Difference is what we most fundamentally have in
common." Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4,
32 (1986) (describing feminist view).
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As a woman and a judge, I have quite a collection of stories that would
likely resonate with other women, as well as stories that demonstrate how we
sometimes experience things differently. I have often referred to these sto-
ries as "W" stories, stories that are unique to my experience as a woman.1 °6
For example, I often tell the story of the first day that the Tenth Circuit had
an all-female panel for oral argument. '07 The reports in the press were comi-
cal for their non-newsworthiness. The press reported comments, such as
"they were very well prepared," and "they asked good questions." On a
lighter note, I will never forget the quizzical look on the face of one of my
very bright male law clerks one Halloween morning when my children were
young, as he said with some puzzlement: "I think I may work for the only
federal judge in the nation who stayed up all night to make a costume for a
child!" His reaction was likely grounded in gendered stereotypes and as-
sumptions, but I always chuckle about the incident. (By the way, sewing a
very furry costume made my day job look easy!) Even a lighthearted anec-
dote, such as this, illustrates how stereotypes pervade our everyday interac-
tions. But generalizing about women or men, in the judiciary or anywhere
else, is often misleading and almost always fails to capture the varied nu-
ances and dimensions of human experience and interests.
When I tell these stories, I hope they speak to the experiences of some
women, but I also hope they inspire some listeners to try to see the world
from a standpoint unlike their own. We learn a great deal from other peo-
ple's stories. This is, in fact, what law students come to understand as they
learn the law by reading cases based on people's experiences,' 08 and they
think about how the law should resolve hypothetical controversies. Simi-
larly, judging is an exercise in listening to stories. Judges attempt to see the
world from many different perspectives.109 Indeed, we expect each judge to
try to transcend his or her own views and experiences in order to understand
the perspectives of others.
In short, we are better served by stories than by generalizations. The
more we expand our limited perspectives, the better lawyers, teachers, and
judges we will be. We should learn from the feminist tradition of connecting
106. Deanell Reece Tacha, "W" Stories: Women in Leadership Positions in the Judiciary,
97 W. VA. L. REv. 683 (1995).
107. See, e.g., id. at 700.
108. See Love, supra note 103, at 88.
109. Katharine Bartlett argues that feminist theory should encourage "the effort to extend
one's limited perspective .... I cannot transcend my perspective; by definition, whatever
perspective I currently have limits my view. But I can improve my perspective by stretching
my imagination to identify and understand the perspectives of others." Bartlett, supra note
103, at 881-82.
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to each other through our real-life stories, without adopting one story as rep-
resentative of us all. This is, after all, how our laws have come to disavow
many stereotypes and generalizations-through individual stories (i.e., cases)
that challenge our views of what is natural and universal. In the end, it
seems we gain little, and risk a great deal, by continuing to ask whether cer-
tain stereotypes hold true in practice. Instead, we should follow the example
of Myra Bradwell and countless other women, who have worked to create a
society of possibilities, rather than categorical limitations.
III. CONCLUSION
So, after decades of legal change, what can we say about the impact of
women on the law? When asked about women's impact on politics, Florence
Ellinwood Allen, the first woman appointed to an Article III court, replied:
You can hardly judge women's effect on politics merely from the
action of individual women officeholders. We don't judge men's
effect on politics in such a manner. And it will take a long time
for women's effect on politics to register so that we may properly
appraise it. But the constant filtering into the home of information
about government, through mothers now as well as fathers, is mak-
ing itself felt. 110
Similarly, we may conclude that we can hardly judge women's impact on the
law, as lawyers, judges, and teachers, by looking at individual acts. But we
can have faith that women's presence in the profession is making itself felt.
Women have challenged what seemed natural and universal; indeed, they
have questioned what was once touted as Law, with a capital "L," the notion
that women are "unfit" for public life and that public laws ought not to med-
dle in the private space women are destined to inhabit. In doing so, women
have used the law to help create the conditions necessary for broader social
change.
It is this ardent commitment to a more inclusive vision of society that
has left its mark and inspired a new generation of women lawyers to continue
breaking down rigid categories and untenable assumptions. As a student of
society and culture, Margaret Mead eloquently captured the promise of a
society able to transcend these limiting social constructions: "If we are to
achieve a richer culture, rich in contrasting values, we must recognize the
whole gamut of human potentialities, and so weave a less arbitrary social
110. N.R. Howard, Miss Allen Talks of Women's Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1934, avail-
able at http://womenslegalhistory.stanford.edu/articles/howard.htm.
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fabric, one in which each diverse human gift will find a fitting place."'1'
Women in the legal profession have moved us closer to this goal by exposing
what once appeared natural and proper as arbitrary and indefensible and by
insisting we work toward a society in which diverse human gifts may indeed
flourish.
111. MARGARET MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES (1935).
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I. INTRODUCTION
I am honored to participate in this important lecture series, and I would
like to thank everyone at Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad
Law Center who has worked to organize it. I would especially like to thank
Associate Dean linda f. harrison,1 my main contact at the Shepard Broad
Law Center, who has been exceptionally helpful and hospitable. I would
also like to thank the co-chairs of the lecture series, Professor Stephanie
Aleong and Professor Olympia Duhart.
I would also like to thank Leo Goodwin, Sr. and his family for their
generous endowment of this lecture series. Since the subject of this year's
Goodwin Lecture series focuses on women and our accomplishments, I want
to provide just a bit of information about the major woman in Leo Good-
win's life and career-his wife, Lillian-to complement the interesting in-
formation about him that your program contains.2 According to the website
of the company they founded, the Government Employees Insurance Corpo-
ration (GEICO): "Lillian Goodwin worked alongside her husband to launch
the company and took an active role in virtually all aspects of the early op-
eration."' 3 The history section of the GEICO website refers to "the Good-
wins"--Lillian as well as Leo-as the company's founders.4 As it notes,
"the Goodwins ... in the mid-1930s-while the Great Depression was still
in full fury-took a calculated risk to start up what has become one of the
most successful and highly respected companies in the nation."5 At that
time, when it was extremely unusual for women to be actively engaged in
leadership positions in the business world,6 Lillian, "a bookkeeper by profes-
sion," not only "took on the [new company's] accounting tasks but also
worked to underwrite policies, set rates, issue policies and market ... insur-
ance to GEICO's target customers, federal employees and ... top ... non-
commissioned Military officers." 7 In short, along with her husband Leo,
Lillian Goodwin was a remarkable business pioneer and leader in her own
right.8
1. Associate Dean linda f. harrison prefers her name to be spelled with lowercase letters.
2. See GEICO History, http://www.geico.com/about/background/geicoHistory.htm (last
visited May 15, 2007) [hereinafter GEICO History].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW
30-31 (1989) (noting the negative view of working women prior to World War II, and the
general notion that marriage was more lucrative).
7. GEICO History, supra note 2.
8. See id.
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I was invited to address what I consider to be the single most important,
overarching civil liberties threat we all face:9 the extent to which the gov-
ernment has unduly played upon understandable fears of terrorism post-9/1 1,
to unjustifiably expand its powers in ways that violate not only core constitu-
tional checks and balances,'° but also individual rights." These overreach-
ing measures have undermined the rights of everyone in this country, includ-
ing those of us who are not even suspected of any crime at all, let alone ter-
rorism.12 Additionally, consistent with the Goodwin Lectures' theme, I will
stress the adverse impact on women in particular.
Before I turn to those issues, though, since I am a New Yorker who is
always happy to be here in your fair state of Florida, I want to tell you one of
my favorite stories about both of our states. In keeping with the Goodwin
Lectures' theme, it involves women, specifically four women who are driv-
ing across the United States, one each from Florida, New York, Idaho, and
Nebraska. Shortly after the trip begins, the woman from Idaho starts pulling
potatoes from her bag and throwing them out the window. When the others
ask her why she is doing that she says: "We have so many of these darn
things in Idaho, I'm just sick of looking at them!" A moment later, the
9. I have previously addressed these issues in the following publications: Nadine
Strossen, Terrorism's Toll on Civil Liberties, in THE TRAUMA OF TERRORISM: SHARING
KNOWLEDGE AND SHARED CARE, AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 365 (Yael Danieli et al. eds.,
2005); Nadine Strossen, Presentation, Free Speech in Wartime, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (2005)
[hereinafter Strossen, Presentation, Free Speech in Wartime]; Nadine Strossen, Safety and
Freedom: Common Concerns for Conservatives, Libertarians, and Civil Libertarians, 29
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73 (2005) [hereinafter Strossen, Safety and Freedom]; Nadine
Strossen, Keynote Address, The Society of American Archivists 68th Annual Meeting (Aug.
5, 2004), http://www.archivists.org/conference/boston2004/strossen.asp; Nadine Strossen,
Suspected Terrorists One and All: Reclaiming Our Civil Liberties in Coalition, 2 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 15 (2003); Nadine Strossen, Preserving Safety and Freedom Post 9-11, 3 J. INST.
JUST. & INT'L STUD. 1 (2003); Nadine Strossen, Maintaining Human Rights in a Time of Ter-
rorism: A Case Study in the Value of Legal Scholarship in Shaping Law and Public Policy,
19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 3 (2003); Nadine Strossen, Conservatives and Liberals Unite to
Conserve Liberty and Security, in IT'S A FREE COUNTRY: PERSONAL FREEDOM IN AMERICA
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (Danny Goldberg et al. eds., 2003).
10. See GENE HEALY & TIMOTHY LYNCH, POWER SURGE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RECORD
OF GEORGE W. BUSH 1 (2006), available at www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/powersurge-healy
_lynch.pdf.
11. See United States of America: Five Years on 'The Dark Side': A Look Back at 'War
on Terror' Detentions, AMNESTY INT'L, Dec. 13, 2006, at 1, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR511952006ENGLISH/$File/AMR5119506.pdf; Hu-
man Rights Watch, The Wrong Lessons from September 11 (Sept. 9, 2006),
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/09/09/usintl4163.htm; Press Release, Human Rights First,
Human Rights First Statement on the Fifth Anniversary of September 11 (Sept. 8, 2006),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/usls/2006/statement/257.
12. See, e.g., HEALY & LYNCH, supra note 10, at 22-23. ,
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woman from Nebraska starts pulling ears of corn from her bag and tossing
them out the window. When the others ask her why she is doing that, she
says: "We have so many of these dam things in Nebraska, I'm just sick of
looking at them!" Inspired by these two other passengers, the Florida
woman opens the car door and tosses out.., the New York woman! '3
II. THE MUTUALLY REINFORCING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL
SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
The title of my speech is drawn from a famous line in a famous concur-
ring opinion by the great former United States Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis. 14 The case involved-notably for this year's Goodwin Lectures'
theme-a woman who had been convicted of terrorism merely for exercising
her First Amendment rights to advocate peaceful political reform.15 In the
fearful, scapegoating climate of the post-World War I "Red Scare" (1918-
21), Anita Whitney was convicted of violating a law that made it a crime to
"aid[] and abet[] . . . terrorism as a means of accomplishing . . . political
change." 16
Justice Brandeis wrote a separate opinion, rejecting the majority's view
that suppressing Anita Whitney's freedoms was justified because it would
advance national security. 7 A central passage from this important opinion
applies fully to our current, post-9/11 climate which is likewise fearful and
scapegoating:
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of [free-
dom]. Men feared witches and burnt women ....
Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards .... They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. [They
were] courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power
of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of
popular government. 18
13. The author gratefully acknowledges the source of this joke, as well as many others
that lighten her life: The Honorable Alex Kozinski, Judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
14. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
15. See id. Whitney "testified that it was not her intention that the Communist Labor
Party of California should be an instrument of terrorism or violence, and that it was not her
purpose ... to violate any known law." Id. at 366.
16. California Criminal Syndicalism Act of 1919, CAL. PENAL CODE § 11401 (West
2000) (repealed 1991).
17. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 376-77.
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Indeed, as Justice Brandeis explained, suppressing the freedoms of Ms.
Whitney and other government critics could actually undermine security.
Let me quote one more excerpt from this enduringly important opinion that
stresses this key point, so significant in our post-9/1 1 world. While Justice
Brandeis focuses on the First Amendment freedoms that were directly at
issue in that case, his general point-that undermining rights also under-
mines security-applies fully to all freedoms, and at all times, including the
present. 9 As he declared:
Those who won our independence believed ... liberty to be
the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty ....
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are sub-
ject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; .. .that fear breeds repres-
sion; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable govern-
ment; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies ....20
In short, Justice Brandeis reminds us that in our democracy, the "F"
word that should be our guiding spirit is not "fear," but rather, "freedom.",
21
That is precisely the theme that the ACLU has stressed ever since the 9/11
attacks in our "Safe and Free" campaign. 22 As that name underscores, con-
sistent with Justice Brandeis's world view, and contrary to too much current
political rhetoric, national security, and civil liberties are not inherently an-
tagonistic; to the contrary, they are mutually reinforcing.23
Justice Brandeis's passage explains why protecting First Amendment
freedoms promotes national security. 24 The very same constitutional princi-
ples that guarantee individual liberty also promote national security. 25 As
another example of this mutually reinforcing relationship between safety and
freedom, consider the fundamental Fourth Amendment principle that is at
stake in so many post-9/1 1 programs: The government may not invade any-
one's freedom or privacy without individualized suspicion-a particular rea-
son to believe that a particular person poses a threat.26 The Fourth Amend-
19. See id.
20. Id. at 375.
21. Id. at 377.
22. See, e.g., Anthony D. Romero, ACLU Insists on Need to Be Safe and Free (Feb. 6,
2002), http://www.aclu.org/natsec/emergpowers/14390prs20020206.btml.
23. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 375.
25. See id.
26. SeeU.S. CONST. amend IV.
2007]
89
: Nova Law Review 31, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LAWREVIEW
ment bars dragnet surveillance measures that sweep through broad groups of
people.27
Of course, the Fourth Amendment's individualized suspicion require-
ment protects individual liberty. Specifically, it protects each of us from
government surveillance based on group stereotyping and guilt by associa-
tion.2" Moreover, this individualized suspicion requirement also promotes
national security. It channels our government's resources-in other words,
our precious tax dollars-in the most strategic, effective way, toward those
persons who actually pose a threat. Precisely for this reason, experts in na-
tional security and counter-intelligence, as well as civil libertarians, have
opposed many of the post-9/11 measures that involve mass surveillance. 9 In
short, these measures are the worst of both worlds: they make all of us less
free, yet they do not make any of us safer.
One important example of the many doubly-flawed post-9/11 mass sur-
veillance measures is the domestic spying program by the super-secret Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA). 30 A federal judge struck down the program
in 2006, in the landmark lawsuit entitled American Civil Liberties Union v.
National Security Agency,3' I'm proud to say! I should also note, in keeping
with this, that Judge Anna Diggs Taylor wrote the opinion for the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.32
The NSA domestic spying program has been sweeping in countless e-
mails and phone calls of American citizens who are not suspected of any
illegal activity, let alone terrorism. 33 Therefore, the program's harshest crit-
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
27. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 723-25 (1969) (suspects were wrong-
fully detained by police merely because of the color of their skin).
28. See id. at 726.
29. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Applauds Local Police Departments for Re-
fusing to Join in Justice Department "Dragnet", (Mar. 4, 2002),
http://www.aclu.org/police/gen/14530res20020304.html. It cites "jurisdictions in Detroit, MI;
Portland, Hillsboro, and Corvallis, OR; Richardson and Austin, TX; and San Francisco and
San Jose, CA" that have raised objections to requests from the Justice Department to conduct
"dragnet investigation[s] of 5,000 immigrants, saying that the police should not be asked to
ignore basic legal procedures or to use ethnic and racial origin as the basis for suspicion." Id.
30. See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
31. See id.
32. Id.; see also Judge Shaped by Civil Rights Era, CHI. TRi., Aug. 18, 2006, at 26.
33. See generally ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 773-75.
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ics include FBI agents.34 The agents complain about the huge amount of
time they have been wasting in tracking down the thousands of completely
innocent Americans whose communications have been swept up in this NSA
fishing expedition.35
This same dual flaw infects the even more sweeping secret surveillance
program that USA Today revealed in 2006,36 which the ACLU is also chal-
lenging across the country,3" including right here in Florida.3" The disclo-
sure reveals that the Bush administration's measures apparently39 seek to
collect data about all phone and online communications from all of the
United States telephone companies about all of their customers. 40 The gov-
ernment asserts that it is using these massive customer calling records for
"data-mining," looking for patterns of calls according to certain mathemati-
cal formulas that, it says, might point to suspected terrorists. 4 However, this
whole data-mining approach has been denounced as "junk science" by
prominent experts in mathematics and computer science. 2 For example, this
perspective was stressed by Jonathan David Farley, who was not only a
mathematics professor at Harvard University, but is also a science fellow at
Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation.43
As he wrote: "[T]he National Security Agency's entire spying program
34. See, e.g., Lowell Bergman et al., Spy Agency Data After Sept. 11 Led F.B.I. to Dead
Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at Al.
35. See id. "F.B.I. officials repeatedly complained to the spy agency that the unfiltered
information was swamping investigators" and said that "the torrent of tips led them to few
potential terrorists inside the country they did not know of from other sources and diverted
agents from counterterrorism work they viewed as more productive." Id.
36. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls, USA TODAY,
May 11, 2006, at Al.
37. See generally ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 754; Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d. 66
(D. Conn. 2005); ACLU, Safe and Free: Secrecy,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/secrecy/index.html (last visited May 15, 2007).
38. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of Florida Joins National Lawsuit to Uncover Details
of Pentagon Surveillance of Law-Abiding Americans, (June 14, 2006),
http://www.aclufl.org/news-events/?action=viewRelease&emaitAlertlD= 1931.
39. I include the qualifying word "apparently" since the clandestine nature of this pro-
gram, as well as conflicting government statements about it in the wake of the USA Today
disclosure, have obscured its precise nature. See A Note to Our Readers, USA TODAY, June
30, 2006, at A2; Frank Ahrens & Howard Kurtz, USA Today Says It Can't Prove Key Points
in Phone Records Story, STAR-LEDGER, July 2, 2006, at 16.
40. Cauley, supra note 36.
41. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Def., 355 F. Supp. 2d 98, 99 (D.D.C.
2004).
42. See CPSR: CPSR Signs ACLU Letter Supporting 132, Oct. 23, 2005,
http://www.cpsr.org/issues/privacy/supportl32; see also Jonathan David Farley, The N.S.A. 's
Math Problem, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at A25.
43. Id.
2007]
91
: Nova Law Review 31, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
seems to be based on a false assumption: that you can work out who might
be a terrorist based on calling patterns .... Guilt by association is not just
bad law, it's [also] bad mathematics." '
The NSA domestic spying and data-mining programs, as well as many
other post-9/11 surveillance programs, are overly broad dragnets or fishing
expeditions. Thus, by definition, they are doubly flawed: they sweep in too
much information about too many innocent people, and they make it harder
to hone in on the dangerous ones. As one ACLU critic memorably put it:
"You don't look for a needle in a haystack by adding more hay to the pile!"45
The progressively disturbing revelations about the government's in-
creasingly pervasive forms of secret, unauthorized domestic surveillance
were well captured in an editorial cartoon by Darrin Bell in Candorville
shortly after the May 2006 USA Today revelation about the telephone com-
panies' collusion in government data-mining.4 6 It starts in 2004, when civil
libertarians were objecting to the drastically reduced warrant requirements
for electronic surveillance under the USA PATRIOT Act.47 It then goes on
to 2005, when the New York Times broke the story about the completely war-
rantless NSA electronic surveillance, 48 and then on to 2006, when USA To-
day broke the story about the telephone companies' wholesale turnover of
customer data to the NSA.4 9 The cartoon strip shows a man watching TV,
listening to a Bush administration official.5" Every quote in this strip is actu-
ally an exact quote from either the president himself or another top official.
In 2004, the official says: "We're not spying on anyone's phone calls with-
out a warrant. Trust us."'" In 2005, the official says: "OK, [we are] spying
on calls without getting warrants, but it's only a few terrorist suspects. Trust
44. Id.
45. See Barry Steinhardt, Dir. of ACLU Tech. & Liberty Program, Testimony on Gov-
ernment Data Mining, House Gov't Reform Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovem-
mental Relations & the Census (May 20, 2003),
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17262leg20030520.html; Ken Clark, Cherish Our
Rights, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 18, 2006, at B6 ("[T]he government is looking for a
needle in a haystack while piling more hay on the stack.").
46. See Cartoonist Group, Candorville by Darrin Bell,
http://www.cartoonistgroup.com/store/add.php?iid=13791 (last visited May 15, 2007).
47. See, e.g., ACLU, Reform the Patriot Act, The Sun Also Sets: Understanding the
Patriot Act "Sunsets", http://action.aclu.org/reformthepatriotact/sunsets.html (last visited May
15, 2007) [hereinafter ACLU, Reform the Patriot Act]; see also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
48. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
49. See Cauley, supra note 36.
50. Cartoonist Group, supra note 46.
51. Id.
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US." 52  In 2006, the official says: "OK, [we are] spying on every single
phone call made by almost everyone in America, but we're not actually lis-
tening to the calls. Trust us." '53 This brings to mind the old saying: "Fool
me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me!"
Former United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, whose
eloquent words were quoted in the title of this article, also warned against the
"trust us" rationale for ceding power to government officials to restrict indi-
vidual liberty, no matter how well-intentioned the officials might appear.54
His justly famous words ring particularly prophetic in the post-9/11 context:
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the Government's purposes are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to lib-
erty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but with-
out understanding."55
The Bush administration maintains that its exercise of unilateral powers
and its restrictions on individual rights are somehow justified in the "War on
Terror., 56 But these claims are flawed on both factual and legal grounds. As
a matter of fact, as I have already indicated, various national security experts
maintain that many of the overreaching, rights-repressing post-9/1 1 measures
do not actually advance national security.57 Conversely, many measures that
will actually advance national security are completely consistent with civil
liberties. That is true, for instance, of most of the specific proposals that
were made by the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, 58 including such mundane
but essential measures as: updating the FBI's antiquated computer system, 59
hiring more interpreters for the pertinent languages, 60 and ending the bureau-
cratic turf battles between various agencies.6'
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. See JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 205 (2006). John Yoo was an Assistant Attorney General with the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel from 2001-2003. Id. at 19.
57. See generally RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR
ON TERROR (2004); BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN
AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (2003).
58. See generally THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (July 22, 2004), available at
http://www.9-1 lcommission.gov/report/91IReport.pdf; accord U.S. S. SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE & U.S. H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, JOINT INQUIRY INTO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATrACKS OF SEPT.
11, 2001, S. REP. No. 107-351, at 1-2 (2d Sess. 2002).
59. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 58, at 427.
60. Id. at 426.
61. Seeid.at400.
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III. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S POST-9/1 1 ABUSES OF POWER, WHICH
HAVE BEEN CONDEMNED BY IDEOLOGICALLY DIVERSE JUDGES AND OTHER
LEGAL EXPERTS
Now let me summarize the bottom-line legal flaw in the Bush admini-
62stration's position: Neither the pertinent statutes, nor the United States
Constitution, contain any blanket exception for national security emergencies
of the sort that President Bush and proponents of his broadly-viewed execu-
tive power are reading into them. 63 Therefore, the ACLU has brought vari-
ous lawsuits to challenge many post-9/1 1 civil liberties violations, and many
judges, across the ideological spectrum, have ruled in their favor.'
The administration's overreaching has earned two unusual repudiations
from the United States Supreme Court in two cases it has decided on point:
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 5 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.66 Most of the Justices who
ruled in these cases are conservative republicans who were appointed by
conservative republican presidents. Moreover, most of them have very broad
views of presidential power. 67 Therefore, it is really noteworthy that even
they have rebuffed the administration's claims of unilateral, unchecked
power in the "War on Terror." That underscores how extreme these claims
are. Specifically, the Court rejected the administration's claimed power to
imprison anyone-even an American citizen-forever, without access to a
lawyer or a court.68 The Court also rejected the administration's claimed
power to try non-citizens before military commissions that violate the mini-
mal fundamental fairness principles in the Geneva Conventions 6 9-and our
62. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Electronic
Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048
(1998) (codified as amended 55 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1862 (2000).
63. See, e.g., Elizabeth Drew, Power Grab, 53 N.Y. REv. OF BooKs 11, June 22, 2006,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19092?email; Nat Hentoff, Don't Ask, Don't
Tell, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0605,hentoff,71946,6.html.
64. See, e.g., ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Doe
v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
65. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
66. No. 05-184, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 29, 2006).
67. See Bernard Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law: 1987-1996, 32 TULSA L.J.
493, 552 (1997) (noting the Rehnquist Court's deference to presidential power); Harold
Hongju Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,
2 (1994) (claiming that the Rehnquist Court showed a disturbing pattern of reflexive deference
to presidential power in foreign affairs).
68. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
69. See Hamdan, No. 05-184, slip op. at 49.
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own Constitution 7°-thus endangering members of our own military when
they are captured by our enemies.7'
In Hamdi, the United States Supreme Court's first decision considering
the executive branch's power in the "War on Terror," the Court strongly
condemned the Bush administration's post-9/11 overreaching in general.72
Significantly for this Goodwin Lecture series' theme, the Court's plurality
opinion was written by none other than Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who
is, of course, the Court's first female Justice.7 3 Her forceful language not
only rebuffed the administration's specific overreaching at issue in that case,
but it also signaled the unconstitutionality of many other post-9/1 1 meas-
ures.74 In fact, Justice O'Connor's opinion has been widely cited and quoted
in many later lower court decisions in which the ACLU and others have suc-
cessfully challenged many other abuses.75 These abuses range from war-
rantless, suspicion-less searches of library records under the USA PATRIOT
Act,7 6 to invasions of the free speech and privacy rights of people who are
just peacefully protesting government policies.77  Justice O'Connor con-
demned the administration's efforts to "condense power into a single branch
of government," and she eloquently declared that "a state of war is not a
70. See id at 38.
71. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, The Guantanamo Decision: Military Fought to Abide by
War Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at Al.
"We argued that this would come back to haunt us and it would taint the military justice sys-
tem," said retired Rear Adm. Donald Guter, the Navy's top uniformed lawyer when "military
commission" trials for Guantanamo Bay detainees were first proposed in 2001. "We were
warning that you would have to be careful to provide basic protections."
Id.; see also Mark Mazzetti & Neil A. Lewis, Military Lawyers Caught in Middle on Tribu-
nals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at Al ("The top uniformed Marine lawyer, Brig. Gen. James
C. Walker, said in his testimony that no civilized country ought to deny defendants the right to
see evidence against them and that the United States 'should not be the first."'); Charlie Sav-
age, Military Lawyers See Limits on Trial Input, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27, 2006, at Al ("Most
military lawyers strongly oppose allowing secret evidence, arguing that such a plan would
probably violate the Geneva Conventions and create a precedent for enemies of the United
States to use show-trials for captured Americans.").
72. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-38.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); United States
v. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1297 (M.D. Fla. 2004) ("[I]n 'our most challenging and
uncertain moments.., we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which
we.fight abroad,"' (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532)).
76. See, e.g., Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 76 (D. Conn. 2005), dismissed as
moot, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
77. See, e.g., ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 771 (E.D. Mich. 2006);
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
2007]
95
: Nova Law Review 31, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citi-
zens." 78
Despite this emphatic United States Supreme Court ruling, the Bush
administration has continued to act precisely as if the "War on Terror" is
indeed a blank check for the president to ignore not only the constitutional
rights of the Nation's citizens, but also the constitutional powers of the other
branches of our national government. Indeed, when Attorney General Al-
berto Gonzales testified before the Senate to defend the NSA's warrantless
domestic spying in 2006, he refused to recognize that there was anything the
president could not do in the name of national security.79
In opposition to that limitless concept of executive power, I would like
to quote one of the constitutional scholars who also testified before the Sen-
ate on this issue. His name is Bruce Fein, and he is a conservative republican
who served in both the Nixon and Reagan administrations.8 ° Again, I am
stressing the important theme that critiques of the Bush administration's
overreaching come from across the political and ideological spectrum. In
Bruce Fein's words:
The theory invoked by the president [in an attempt] to justify
[the NSA domestic spying] .. .would equally justify mail open-
ings, burglaries, torture or internment camps, all in the name of
gathering foreign intelligence .... Unless rebuked, it will lie
78. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
79. See Dana Milbank, In Quizzing a Reticent Gonzales, Senators Encounter a Power
Shortage, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at A2. Gonzales was asked whether "President Bush,
invoking his 'inherent powers' under the Constitution, also authorized warrantless eavesdrop-
ping on domestic calls, opening of Americans' mail and e-mail, and searches of their homes
and offices?" Id. The Attorney General responded, "I am not comfortable going down the
road of saying yes or no as to what the president has or has not authorized." Id. (quoting
Attorney General Gonzales). See also Nat Hentoff, Nominee Gonzales Speaks for Himself,
Sort of TULSA WORLD, Jan. 25, 2005, at A15.
Sen. Russ Feingold, D-Wis., asked Gonzales whether the president has "the authority to
authorize violations of the criminal law under duly enacted statutes (by Congress) simply be-
cause he's commander in chief?"
Gonzales [replied]: "To the extent that there is a decision made to ignore a statute, I con-
sider that a very significant decision, and one that I would personally be involved with.. with a
great deal of care and seriousness."
"Well," Feingold said, "that sounds to me like the president still remains above the law."
When [Senator] Kennedy asked the same question, Gonzales said it was "a very, very dif-
ficult question."
Id.
80. See Charles Babington & Dan Eggen, Gonzales Seeks to Clarify Testimony on Spy-
ing, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2006, at A8 (describing Bruce Fein as "a government lawyer in the
Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations"); see also Brian Gilmore, A Conservative for
Impeachment, PROGRESSIvE, Dec. 2006, at 23.
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around like a loaded weapon, ready to be used by any [president]
who claims an urgent need."1
Indeed, the Bush administration has insisted on its power to pursue
some of the very policies that Bruce Fein deplored, including torture, 2 de-
spite international8 3 and United States law8' that absolutely outlaws it under
any circumstances.8 5  In the Fall of 2006, the ACLU held its nationwide
membership conference in Washington, D.C.8 6 The ACLU's Executive Di-
rector, Anthony Romero, gave a stirring opening address, and I especially
loved one of his lines after he had described some of President George W.
Bush's abuses of power. Romero then denounced President Bush as: "that
son of a. .. Bush!
' 87
IV. THE NON-PARTISAN NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES VIOLATIONS
INCLUDING VIOLATIONS DURING THE CURRENT "WAR ON TERROR," AND
OTHER NATIONAL CRISES
Before I level any more criticism at particular positions that the Bush
administration has taken, I want to stress that the ACLU always has been
staunchly non-partisan, never endorsing or opposing officials, but rather,
81. Jim Malone, VOA News: Congress, Legal Scholars Debate US. Domestic Spying,
U.S. FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 1, 2006.
82. Leon Panetta, A Republic... If You Can Keep It, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, July
9, 2006, available at http://www.panettainstitute.org/Commentaries/070906.htm. "Bruce Fein
... said that Addington and other [p]residential legal advisors had 'staked out powers that are
a universe beyond any other administration . . .[with the] ability to collect intelligence, to
open mail, to commit torture, to use electronic surveillance."' Id.
83. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (ratified by the United States, Oct. 21, 1994).
On 3 June 1994, the Secretary-General received a communication from the Government of the
United States of America requesting, in compliance with a condition set forth by the Senate of
the United States of America, in giving advice and consent to the ratification of the Conven-
tion, and in contemplation of the deposit of an instrument of ratification of the Convention by
the Government of the United States of America, that a notification should be made to all pre-
sent and prospective ratifying Parties to the Convention to the effect that: "...nothing in this
Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States of America
prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States."
Id. at n. 12 (alteration in original).
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A, 2441 (2000).
85. See id.
86. ACLU 2006 Membership Conference, http://action.aclu.org/conference/agendahtml
(last visited May 15, 2007).
87. Anthony D. Romero, ACLU Executive Dir., Keynote Address at the 2006 ACLU
Membership Conference (Oct. 16, 2006), audio available at
http://action.aclu.org/conference/webcasts.html#oct15.
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criticizing or praising each official's position on particular issues.8"
Throughout history, presidents have consistently earned criticism for unjusti-
fiably invading freedoms in the name of national security. This has been true
regardless of who was president, or what his political party was. Accord-
ingly, I keep telling my liberal friends that they should not disproportionately
demonize President Bush and former Attorney General John Ashcroft, who
was a special lightning rod for critics. That is because, alas, President
Bush's and Attorney General Ashcroft's actions are typical of what all presi-
dents and all attorneys general have done in response to all national security
crises.
After all, prior to 9/11, the worst terrorist attack on United States soil
was the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and former President Bill Clinton
and former Attorney General Janet Reno reacted much the same way that
George W. Bush and John Ashcroft did after 9/11. President Clinton and
Attorney General Reno pressured Congress to pass an "anti-terrorism" law89
that, in fact, extended far beyond terrorism and indeed undermined vital
freedoms even for people not suspected of any crime at all.9"
Just as civil liberties violations cross party lines, the same is true for
civil liberties support.91 Many members of Congress, both Republicans and
Democrats, have deplored the many unilateral post-9/1 1 rights-repressive
actions by the Executive Branch.92
Additionally, we have also seen strong bipartisan critiques of overreach-
ing congressional measures, including provisions in the USA PATRIOT
Act,9 3 which was rushed through Congress and signed by the president just
forty-five days after the terrorist attacks, with almost no hearings and almost
no debate, under enormous pressure from the Bush administration.94 One of
the strongest congressional critics of the USA PATRIOT Act is actually a
member of the House Republican Leadership--Alaska Congressman Don
88. See generally WOODY KLEIN, LIBERTIES LOST: THE ENDANGERED LEGACY OF THE
ACLU (2006); SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES (2d ed., So. I11. Univ.
Press 1999) (1990).
89. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
90. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Speech and Privacy, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE WAKE OF
CLINTON (Roger Pilon ed., 2000).
91. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Joins Conservatives to Restore Freedoms Lost
Under Patriot Act: "Patriots to Restore Checks and Balances" Hopes to Shape National Dia-
logue (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/generalU17577prs20050322.html.
cfm?ID=17798&c=206 [hereinafter ACLU Press Release, ACLU Joins Conservatives].
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Strossen, Safety and Freedom, supra note 9, at 79-80.
94. Bob Egelko, FBI May Check People's Reading Habits, Hous. CHRON., June 30,
2002, at 12.
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Young.95 Consider his extremely harsh condemnation of that law: "Worst
act we ever passed .... Everybody voted for it, but it was stupid. It was...
'emotional voting.' ' 96  Some USA PATRIOT Act provisions were even
questioned by the chairman of President Bush's re-election campaign, Mark
Racicot, former chairman of the Republican National Committee."
The ACLU's "Safe and Free" allies have included conservative citi-
zens' groups and officials such as the American Conservative Union, Ameri-
cans for Tax Reform, Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum, and major gunowners'
organizations. 98 Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association (NRA)
explained to NRA members why they should support the ACLU's "Safe and
Free" campaign, despite their enthusiastic support for President Bush on gun
rights and other issues. 99 He said:
Maybe you think that with President George W. Bush in the
White House, everything is safe. You think you can put aside your
principles, just this once, to be a loyal conservative.
... But if we, as conservatives, don't stand up for these fun-
damental truths, who will?
Never accept the idea that surrendering freedom-any free-
dom-is the price of feeling safe. 100
In the same vein, we have also heard strikingly strong criticisms from
the so-called "Religious Right," conservative Christians who campaigned for
John Ashcroft's appointment as Attorney General because they agree with
his views on abortion and gay rights. 101 Yet they still have decried the new
investigative guidelines Attorney General Ashcroft issued after the terrorist
attacks, which allow surveillance and infiltration of religious and political
groups without any suspicion whatsoever."°2 For example, the former head
95. See Rick Montgomery, Federal Patriot Act Meets with Grass-Roots Resistance, KAN.
CITY STAR, May 19, 2003 at Al.
96. Id.
97. See Audrey Hudson, Kerry Criticized on Patriot Act: Cheney Says Democrat's
Original Stance 'Was Right', WASH. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at A07.
98. See ACLU Press Release, ACLU Joins Conservatives, supra note 91.
99. Wayne LaPierre, NRA, The Conservative Political Action Conference: Frightened or
Free? (Feb. 2002), http://www.nrahq.org/transcripts/cpac0202.asp.
100. Id.
101. See Neil A. Lewis, Ashcroft's Terrorism Policies Dismay Some Conservatives, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 24, 2002, at Al.
102. Id.; see also JOHN ASHCROFT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR FBI
NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (Oct. 31,
2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/nsiguidelines.pdf.
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of the Family Research Council, Ken Connor, said: "'It's important that we
[religious] conservatives maintain a high degree of vigilance .... We need
to ask ourselves... [h]ow would our groups fare under these new rules?"" 3
The extraordinarily diverse critics of the government's post-9/1 1 over-
reaching have included: prominent republican officials and conservative
citizens' groups; experts with enormous experience in national security,
counter-intelligence, and law enforcement; leaders of the business commu-
nity; and groups that never before have taken public positions on these kinds
of issues-the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, the National Association of Realtors, the Financial
Services Roundtable, and-of special significance in this law school for-
um-the Association of Corporate Counsel. "° On October 4, 2005, these
organizations wrote to Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, to call for cutbacks on the USA PATRIOT Act's expansion
of the government's power to obtain "voluminous and often sensitive records
from American businesses, without judicial oversight or other meaningful
checks on the government's power."' 5 These organizations objected to the
USA PATRIOT Act's invasions of the confidentiality rights of business enti-
ties themselves, as well as the Act's invasions of the privacy rights of the
entities' customers. 106 As they wrote to Senator Specter:
[T]he rights of businesses to confidential files-records about our
customers or our employees, as well as our trade secrets and other
proprietary information--can too easily be obtained.., under...
the Patriot Act ....
... Reforming the Patriot Act is an important step to ensure
that powerful law enforcement tools are focused on those who
would do us harm and that privacy rights and business[] interests
are protected .... 07
I can sum up my points about all of the unjustified, unconstitutional
post-9/1 1 measures by quoting a couple satiric, but apt, definitions from the
Nation Magazine's dictionary of current political terminology. Here are its
two definitions for USA PATRIOT Act: "1. The pre-emptive strike on
103. Lewis, supra note 101.
104. Letter from Ass'n of Corp. Counsel et al. to Arlen Specter, Chairman, Senate Judici-
ary Comm. (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/WOissues/civilliber-
ties/theusapatriotact/BusgrpLtr04oct05.pdf.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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American freedoms to prevent the terrorists from destroying them first. 2.
The elimination of one of the reasons why they hate us.""°8 In the same vein,
here is how the Nation's dictionary defines 9/11: "Tragedy used to justify
any administration policy."1
0 9
V. GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN CIVIL
LIBERTIES DURING A NATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS
For details about the many specific post-9/11 issues and cases, I urge
you to visit the ACLU's website. "' It is a treasure trove of information,
including all of the pertinent statutes, court rulings, and lawyers' briefs.
Now I will lay out the general constitutional principles that govern civil lib-
erties in a time of a national security crisis-the general standards that we
apply in assessing any specific post-9/11 measure.
As to individual rights in the context of national emergencies, the
United States Constitution contains only one express limitation on just one
right in solely two specified types of national emergencies."' The "Suspen-
sion Clause" empowers Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, the
time-honored procedure for challenging government detention.1 12 Further,
the "Suspension Clause" strictly limits Congress' suspension power to
"Cases of Rebellion or Invasion," and even in such cases it permits suspen-
sion of the writ only when "the public Safety may require it."" 3
Beyond the strictly limited circumstances in which the Constitution au-
thorizes Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, the Constitution pro-
vides no textual warrant for any further limits on rights when the national
security may be in peril. In that key respect, it is distinguishable from both
the constitutions of many other countries" 4 and from regional and interna-
tional human rights treaties."'
In short, the Framers of the United States Constitution deliberately re-
jected a general provision of more government power and fewer individual
108. Katrina vanden Heuvel, Dictionary of Republicanisms, THE NATION, Dec. 12, 2005,
at 23.
109. Id.
110. http://www.aclu.org.
111. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
112. Id. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." Id.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. See, e.g., NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, CASES AND
MATERIALS (2003).
115. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (2d ed. 2000).
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rights, in any national security or other emergency. This key point has been
stressed by important United States Supreme Court opinions arising from
various emergencies throughout Unites States history, from the Civil War "6
to the Korean War." 7 For example, in 1934, the Court declared:
[W]e must consider the relation of emergency to constitutional
power ....
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not in-
crease granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions im-
posed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was
adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power...
and its limitations of... power ... were determined in the light of
emergency and they are not altered by emergency." 
8
This same crucial point was stressed, specifically in the post-9/11 con-
text, by United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, in his opinion
in the Hamdi case. 1 9 Of all the Court's post-9/1 1 opinions, Justice Scalia's
opinion in that case most strongly condemned the Bush administration's
claims of executive power and most strongly supported individual constitu-
tional rights. Notably, that opinion was joined by Justice John Paul Ste-
vens. 20 I say "notably" because Justice Stevens is the Court's most outspo-
ken liberal, whereas Justice Scalia is its most outspoken conservative.
116. SeeExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by
the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigen-
cies of [the] government.
Id.
117. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649-50 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
The appeal . . . that we declare the existence of inherent powers ex necessitate to meet an
emergency asks us to do what many think would be wise, although it is something the forefa-
thers omitted. They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for au-
thoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also
suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies. Aside
from suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in time of rebellion or invasion,
when the public safety may require it, they made no express provision for exercise of extraor-
dinary authority because of a crisis. I do not think we rightfully may so amend their work ....
Id.
118. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934).
119. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "The Suspen-
sion Clause was by design a safety valve, the Constitution's only 'express provision for exer-
cise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis."' Id (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co., 343 U.S. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
120. Id. at 554.
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In sum, apart from the writ of habeas corpus, the Constitution affords
the same strong protection to individual rights during national crises as at
any other time. For example, the government's many post-9/1 1 restrictions
on First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, and association are still pre-
sumptively unconstitutional, even during a national emergency.12 ' The
United States Supreme Court resoundingly reaffirmed this core constitutional
principle in the famous "Pentagon Papers Case" in 1971, while the United
States was engaged in the Vietnam War.' 22  The Nixon administration
claimed that publication of the Pentagon Papers-the government's secret
study of United States' involvement in Vietnam-would endanger many
American lives, as well as national security. 123 Yet, the Court rejected this
claim, because the government did not satisfy its heavy constitutional burden
of proof under the strict scrutiny standard. 124 Under that standard, any rights-
restricting measure is presumptively unconstitutional and the government
can overcome that presumption only by proving that the restriction is neces-
sary to promote a purpose of compelling importance. 1
25
The government can easily satisfy the compelling purpose prong of this
strict scrutiny standard for any post-9/11 measure; of course, protecting na-
tional security meets that test. But it is much harder for the government to
satisfy the second prong of strict scrutiny, by proving that the measure is
necessary or, as the United States Supreme Court often phrases it, that the
measure is the least restrictive alternative. In other words, if the government
could promote national security through alternative means, which are less
restrictive of fundamental rights, then it must do so. 126
It really does maximize security, with the minimal feasible cost to lib-
erty. Not only is this the very same analysis that the United States Supreme
Court uses as a matter of constitutional law, strict judicial scrutiny, but it also
reflects just plain common sense. After all, why should we give up our free-
121. See, e.g., Strossen, Presentation, Free Speech in Wartime, supra note 9, at 930. See
generally ACLU, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: DISSENT IN POST-9/11 AMERICA (May 2003).
122. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
123. Brief for the United States at 3, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (Nos. 1873 & 1885). The government "now seeks to bar only the publication of a
relatively small number of documents whose disclosure would pose a 'grave and immediate
danger to the security of the United States."' Id. at 3. "[P]ublication of the Defense Depart-
ment studies would pose a serious danger to the armed forces." Id. at 18.
124. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
125. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 534-55,
761-889 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the various levels of scrutiny applied by courts to restric-
tions on fundamental rights).
126. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (articulating
the least restrictive alternative test).
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dom if we do not gain security in return? Or, could we gain as much security
without giving up as much freedom?
In short, the general constitutional standard for assessing rights restric-
tions, including during times of war and other national emergencies, is also a
sensible policy analysis. It is the very standard that was unanimously en-
dorsed by the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, which was chaired by New Jer-
sey's former Governor Tom Kean, a republican, and co-chaired by former
Indiana Congressman Lee Hamilton, a democrat. 127
Applying this sensible and constitutional test to the myriad post-9/11
policies that have been implemented or proposed, many have passed scru-
tiny, and hence, have not been opposed by the ACLU or our many diverse
allies. For example, of the over 150 provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act,
the ACLU and our allies have criticized only about twenty. l'2 Moreover,
even as to those provisions, we have not advocated repeal, but rather, reform:
revisions that would preserve the core of the powers the government says it
needs to protect our lives, but subject to judicial review, Congressional over-
sight, and other limits to bring them back in line with constitutional checks
and balances. 2 9
This constrained and constructive criticism hardly warrants the charges
of "hysteria,"' 30 and even treason,13' that John Ashcroft leveled at his civil
libertarian critics while he was Attorney General. Specifically, he said that
we "only aid terrorists... [and] give ammunition to America's enemies."' 32
127. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 58, at xi.
Recommendation: The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power should
be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b)
that there is adequate supervision of the executive's use of the powers to ensure protection of
civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to
properly confine its use.
Id. at 394-95.
128. See, e.g., ACLU, Reform the Patriot Act, supra note 47.
129. ACLU, The Patriot Act: Where it Stands, http://action.aclu.org/reformthepatriotact/
whereitstands.html (last visited May 15, 2007).
130. Curt Anderson, Ashcroft Slams Critics' 'Hysteria', CBS NEWS.COM, Sept. 16, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/18/national/main573894.shtml.
131. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Ashcroft Quits Top Justice Post, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004.
132. Dep 't of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2001) (tes-
timony of Attorney General John Ashcroft), available at www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/
1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm.
We need honest, reasoned debate; not fearmongering. To those who pit Americans against
immigrants, and citizens against non-citizens; to those who scare peace-loving people with
phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists-for they erode
our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and
pause to America's friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of
evil.
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I say "we" advisedly, since Attorney General John Ashcroft made that accu-
sation when he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee several years
ago, and Yours Truly had testified shortly before him! 133 This reminds me of
a headline in one of my favorite publications, The Onion. This particular
headline read: "Bush Asks Congress for $30 Billion to Help Fight War on
Criticism."'' 34 In the same vein, another Onion headline warned: "Revised
Patriot Act Will Make It Illegal to Read [Original] Patriot Act."' 135  Well,
most members of Congress would not have to worry, since they have admit-
ted that they did not even read the USA PATRIOT Act before voting for
it! 136
VI. POST-9/1 1 CONCERNS SPECIFICALLY REGARDING WOMEN
For the remainder of this article, in keeping with the theme of this
year's Goodwin Lecture Series, I am going to discuss some post-9/11 con-
cerns specifically regarding women. These concerns have been the focus of
much of the ACLU's work in the past five years, not only by our staff mem-
bers who have been working on our "Safe and Free" campaign, but also by
our Women's Rights Project, which was founded by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in 1972.'
Let me first list a half dozen of the major ways in which the civil liber-
ties of women, in particular, have been affected post-9/1 1. I will then elabo-
rate on a couple of these:
First, Muslim women have been subjected to discriminatory, harassing
treatment based solely on their religious attire. 138
Second, certain immigrant women, as well as their families and com-
munities, have suffered devastating consequences as a result of the unwar-
Id.
133. Dep "t of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2001)
(testimony of Nadine Strossen, President, ACLU), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print testimony.cfm?id= 128&wit id=83.
134. Bush Asks Congress for $30 Billion to Help Fight War on Criticism, THE ONION, July
2, 2003, http://www.theonion.com/content/node/28954.
135. Revised Patriot Act Will Make It Illegal to Read Patriot Act, THE ONION, Sept. 17,
2003, http://www.theonion.com/content/node/32312.
136. See generally Declan McCullagh, Congress Plans Scrutiny of Patriot Act, CNET
NEWS.COM, May 9, 2005, http://news.com.com/Congress+plans+scrutiny+of+Patriot+Act/
2100-1028_3-5700986.html (noting that many members of Congress did not read the initial
enacted version of the USA PATRIOT Act).
137. See, e.g, SHANTI HUBBARD, ACLU WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT
2005, available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/wrpannualreport2005.pdf.
138. See infra part VII.
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ranted mass detentions and deportations of the men in their lives, based on
ethnic and religious profiling. The ACLU documented these problems in a
report issued in 2004, Worlds Apart: How Deporting Immigrants after 9/11
Tore Families Apart and Shattered Communities.'39  The ACLU also has
pursued various legal remedies for these violations not only in the United
States, 140 but also before the United Nation's Special Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, in Geneva. 141
Third, as a result of the post-9/1 1 crackdowns on immigrants in general,
female victims of domestic violence and other crimes in immigrant commu-
nities are now chilled in their efforts to seek safety, due to greater likelihood
that they, or their family members, will face deportation. 1
41
Fourth, similarly, immigrant women workers who face exploitation,
discrimination, and sexual abuse on the job have been deterred from report-
ing these violations, and hence are increasingly preyed upon. 14 The ACLU
detailed these problems in a complaint filed with the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights in 2006,'44 since they violate international human
rights standards that bind the United States.
Fifth, one of the many problems resulting from the expanded police
powers that have flourished since 9/11 is the migration of those methods to
non-terrorism-related law enforcement, including drug law enforcement. 
41
139. ACLU, WORLDS APART: How DEPORTING IMMIGRANTS AFTER 9/11 ToRE FAMILIES
APART AND SHATrERED COMMUNITIES (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/worldsapart.pdf.
140. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94
(D.D.C. 2002).
141. See, e.g., Petition to the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Jan.
27, 2004, available at http://aclu.org/FilesPDFs/complaint.final.012704.pdf (submitted on
behalf of certain immigrants detained by the United States in connection with its investigation
into the events of 9/11); see also ACLU, AMERICA'S DISAPPEARED: SEEKING INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRANTS DETAINED AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/un%20report.pdf.
142. See, e.g., Norman Miller, Newcomers to U.S. Hesitant to Report Domestic Abuse,
BOSTON HERALD, May 27, 2006, at 80; Fernando Quintero, Immigrants Often Silent on Family
Violence, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 2, 2006, at 19A; Amanda Keim, Battered Immigrants
Fear Police As Much As Husbands, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at A18.
143. See infra part VIII.
144. ACLU et al., Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Undocumented
Workers by the United States of America, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Nov. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/images/asset uploadfile946_27232.pdf; see also Press Release, ACLU,
Undocumented Workers Bring Plea for Non-Discrimination to Human Rights Body (Nov. 1,
2006), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrim/27235prs20061101.html.
145. ACLU, CAUGHT IN THE NET: THE IMPACT OF DRUG POLICIES ON WOMEN AND
FAMILIES 16 (2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/assetupload file393
_23513.pdf.
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As a result, the number of women in prison has skyrocketed and their chil-
dren are often left parentless, to flounder in the foster care system. 46 The
ACLU Women's Rights Project documented these devastating problems in a
2005 report, Caught in the Net. The Impact of Drug Policies on Women and
Families. 1
47
Sixth, many of the key post-9/11 players on all issues-including plain-
tiffs, 148 lawyers, 149 government officials,'5 0 whistleblowers, 5 ' judges, 5 2 and
146. Id. at 49-50.
147. Id.
148. See Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, 459 F. Supp. 2d 592 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (plaintiffs included several organizations that either are headed by women and/or work
for women's rights); Gordon v. FBI, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (plaintiff was
Rebecca A. Gordon); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004)
(plaintiff was Sibel Edmonds); ACORN v. Philadelphia, No. 03-4312 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2004)
(plaintiff was the National Organization for Women); Complaint, Am. Friends Serv. Comm.
v. Dep't of Def., No. 06-2529, (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2007) (plaintiffs included several organiza-
tions that are headed by women and/or work for women's rights).
149. Prominent female lawyers handling major post-9/11 lawsuits include: Kate Martin,
Director of the Center for National Security Studies who played a key role in, among others,
the challenge to government secrecy of the names of post-9/1 I detainees, see Center for Na-
tional Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002); Bar-
bara Olshansky, Assistant Legal Director for the Center for Constitutional Rights, represented
Guantanamo Bay detainees in Rasul v. Bush, which held that detainees held at the Guan-
tanamo Bay facility could challenge their incarceration in federal court, Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004); Ann Beeson, Associate Legal Director of the ACLU, was the lead counsel on
many important challenges to the government's post-9/11 overreaching, including the NSA
lawsuit and USA PATRIOT Act challenges, ACLU, Ann Beeson, Associate Legal Director,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/17310res20030415.html (last visited May 15, 2007);
and Donna Newman represented Jose Padilla-the citizen who has been imprisoned as an
alleged "enemy combatant" whose case went to the United States Supreme Court, Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
150. E.g., Condoleezza Rice was Secretary of State, and former National Security Advi-
sor, Valerie E. Caproni, was General Counsel for the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FBI Executives-Valerie E. Caproni, http://www.fbi.gov/libref/executives/caproni.htm (last
visited May 15, 2007). Elizabeth Redman is Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
and has held this position at the Department of Homeland Security since the inception of the
Office of Inspector General in March 2003. Dep't of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector
Gen., Semiannual Report to Cong. 4, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG Fall 2003_SAR.pdf. Jamie Gorelick held
key positions in the Clinton administration and was the only female member of the bipartisan
9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission, ONLINE NEwsHOUR WITH JIM LEHRER, Mar. 24,
2004, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/terrorism/jan-june04/91 Icommission 3-
24.html. Ms. Gorelick received lots of press because some administration officials tried to
blame her, when she had been in the Clinton Justice Department, for what they saw as legal
obstacles to sharing of terrorism-related intelligence information between the FBI and CIA.
Id.; see also Adam Nagourney & Eric Lichtblau, Evaluating the 9/11 Hearings' Winners and
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journalists 53-have been women. Consider, for example, the critical roles
Losers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at 1.23. The blame that was placed on Ms. Gorelick's
editorials in the New York Times and other leading publications. See generally id.
151. Coleen Rowley, who as Chief Legal Advisor for the FBI, wrote a paper detailing how
the FBI mishandled intelligence pre-9/l 1 and subsequently testified in front of the 9/11 Com-
mission. Press Release, ACLU, Famous FBI Whistleblower to Speak (Apr. 7, 2005),
http://aclu-ia.org/news.asp?ID=17. Sibel Edmonds founded the National Security Whistle-
blowers Coalition. Nat'l Security Whistleblowers Coalition-Staff,
http://www.nswbc.org/nswbcstaff.htm (last visited May 15, 2007). Jesselyn Radack worked
for the FBI and was fired because of whistleblowing. Jesselyn Radack, My Story,
http://www.patriotictruthteller.net/mystory.html (last visited May 15, 2007). Ms. Radack
wrote a book titled The Canary in the Coal Mine: Blowing the Whistle in the Case of "Ameri-
can Taliban" John Walker Lindh. Id. The book is about her experience, actions, and her
point of view. Id
152. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, was "the first woman named to the [United States]
Supreme Court." National Women's Hall of Fame, Women of the Hall: Sandra Day
O'Connor, http://www.greatwomen.org/women.php?action=viewone&id= 115 (last visited
May 15, 2007). Judge Anna Diggs Taylor "became the first black woman judge to be ap-
pointed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan." Michigan
Supreme Court Historical Society, Anna Diggs Taylor, http://www.micourthistory.org/
resources/women-and-law/taylor.php (last visited May 15, 2007). Colleen Kollar-Kotelly was
appointed to serve as a judge for the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia: Judge Collen Kollar-Kotelly,
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/kotelly-bio.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). Judge Shim A.
Scheindlin, a judge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
issued an important decision concerning the material witness statute in the case concerning
Osama Awadallah, a Jordanian-born student who was charged with making false statements at
a grand jury proceeding. Press Release, ACLU, Government Cannot Use Material Witness
Statute to Detain People, ACLU Tells Appeals Court (Nov. 22, 2002), http://www.aclu.org/
safefree/general/17113prs20021122.html?ssrc=RSS. Judge Denise Page Hood, a judge in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, ruled on the ACLU's
challenge regarding Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Press Release, ACLU,
PATRIOT Act Fears Are Stifling Free Speech, ACLU Says in Challenge to Law (Nov. 3,
2003), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/patriot/I8418prs20031103.html. The lead plaintiff in the
ACLU's lawsuit was the Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor. Id. Sixth, there was
Judge Gladys Kessler, judge in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
who ruled on the 9/11 Committee on National Security Systems v. Department of Justice
criminal case, which "ordered the Justice Department to produce the names of all detainees
and their lawyers within 15 days." Human Rights First, September 11 th, 2001 and the Courts,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/cases/courtcases.htm (last visited May 15,
2007). Finally, Judge Gladys Kessler, sitting on the same court, "issued a blunt indictment of
the Bush administration's legal handling of prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in
Cuba." Carol D. Leoning, A Judge's Sharp Opinion, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2006, at A17.
153. Dana Priest received a Pulitzer Prize for breaking the story about the secret CIA
prisons. Dana Priest: 2006 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Category of Beat Reporting,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 2, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/linkset/2006/04/17/LI2006041700530.html. Leslie Cauley broke the story about
the NSA's domestic spying. Cauley, supra note 36. Paisley Dodds received the Hugh M.
Hefner First Amendment Award in 2006 for her coverage of Guantanamo Bay. U. Chi. Law
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that have been played by women from judges such as Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor and Judge Anna Diggs Taylor-whose key roles I have already
noted, to courageous FBI whistleblower, Coleen Rowley-whom Time
Magazine hailed as a "Person of the Year" in 2002, 54 to the members of the
Raging Grannies-women of a certain age who have been ACLU clients in
important cases all over the country helping us to challenge the government's
post-9/l1 surveillance of citizens who are simply exercising their First
Amendment rights of peaceful protest.' Given the longstanding, ongoing
stereotypes and discrimination that women have faced in many areas, and
given the glass ceilings that women have faced in the national security arena
in particular, 56 we should be cognizant of these many women who have
played key roles in keeping us safe and free.
As I just noted, the Pentagon and other government agencies have been
spying on citizens all over the country who are simply exercising First
Amendment rights, but who are treated like terrorists just because they dare
to dissent from certain government policies. To underscore that point, let me
cite one current example from right here in Fort Lauderdale. The ACLU
recently obtained government documents through one of their lawsuits, de-
tailing massive surveillance of a peaceful protest that had been planned by
the Broward Anti-War Coalition during the Fort Lauderdale Air & Sea
Show.' 57 The many government agencies that collected information about
School, Playboy Foundation Announces Winners of 2006 Hugh M. Hefner First Amendment
Awards, (May 11, 2006), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/stone-award.html. Lucy Dalglish was
executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. Reporters Commit-
tee for Freedom of the Press, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press: A Short
History, http://www.rcfp.org/about.html (last visited May 15, 2007). Ms. Dalglish advocated
for embattled reporters post-9/1 1. Id.
154. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 32;
see also Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 (D.D.C. 2004). "Sibel Edmonds
[is] a Turkish-American woman [who] was hired as [an FBI] translator. . . shortly after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 because of her knowledge of Middle Eastern lan-
guages," and was subsequently "fired in retaliation for reporting security breaches and possi-
ble espionage within the Bureau." Press Release, ACLU, Sibel Edmonds v. Department of
Justice: A Patriot Silenced, Fighting to Keep America Safe (Sept. 26, 2005),
http://www.aclu.org/scotus/2005/19950prs20050926.html; see also David Rose, An Inconven-
ient Patriot, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2005, at 264.
155. See Anemona Hartocollis, With 'Grannies' in the Dock, a Sitting Judge Will Squirm,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at B 1.
156. See Jo Kadlecek, Chipping at a Political Glass Ceiling, COLUM. U. REC., Mar. 26,
2004, at 5, available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/record/archives/vol29/vol29_issl2/Pg.5-
2912.pdf.
157. Press Release, ACLU, Pentagon Documents Uncovered by ACLU Shed New Light
on Surveillance of Florida Peace Activists (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://www.aclufl.org/newsevents/?action=viewRelease&emailAlertlD=2169.
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this event include: the Department of Defense, the Joint Terrorism Task
Force, the United States Army Recruiting Command, and the Miami-Dade
Police Department.' Moreover, the collected information has been stored
in a military anti-terrorism database. 5 9 According to the government's re-
cords, the dangerous activities planned by this allegedly terrorist Broward
Anti-War group include "guerrilla theater and other forms of subversive
propaganda."' 60  Sadly, our government appears to be confusing guerrilla
theater with guerrilla war!
Now, let me briefly expand on a couple of the post-9/11 issues specifi-
cally affecting women. I will start with the most visible one, arising from the
religious attire that some Muslim women choose to wear, thus being visibly
identified as members of a group that has borne a disproportionate brunt of
unjustified post-9/1 1 measures.
VII. POST-9/1 1 DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN WHO ARE VISIBLY
IDENTIFIABLE AS MUSLIM THROUGH THEIR RELIGIOUS ATTIRE
Let me provide some background context for this issue. Prior to 9/11,
the ACLU and many diverse allies had made enormous headway in our
"Campaign Against Racial Profiling,"'' 61 to the extent that even President
George W. Bush 162 and his first Attorney General, John Ashcroft, 163 had
promised to halt such policies as arresting people for "'Driving While
Black.'''64 However, after 9/11 we suddenly saw widespread support for
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See ACLU, Racial Profiling: Old and New, http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racial-
profiling/index.html (last visited May 15, 2007); see Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Wins Na-
tional Public Relations Award for Campaign to End Racial Profiling (June 9, 2000),
http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/ 15948prs20000609.html [hereinafter ACLU
Press Release, ACLU Wins National Public Relations Award].
162. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Applauds Introduction of 'End Racial Profiling Act' as
ACLU Releases Report on Racial Profiling (Feb. 26, 2004),
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17018prs20040226.html. "On February 27, 2001, Presi-
dent Bush told a joint session of Congress that racial profiling 'is wrong and we will end it in
America."' Id.
163. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Applauds Ashcroft Move on Racial Profiling: Calls on
Attorney General to Examine Other Racial Justice Issues (Mar. 1, 2001),
http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/15833prs20010301.html. "In a letter sent to
the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ashcroft called on
Congress to consider racial profiling legislation within six months. If Congress does not act,
Ashcroft said, he would instruct the Justice Department to begin its own study of available
data." Id.
164. ACLU Press Release, ACLU Wins National Public Relations Award, supra note 161.
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this very same demographic profiling, although targeting different people.'65
Again, the government has been targeting too many people, based not on
what they have done, but only on who they are. The very hardest hit have
been young, Muslim immigrant men from the Middle East or South Asia. 1
66
Based on profiling, they have been subjected to unjustified surveillance, in-
terrogation, detention, incarceration, and deportation. 1
67
This post-9/11 profiling-along with all demographic profiling-
violates individual rights, since it substitutes discriminatory stereotypes and
guilt by association for individualized suspicion. 168 Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that civil libertarians have criticized it on principled grounds. 169 You
might be surprised, though, to learn that counter-terrorism experts also have
criticized such profiling on pragmatic grounds, from a national security per-
spective. 7 ° This concern was raised, for instance, by a group of senior
United States intelligence specialists, in a memorandum sent to law enforce-
ment agencies worldwide, shortly after 9/11. "' The memo warned that look-
ing for someone who fits a demographic profile is just not as useful as look-
ing for someone who acts suspiciously.' Indeed, the memo even suggests
that over-reliance on profiles might be one of the reasons for our govern-
ment's tragic failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. 171 More recently, U.S. intel-
ligence agencies have expressed mounting concern that future terrorist at-
tacks may well involve Al Qaeda members from Asia or Africa, expressly to
elude the ethnic profiles that U.S. personnel have been using. 17 In short, this
165. See, e.g., Henry Weinstein et al., Racial Profiling Seems Inevitable in Terror Climate,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at A9; Jeff Jacoby, Frisking the Innocent, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 20, 2002, at A15.
166. See id.
167. Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), The Status of Muslim Civil Rights
in the United States 2002: Stereotypes & Civil Liberties: Executive Summary,
http://www.cair-net.org/asp/execsum2002.asp (last visited May 15, 2007). See generally
LAWYER COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Immigrants, Refugees, and Minorities, in
ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED
STATES 30-106 (2003).
168. See generally ACLU, SANCTIONED BIAS: RACIAL PROFILING SINCE 9/11 (2004),
available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/racial%20profiling%20report.pdf.
169. See generally id
170. See id at 3-4.
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id.
173. See generally Bill Dedman, Memo Warns Against Use of Profiling as Defense,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2001, at A27. See generally Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining
Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195 (2003).
174. Protecting Dr. King's Legacy: Justice and Liberty in the Wake of September 11 th:
Forum on National Security and the Constitution Before Congressman John Conyers (Jan. 24,
20071
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demographic profiling is one of many post-9/ 11 measures that suffer from
the dual flaw I noted earlier: it does decrease liberty, but it does not increase
security.
Muslim men certainly have endured extreme profiling tactics, including
the sweeping post-9/11 arrests and incommunicado incarcerations that were
strongly denounced even by the Justice Department's own Inspector Gen-
eral. '75 Through such measures, Muslim men certainly have suffered serious
discriminatory rights violations post-9/1 1.176 However, Muslim women are
more readily identifiable, as adherents of Islam, when they choose to wear
traditional religious attire, such as the headscarf or hijab. Hence, post-9/1 1,
throughout the United States, there have been dramatic increases in reported
incidents of discrimination and harassment, not only against Muslims in gen-
eral, but also against Muslim women in particular. The New York Times
described this pattern in a recent article. 17 7 It said:
Before Sept. 11, Muslim women who wore head scarves in
the United States were often viewed as vaguely exotic. The terror-
ist attacks abruptly changed that, transforming the head scarf, for
many people, into a symbol of something dangerous, and marking
the women who wear them as among the most obvious targets ....
2002) (testimony of Nadine Strossen, President, ACLU), available at http://www.aclu.org/
natsec/emergpowers/12473 leg20020124.html#6.
175. GLENN A. FINE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 70 (Apr.
2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detainees.pdf ("[w]e criticize the
indiscriminate and haphazard manner in which the labels of 'high interest,' 'of interest,' or 'of
undetermined interest' were applied to many aliens who had no connection to terrorism.").
See generally GLENN A. FINE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND RESPONSE BY
THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S
JUNE 2003 REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES (Jan. 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0401/final.pdf; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Files Com-
plaint with United Nations in Geneva Seeking Justice for Immigrants Detained and Deported
After 9/11 (Jan. 27, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/16908prs20040127.html.
176. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., Congress Should Investigate Ashcroft's Detentions, 34
NAT'L J. 1536 (2002).
Despite the unprecedented secrecy imposed by Attorney General John Ashcroft, evidence has
mounted that [since 9/11] his Justice Department has put hundreds of harmless Muslim men
from abroad behind bars for far too long, treated many of them worse than convicted criminals,
and arguably violated their constitutional rights-all without finding enough evidence to
charge a single one ... with a terrorist crime.
Id.
177. Neil MacFarquhar, A Simple Scarf But Meaning Much More Than Faith, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at A22.
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Muslim ... women ... who wear head scarves ... say they
face widespread discrimination in their careers and in their daily
lives. 178
Since 9/11, the ACLU has defended many visibly self-identified Mus-
lim women, who wear headscarves or other religious attire, against various
adverse actions. For example, the ACLU of Nebraska recently successfully
settled a lawsuit against the city of Omaha, which barred Muslim women
from going to city swimming pools just because of their religious attire. 179
The ACLU's client, Lubna Hussein, wanted to go to a pool to watch her
small daughters while they swam."' She did not want to swim herself.8 '
Nonetheless, the city barred her from going to the pool unless she wore a
bathing suit, even though that would violate her religious belief of uncover-
ing her body in such a public place. 182 When the city agreed to change its
policy in response to the ACLU's lawsuit, Lubna Hussein's reaction under-
scored that what was at stake was not only the welfare of her own daughters
but also her own equal status, and that of other Muslim women, as full mem-
bers of the community. As she said, "'I am so pleased at this change in pol-
icy .... My little girls have been waiting for a chance to try out the water
slides and they'll finally get the opportunity [now]. We're happy to feel like
part of the community again."
8 3
The ACLU has also represented American Muslim women who have
been forced to remove their hijabs in front of male security personnel at air-
ports and other facilities without any basis for suspecting them of carrying
contraband, even though this violates their core religious beliefs.'84 This has
happened even when these women have begged to go to private rooms to be
searched by female security personnel. 18 5 One of the clients in this category
is Samar Kaukab, who was subjected to this degrading treatment, violating
her religious freedom, at Chicago's O'Hare Airport shortly after the 9/11
178. Id.
179. See Press Release, ACLU, City of Omaha and ACLU of Nebraska Announce Settle-
ment in Lawsuit over Muslim Women Barred from Public Pool (Feb. 18, 2005),
http://www.aclu.org/religion/discrim/16248prs20050218.html.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of Illinois Challenges Ethnic and Religious Bias in
Strip Search of Muslim Woman at O'Hare International Airport (Jan. 16, 2002),
http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/15783prs20020116.html [hereinafter ACLU
Press Release, ACLU of Illinois Challenges Ethics and Religious Bias].
185. Id.
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attacks. 186 Samar Kaukab was a twenty-two-year-old American citizen, liv-
ing in Ohio.1 17 Ironically, Ms. Kaukab was passing through the airport en
route home from a conference of the VISTA program, Volunteers in Service
to America. i8 8 I say this was ironic, since the treatment she experienced was
counter to the core American values of fairness and equality. As she said:
"'I felt as though the security personnel had singled me out because I didn't
belong, wasn't trusted and wouldn't be welcomed in my own country. 1',189
Another example is Cynthia Rhouni, who was forced to remove her
headscarf in front of male prison officials and male prisoners as a precondi-
tion for entering the Columbia Correctional Institution in Madison, Wiscon-
sin, where she was taking her son to visit his father, an inmate there. 90 "Ms.
Rhouni explained that she wears the headscarf for religious reasons and of-
fered to remove it in the presence of a female guard," who could ascertain
that she was not using it to conceal any weapons or contraband. ' When
prison officials still refused to accommodate Ms. Rhouni's request, she re-
moved her headscarf because she believed it was necessary for her son, who
was having problems in school, to see his father.'92 She felt humiliated and
guilty because she had to enter the prison visiting area, in the presence of the
male prisoners and guards, without the headscarf. 193 As she said: "I felt
naked. I felt I disgraced my family and my religion."' 94 She sought reli-
gious counseling to come to terms with this forced violation of her beliefs.' 95
A day after the ACLU filed a lawsuit on Ms. Rhouni's behalf, the Wisconsin
Corrections Secretary announced that he was ordering the Department's staff
to change its policies to respect the religious freedom of visitors such as Ms.
Rhouni. 196 Her attorney said that Ms. Rhouni was "very, very pleased" to
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. ACLU Press Release, ACLU of Illinois Challenges Ethnic and Religious Bias, supra
note 184 (quoting Samar Kaukab).
190. Press Release, ACLU, Muslim Woman Sues Prison for Forcing Her to Remove
Headscarf in Front of Male Guards and Prisoners (May 25, 2005), http://www.aclu-
wi.org/wisconsin/religious-liberty/20050525rhounipressrelease.shtml [hereinafter ACLU
Press Release, Muslim Woman Sues Prison]; see Muslim Woman Sues Over Head Scarf Ban,
CHI. TPB., May 26, 2005, at 20.
191. ACLU Press Release, Muslim Woman Sues Prison, supra note 190.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Kevin Murphy, Headscarves OK at Prisons, MADISON CAP. TIMES, May 27, 2005, at
[Vol. 31
114
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss2/1
FREEDOM AND FEAR POST-9/11
learn of this announcement, and "a little proud of herself for making a stand
and having it make an impact so quickly." '197
While I could cite many other examples of this pervasive problem,9 8 I
will confine myself to two more involving women from your own state of
Florida. One is Dena al-Atassi, a student at the University of Central Flor-
ida, where she chairs the Florida chapter of the Muslim Students Associa-
tion. 199 She was featured in a recent New York Times article about post-9/1 1
discrimination faced by American Muslim women.2"' Ms. Atassi was born
to a Syrian father and an American mother."2' While she was a teenager, she
spent three years in Syria.202 According to the article, she thought "that
veiled women showed a self-confidence lacking among American women,
who seemed . . . to be trying to transform themselves into a Barbie-doll
ideal."2 3 In her words: "I would meet women who were not attractive by
Western standards . . . and when I told them, 'You look beautiful,' they
would say, 'I know, thank God.' They really believe it. The veil facilitates
inner strength, a greater feeling of self-esteem.,
204
At age sixteen, Ms. Atassi decided to begin wearing a head scarf, along
with a floor-length trench coat.205  About a year later, she was passing
through an airport for the first time after the 9/11 attacks.2 6  "[S]ecurity
screeners singled her out, questioned her, and made her remove her coat., 27
"Feeling violated, . . . she tore off her scarf in a bathroom and wept."208 She
said: "'I had gained such a strong relationship with God that I didn't want to
197. Id.
198. See Dan Herbeck, Muslim-Americans Held at Border Lose Suit, BUFF. NEWS, Dec.
23, 2005, at D1; see also Tabbaa v. Chertoff, No. 05-CV-5825, 2005 WL 3531828 at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005). New York Civil Liberties Union brought a lawsuit on behalf of
some young American Muslim women, as well as their families, who were detained for more
than six hours, frisked, photographed, and fingerprinted when returning to the United States
from Canada, just because they had attended an Islamic conference in Toronto. Id. They
were prevented from contacting attorneys, family members, or the news media to tell them
about this unwarranted detention; border patrol agents even confiscated their cell phones.
Press Release, ACLU, Homeland Security Violates Civil Rights of Muslim American Citizens
(Apr. 20, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general17512prs20050420.html.
199. See MacFarquhar, supra note 177.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. MacFarquhar, supra note 177.
205. Id
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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do anything to distance myself from him, and I felt like I was doing just
that. 9 , 209
The second Florida Muslim woman I want to mention is Sultaana
Freeman, of Winter Park. The ACLU represented her in challenging the
state's post-9/1 1 requirement that she had to remove her face veil, a niqab, to
get a driver's license. 210 Ms. Freeman, a U.S. citizen who is a stay-at-home
mother of two young children, has explained her decision to wear the niqab
as follows: "'The niqab is part of who I am .... Embracing the niqab was a
very personal choice, and I thank Allah for the protection it has afforded me
in life, as a woman of faith.' ' 21' Shortly after Mrs. Freeman moved to Flor-
ida from Illinois in February 2001, she had no problem getting a Florida
driver's license with a photograph in which she wore her niqab.212 She had
previously had an Illinois driver's license with the face veil, since Illinois is
one of at least fifteen states whose driver's license requirements explicitly
exempt people with religious objections to photographs.2 3 Likewise, courts
in other states have held that drivers' licenses must be issued to people with
religious objections to the usual photographic requirements.1 For example,
some Christians believe that photographs violate the Second Command-
ment's prohibition on graven images, 215 and some Native Americans believe
that photographs steal their souls.
2 16
It was only after the 9/11 attacks that the Florida Department of High-
way Safety sent Mrs. Freeman a letter telling her that she needed a full-facial
209. MacFarquhar, supra note 177.
210. Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
211. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Asks Florida Court to Reinstate Suspended Driver's
License of Muslim Woman Forced to Remover Her Face Veil (May 27, 2003),
http://www.aclu.org/religion/gen/16218prs20030527.html [hereinafter ACLU Press Release,
ACLU Asks Florida Court to Reinstate Suspended Driver's License].
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 3, Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 48 (No. 02-2828).
215. See Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, The Ten Commandments, Implica-
tions of the Second Commandment, http://www.religioustolerance.org/chrl10cj.htm (last
visited May 15, 2007); Craig W. Booth, Second Commandment Issues-Art, Plays, Movies of
Jesus (Make No Graven Images, or, Make No Idols?), THEFAITHFULWORD.ORG (2004),
http://www.thefaithfulword.org/secondcormnandment.html; see also Ali Eteraz, Christian
Women Refuses License Pic Versus Muslim Woman Doing Same (Oct. 19, 2006),
http://eteraz.wordpress.com/2006/10/19/christian-women-refuses-license-pic-versus-muslim-
woman-doing-same.
216. See, e.g., William Bobos, The Bleeding Edge Premiere Column: The Art of Stealing
Souls, WEDDING PHOTOGRAPHY DIRECTORY, http://www.weddingphotographydirectory.com/
wedding-photo/for-wedding-photographers/bleeding-edge-column/art-of-stealing-souls.aspx
(last visited May 15, 2007).
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photograph on her driver's license.217 When she declined, her license was
revoked. 21s This was done despite the fact that she offered to submit her
fingerprints, and other identifying documents, such as her birth certificate
and Social Security card.2 19
Florida also persisted in demanding a full-facial photograph from Mrs.
Freeman, despite the fact that it had issued 800,000 temporary licenses or
permits in the past five years, without any photographs at all, to individuals
220in various categories. For example, Florida issues driving permits without
any photographs to convicted drunk drivers who have had their licenses re-
voked, to people who failed their eye exams, and to those who failed their
written license exams. 221 These facts make it clear that Mrs. Freeman's li-
cense was revoked not because she was a security threat or unsafe driver, but
only because of discriminatory stereotypes.
VIII. THE INCREASED VULNERABILITY OF IMMIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS
TO ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND SEXUAL ABUSE RESULTING FROM THE
STEPPED-UP POST-9/1 1 ANIMUS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS IN GENERAL
In my limited remaining time, let me comment briefly on one more of
the post-9/1 1 issues especially affecting women: the increased vulnerability
of immigrant women workers to economic exploitation and sexual abuse
resulting from the stepped-up animus against immigrants in general. This is
a long American tradition,222 going back to the very first national security
crisis, when we feared French influences and passed the now-discredited
Alien and Sedition Act. 223  This anti-immigrant tradition also infused the
World War I era "Red Scare" atmosphere that fueled the law under which
Anita Whitney was convicted, leading to Justice Brandeis's eloquent dissent
that I quoted earlier.224
In that same tradition, since 9/11, immigrant women workers have been
more vulnerable than ever. Protecting their rights has been a major focus of
217. Appellant's Initial Brief at 5, Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 48 (No. 02-2828).
218. Id. at 5, 7.
219. Id. at 11-12, 32 n.27.
220. Id. at 10.
221. ACLU Press Release, ACLU Asks Florida Court to Reinstate Suspended Driver's
License, supra note 211.
222. See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003).
223. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) ("Although the Sedi-
tion Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the
court of history.").
224. See supra text accompanying notes 15-23.
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the ACLU's Women's Rights Project.225 This is one of several areas where
the ACLU has been able to make innovative use of the burgeoning new in-
ternational human rights guarantees and forums,226 for example, the Interna-
tional Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families,227 which went into effect in 2003, and the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers.
In addition to invoking these international human rights remedies, the
ACLU's many other strategies for seeking broader protections for immigrant
women workers include lawsuits on behalf of individual women against par-
ticular employers. 28 These lawsuits seek not only to secure justice for the
specific women who are plaintiffs in the cases, but also to send the general
message that employers cannot exploit their immigrant women workers with
impunity.229 Most recently, in the fall of 2006, a jury in New York awarded
substantial compensatory and punitive damages to three Latina immigrant
workers who were assaulted and sexually harassed by a Manhattan em-
ployer.23" Likewise, a couple months before that, the ACLU Women's
Rights Project settled a federal lawsuit against a restaurant in New Jersey by
Chinese waitresses who had been subjected to physical and emotional abuse
and who had been paid only $120 per month for nearly 300 hours of work,2 31
which comes to only forty cents per hour.
The ACLU's Women's Rights Project highlighted this work on behalf
of immigrant women workers in its latest annual report, which was dedicated
to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in honor of her twenty-fifth anniversary as a
federal judge.232 Justice Ginsburg has strongly encouraged this work.233 In
225. See generally HUBBARD, supra note 137.
226. See generally ACLU Human Rights Project,
http://www.aclu.org/intlhumanrights/index.html (last visited May 15, 2007).
227. See generally INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF
ALL MIGRANT WORKERS AND MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES (1990), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cmw.pdf.
228. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, Jury Sides with Women Workers, ACLU in Harass-
ment Case (Sept. 29, 2006),
http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/employ/26966prs20060929.html [hereinafter ACLU Press
Release, Jury Sides with Women Workers]; Press Release, ACLU, New Jersey Chinese Res-
taurant Settles Waitress Exploitation Lawsuit Brought by ACLU (May 2, 2006)
http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/employ/25392prs20060502.htm [hereinafter ACLU Press
Release, New Jersey Chinese Restaurant Settles Waitress Exploitation Lawsuit].
229. See, e.g., id.
230. ACLU Press Release, Jury Sides with Women Workers, supra note 228.
231. ACLU Press Release, New Jersey Chinese Restaurant Settles Waitress Exploitation
Lawsuit, supra note 228.
232. See HUBBARD, supra note 137, at v.
233. See id.
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her gracious thank-you note to her successor, the Project's current Director,
Justice Ginsburg said that our immigrant working women clients are "the
most vulnerable.., women.., too long forgotten [and] ignored. 234
IX. CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude with two pertinent statements from two United
States Supreme Court Justices. In the spirit of the Goodwin Lectures, I will
quote the first two women to have graced the United States Supreme Court
bench throughout its history, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg.
The very first United States Supreme Court Justice to speak publicly af-
ter the 9/11 attacks was Justice O'Connor.235 Making an appearance at New
York University Law School that had been scheduled before the terrorist
attacks, she stressed the special role that all of us in the legal profession must
play in our new post-9/1 1 world.236 In words that seemed prescient at the
time, and that have proven to be so in the intervening years, she said that we
lawyers "will help define how to maintain a fair and a just society with a
strong rule of law at a time when many are more concerned with safety and
... vengeance." 2
37
More recently, Justice Ginsburg was being honored for her towering
contributions to women's rights. 238 After her opening remarks, someone in
the audience asked her if people's rights are endangered by the domestic war
on terrorism. 2 39 In response, she stressed that "an active public" had made
the difference in ensuring women's rights.24° In other words, she was saying
the reduction in gender discrimination, to which she signally contributed
through her pioneering litigation as the Founding Director of the ACLU's
Women's Rights Project, ultimately depended on engagement by "We the
People," to quote the Constitution's first three words. 241 As in all law reform
movements, many initiatives come from the citizenry, including legislative
234. Id. at vii.
235. Linda Greenhouse, In New York Visit, O'Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Gina Holland, Ginsburg: Don't Be Apathetic About Loss of Freedom, CAPITOL HILL
BLUE, Jan. 30, 2004, http://www.capitolhillblue.com/news/publish/WhatPriceFreedom_22/
GinsburgDon t Be ApatheticAboutLoss of Freedom_3986_printer.shtml.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id; see also U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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reforms and constitutional amendments.242 Moreover, even litigation victo-
ries are only meaningful if engaged members of the public are aware of, and
exercise, their newly recognized rights.243
Justice Ginsburg then drew an analogy between this aspect of the
women's rights movement and the current context of post-9/1 1 civil liber-
ties.2" In her words: "On important issues, like the balance between liberty
and security, if the public doesn't care, then the security side is going to
overweigh the other., 245 But "[t]hat would change," she said, "if people
come forward and say we are proud to live in the USA, a land that has been
more free, and we want to keep it that way. 246
In short, to combine the wisdom of our first two female Justices, we
members of the legal profession all have a special opportunity-and respon-
sibility-to come forward, as both lawyers and citizens, to uphold the rule of
law that has kept our great country both safe and free.
242. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 564 (Har-
vard Univ. Press 1954) (1941).
243. See id. at 564 ("In the long run, the public gets just as much freedom of speech as it
really wants.").
244. See Holland, supra note 238.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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HEROES, LAWYERS, AND WRITERS-A REVIEW OF Two
SCHIAVO BOOKS
LOIS SHEPHERD*
FIGHTING FOR DEAR LIFE, BY DAVID GIBBS
Can a good lawyer also be a good person? Professors of legal ethics of-
ten challenge their students with this question. After all, lawyers success-
fully defend child predators and have the convictions of known killers
thrown out. They persuade jurors to believe plausible stories that in their
hearts the lawyers know are not true. There are also times when lawyers
bring honorable witnesses on the stand to tears.
David Gibbs, the lawyer who assisted the parents of Terri Schiavo from
2003 to 2005 in achieving passage of special state and federal legislation
aimed at preventing the removal of her feeding tube, wants readers to know
that he is not only a good lawyer-he tells us that opposing counsel, George
Felos, offered him the compliment: "[I]f I ever need to get something passed
by the United States Congress, I'll know who to call."-but also that he is a
good person. When he was a student at Duke University School of Law, a
law professor once chided him about getting too passionate about his client's
position in a mock trial exercise. 2 The professor said he should be able to
disconnect from the process, so that if he had to, he could "go to court and
argue for the other side." 3 But Gibbs tells us that he cannot do that because
he has to believe he's "on the side of truth."4 In his view, God called him to
try to save Terri Schiavo's life.
The fact that Gibbs sees himself as a hero in the Schiavo controversy is
probably the book's central downfall. But it is also the reason that students
of the Schiavo case might find the book worth taking a look at because it
offers an insight into the motivations of the conservative forces that pro-
pelled the Schiavo case forward to become the most litigated and publicized
end-of-life decision-making case in the United States, and probably in the
world.
* D'Alemberte Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
1. DAVID GIBBS wiTH BOB DEMoss, FIGHTING FOR DEAR LIFE 153 (2006).
2. Id. at 70.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
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The Schiavo case revealed a country confused and divided about essen-
tial issues involving life, death, disability, family relationships, basic human
care, dignity, and choice. Within the case, there are several central and trou-
bling questions about: 1) the certainty of medical diagnosis-a trial court
had determined on the basis of expert testimony that Terri was in a perma-
nent vegetative state while others disputed that diagnosis;6 2) the rights of
family members to weigh in on decisions about continuation or discontinua-
tion of life support-Terri's husband, Michael Schiavo, sought the removal
of her feeding tube eight years after her collapse while Terri's parents, Mary
and Bob Schindler, fought its removal;7 3) whether feeding tubes should be
understood differently than ventilators when their removal is considered;8
and 4) how much weight should be given to oral, informal statements made
by individuals about the kinds of existences they would find intolerable and
worse than death.9
These and similar questions plague thoughtful judges, legislators, schol-
ars, even-and especially-people facing their own difficult decisions re-
garding their own or family members' lives, who search for, if not the "right"
answers, the "better" answers.
David Gibbs stands in contrast to those who struggle with what is right
and wrong. His "divine appointment"-in his own words-provides him
with unwavering conviction that forces of evil were at work to remove Terri
Schiavo's feeding tube.1° There is no doubt in his mind that Terri Schiavo
was conscious-he tells us she kissed her parents, cried, attempted to talk
and, in fact, "jabber[ed]" at him.11 His associate, Barbara Weller, came be-
fore the media in the last days of Terri's life, following removal of her feed-
ing tube, claiming that Terri had said "Ahhhhhhh" and then "Waaaaaaaa" in
answer to Weller's plea to say she wanted to live in order to save her own
life.12 Gibbs reports that Weller told him on the phone that Terri could not
say more because "[y]ou know, Terri can't say consonants."13
Gibbs is unlikely to find many new believers of this version of the
Schiavo story. The overwhelming evidence from well-known neurologists
who examined Terri and from health care providers who cared for her on a
daily basis for over many years supported the diagnosis of permanent vegeta-
6. See GIBBS, supra note 1, at 26-27, 57, 59-66, 129-30.
7. See id. at 56-58, 93, 144-46.
8. See id. at 105, 239-40.
9. See id. at 108-112.
10. Id. at 37-38.
11. GIBBS, supra note 1, at 22-23, 26.
12. Id. at 124-26
13. Id. at 125.
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tive state; ultimately, her autopsy results were also consistent with that diag-
nosis. 14 Even if his claim at the beginning of the book that Terri "recognized
people, enjoyed the company of her family and struggled to communicate" 15
might catch any reader's attention-for it is true that only a few people actu-
ally got to spend time with her and observe her condition for themselves-
his credibility is quickly lost as he reveals his bias about other issues.
One easily uncovered misrepresentation, for example, is his assertion
that Michael Schiavo took advantage of a law passed by the Florida legisla-
ture in 1997 that made it possible to remove artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion. 16 Without passage of such a law, he implies, Terri's feeding tube would
have remained in place.17 He tells us to "[k]eep in mind that Terri seemed to
be the 'test case' for this new law ... George Felos used it for the first time
at [Michael's trial in] 2000 to allow the court to condemn Terri to death."18
In fact, in 1990, in the well-known In re Browning19 case, the Supreme Court
of Florida established the right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration.2"
At that time, the court's opinion acknowledged the already existing consen-
sus among courts nationwide on this issue, recognizing that "[c]ourts over-
whelmingly have held that a person may refuse or remove artificial life-
support, whether supplying oxygen by a mechanical respirator or supplying
food and water through a feeding tube."'"
As a lawyer involved in the Schiavo case, Gibbs has to know the
Browning case backwards and forwards-yet he repeatedly misrepresents the
law of Florida and, more generally, the law throughout the nation. Readers
cannot know for sure what he saw in Terri's hospital room or what transpired
in conversations that Gibbs was privy to. However, we can read the Brown-
ing case and the Florida Statutes to check his descriptions of them. When a
lawyer is bold as to misrepresent the law, he is clearly not trying to convince
certain readers. His audience is narrow. He's preaching, as they say, to the
choir (and he does preach in the last twenty pages or so-just outright
preaching, complete with Bible verse).
14. See id. at 20-24, 191-99. For an unbiased and accurate rendering of the facts of the
Schiavo controversy, see WILLIAM H. COLBY, UNPLUGGED: RECLAIMING OUR RIGHT TO DIE IN
AMERICA (2006), which is also reviewed in this article. Colby discusses the evidence of
Terri's medical condition on pages 14-25 and 47-53.
15. GIBBS, supra note 1, at 26.
16. Id. at 42.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
20. Id. at 11-12 (recognizing state constitutional rights to refuse medical treatment on
behalf of incompetent patients).
21. Id.
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But as I said above, there's something to the Gibbs book that is of inter-
est to a greater circle of readers. It is this "hero thing." The most telling part
of the book is not in the slanting of facts, the innuendos about the wrongdo-
ing of others, or even in his claim to altruism.22 (For example, Gibbs delib-
erately gives the impression that his law firm represented the Schindlers for
no legal fee. This statement is disputed by Jon Eisenberg's book, which in-
cludes a tax return showing contributions to the Gibbs Law Firm of almost
two million dollars during 2003 from the Christian Law Association.23
Eisenburg ties the contributions to representation in the Schiavo case.)24
Below is an excerpt from the passage that I find most incredible and
most revealing. It is not enough for Gibbs to be a crusader; in order to be a
true hero, he must be threatened by actual physical harm as he stands up for
what is right. At this point in the book, he describes-with the moment-by-
moment drama more often found in a "B" suspense novel-a courtroom
drama scene in which a law enforcement officer approached his table before
proceedings began, for reasons then unknown to Gibbs:
The officer appeared at my side. He placed his left hand on
the table, palm down, and then leaned in close as if preparing to
offer an insider stock tip. He cleared his throat. In a low, com-
manding tone he spoke three words.
"Don't turn around."
"Excuse me?" I said, matching his muted voice.
I noticed his eyes were focused somewhere over my shoulder
on an unseen point of interest behind me. "Mr. Gibbs, I need to
ask you to avoid making any sudden moves that would draw atten-
tion to us. Do you understand?,
25
Following that, we get the play-by-play of Gibbs's learning that a suspi-
cious man had entered the courtroom, was sitting in the last row, and ap-
peared focused on his every move.26 Gibbs describes entering a reverie of
sorts, wondering if his wife and children had come to court to watch him-
were they safe?27 (They hadn't actually come.) He tells us, "Suddenly, I
found myself fighting not only for Terri's life, but potentially for the lives of
22. See generally, GIBBS, supra note 1. Gibbs wonders whether Michael abused Terri,
eventually resulting in her collapse. Id. at 196.
23. JON B. EISENBERG, USING TERRI: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT'S CONSPIRACY TO TAKE
AWAY OUR RIGHTS 235 (2005).
24. Id. at 103-04 (disputing Gibbs's statements to the media that he received nothing for
work on the Schiavo case).
25. GIBBS, supra note 1, at 85.
26. Id. at 86.
27. Id. at 87.
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those around me."28 While the scene is drawn out over a good five pages, it
turns out that the man dressed too warmly for Florida in a heavy, black
trench coat does nothing at all to threaten anyone. 29 But Gibbs credits "the
presence of the marshals and the power of prayer" for an afternoon in the
courtroom that passes without incident.3°
In light of the many actual death threats received by Judge George
Greer, who presided over the trial court proceedings relating to the feeding
tube's removal, 3 the passage is almost bizarre. In these later stages of the
courtroom battle over Terri Schiavo, Judge Greer was under the protection of
bodyguards. 32 As bizarre as Gibbs's retelling of this part of the story is, it
reveals something important about the perspectives and motivations of the
people who sought or participated in achieving extraordinary special legisla-
tion to try to prevent removal of Terri's feeding tube.
In March 2005, over Palm Sunday weekend, the United States Senate
and House of Representatives passed a bill to allow the Schindlers to seek
federal review of the Schiavo case.33 An earlier attempt on the part of House
committees to stop removal of Terri's feeding tube through the issuance of
subpoenas for her testimony had failed when Judge Greer refused to allow
the subpoenas to unseat his order for discontinuance of artificial nutrition and
hydration.34 When it became clear that the congressional subpoenas had
failed and Terri's feeding tube was removed, the Schindlers' bill was pushed
forward.35 While many congressional representatives had already left town
for the Easter break, many returned to cast their vote.36 President George W.
Bush cut short a vacation in Crawford, Texas to return to Washington so that
he could sign the bill immediately after it passed-which, because of rules of
Congress, could not occur until a little after midnight on Sunday.37 The tac-
tic ultimately failed when the federal court refused to order the reinsertion of
Terri's feeding tube because it determined that the Schindlers were unlikely
to succeed on the merits of their claim that Terri's case had received inade-
quate process in the state courts.38
28. Id.
29. Id. at 88.
30. GIBBS, supra note 1, at 88.
31. See David Sommer & Adam Emerson, Judge Greer Evokes Admiration, Anger,
TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 27, 2005, at 1.
32. Id.
33. See COLBY, supra note 14, at 37--41.
34. Id. at 38-39.
35. Id. at 39.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 39-40.
38. COLBY, supra note 14, at 40-41.
2007]
125
: Nova Law Review 31, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LAWREVIEW
Conservative legislators would later take some heat for their involve-
ment in a single individual's case over the question of life support.39 Sur-
veys of the American public revealed that a majority of Americans did not
approve of the federal government's actions in the case.' According to one
CBS News poll conducted in March 2005, 82% of those surveyed believed
that Congress and President Bush should stay out of the Terri Schiavo dis-
pute.41 Bill Frist, then majority leader in the Senate and also a Harvard-
educated doctor, may have ruined his chances of a run for the White House
in 2008 in part because of his diagnosis of Terri Schiavo on the floor of the
Senate, for which he was widely criticized. 2
Did Republican politicians simply miscalculate the political gain to be
made from championing Terri's "right to life?" At the time, people generally
perceived that political motivation drove the congressional and executive
actions. A CBS News poll asked Americans about the motivations of Con-
gress in passing the bill to require federal review of the case; 74% thought
the bill was passed to advance a political agenda.43 Only 13% indicated that
they believed Congress really cared about what happened in the case.'
There was some evidence to support this view, most prominently a "smoking
gun" memo that was eventually traced to personnel in Senator Mel Marti-
nez's office. 45 That memo identified the Schiavo case as one that will have
the "pro-life base ... excited that the Senate is debating this important issue"
and is a "great political issue" that "is a tough issue for Democrats."'
Gibbs sees the motivations differently. He thinks that rather than pursu-
ing political agendas (and miscalculating), conservative political leaders sac-
rificed their political ambitions in order to do what was right:
Having spoken with so many of the legislators myself-both De-
mocrat and Republican-during the heat of the floor debate, I
could tell this was one of those decisions where political ambi-
39. See, e.g., David Espo, Frist Abandons '08 Presidential Bid, DAILY BREEZE, Nov. 30,
2006, at A7.
40. Poll: Keep Feeding Tube Out, CBS NEWS.COM, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2005/03/231opinion/polls/main682674.shtml.
41. Id.
42. See Spencer S. Hsu & Hamil R. Harris, Schiavo Vote Tied to Law, Religion, WASH.
POST, Mar. 24, 2005, at BO1; see also Espo, supra note 39.
43. Political Fallout over Schiavo, CBS NEWS.COM, Mar. 23, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/23/politics/main682619.shtml.
44. Id.
45. EISENBERG, supra note 23, at app. fig. 4.
46. Id.
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tions, in most cases, took a back seat to trying to do the right thing
just because it was the right thing.47
Gibbs's own portrayal of himself as heroic crusader for Terri's life,
willing to work for free, (but not really) a potential target for delusional, an-
gry protestors, (again, not really) and divinely appointed, (really?) makes this
reader wonder if Gibbs is not right about the motivations of at least some of
the political leaders he worked with in the Schiavo matter. Perhaps politi-
cians were not just motivated by potential political gain when they jumped
into the fray of the Schiavo case. Could a portion of them have been seeking
redemption rather than votes? More importantly, which is more dangerous?
UNPLUGGED: RECLAIMING OUR RIGHT TO DIE IN AMERICA, BY WILLIAM
H. COLBY
Attorney William Colby, the author of Unplugged, argued before the
United States Supreme Court on behalf of Nancy Cruzan's right to die in the
famous 1990 case that is often credited with establishing a constitutional
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.18 He writes an entirely different
kind of book than Gibbs. The difference goes deeper than the fact that Colby
was not involved in the Schiavo case and, therefore, is more objective than
Gibbs. The difference also goes deeper than the fact that in Cruzan v. Mis-
souri Department of Health,49 Colby represented "the other side," arguing in
favor of the removal of a feeding tube from a patient in a permanent vegeta-
tive state.5 °
The great difference, to Colby's credit, is that in Unplugged, Colby rec-
ognizes the difficulty of knowing-as individuals and as a society-what is
the right thing to do in these kinds of cases. At the very beginning of the
book, he tells readers that when television producers, in preparation for his
appearances as an expert in the Schiavo case, asked him, "Which side are
you on?" He answered, to their perplexity, "Neither.",51 Moreover, he tells
us that he has been on both sides of these kinds of disputes. Some of the
47. GIBBS, supra note 1, at 157.
48. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
49. Id.
50. For an example of the kind of excellent writing that an attorney in an end-of-life
dispute can produce, readers should take a look at WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE
DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN (2002). It is riveting, dramatic, and accessible-while at the same
time, informative and probing of the ethical and legal issues involved in these kinds of cases.
51. COLBY, supra note 14, at 3.
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families he has represented have sought removal of treatment, while others
have fought to keep it in place when medical professionals thought it futile. 2
Gibbs actually figures briefly in the book, in an episode that highlights
the difference between these two lawyers and writers. Colby tells us about a
last-ditch federal court hearing that took place about a week after the third
and final removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube:
When the Schindlers' lawyer, David Gibbs, who is also the Presi-
dent of the Christian Law Association, called Michael Schiavo a
"murderer," Judge Whittemore cut him off. "That's the emotional
aspect of this case, and the rhetoric that does not influence this
court. We have to follow the rule of law and that's what will be
applied," said the judge.53
Colby lets the exchange speak for itself.
This, to a large extent, is Colby's way in Unplugged. He provides in-
teresting detail, keeps the narrative lively, but is also accurate in his very
useful presentation of the facts of the Schiavo case, especially its compli-
cated legal history. Taking readers through that legal history is not an easy
task. Between the time of Terri Schiavo's collapse and the removal of her
feeding tube, fifteen years elapsed. Except for the first two years, the re-
mainder of that time involved some sort of legal dispute, including the medi-
cal malpractice case that Michael Schiavo brought against Terri's doctors for
failing to diagnose the condition that led to her cardiac arrest54 (which a jury
determined was bulimia, even though there was neither definitive physical
proof that Terri was bulimic nor had anyone ever witnessed her engaging in
the binge and purge cycle of bulimics); various attempts on the part of the
Terri's parents, Mary and Robert Schindler, to remove Michael as guardian
for Terri;55 and most importantly, Michael Schiavo's petition to remove
Terri's feeding tube, and all of the subsequent legal repercussions of that
successful petition.56 The case went to the Florida District Court of Appeals
four different times, 57 and the Supreme Court of Florida ultimately struck
down as unconstitutional the statute known as "Teri's Law," the special
Florida legislation allowing Governor Bush to order the reinsertion of her
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 43.
54. Id. at 49.
55. Id. at 14.
56. COLBY, supra note 14, at 4.
57. Id. at31.
[Vol. 31
128
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss2/1
HEROES, LAWYERS, AND WRITERS
feeding tube. 8 The federal courts were eventually called in by special fed-
eral legislation, but swiftly got back out.5 9
Colby explains this history in clear, objective terms, and is brief
enough, leaving room to discuss some of the issues of the case, but is not so
scaled back that readers feel uninformed about the legal mechanics of what
went on. The book then discusses the technological advances that have
brought us to the ethical and legal uncertainty in which we now live, and will
likely face as we or our family members die. Here he provides useful his-
torical details-how the living will was born from a law review article,
60
how the criteria for diagnosing brain death emerged from the needs of human
organ transplantation,6 and how the condition of permanent vegetative state
is a result of "almost successful technology", in the words of one doctor,
because the patient's breathing is restored, but the damaged brain cannot be
healed.62 Colby is at his best in these explanations, as he successfully
weaves together cultural history, personalities, and medical advances to re-
veal how we got to where we are, which he sums up neatly, stating: "[T]he
time of nature taking its course for the seriously ill in America is over.,
63
For most readers, Unplugged will hit the right balance between descrip-
tion and analysis. Especially for those readers unfamiliar with the rich litera-
ture on end-of-life decision-making, the book will educate and challenge
their thinking about the issues in the Schiavo case and other end-of-life con-
troversies, like physician-assisted suicide. For scholars in the field, the book
is somewhat less captivating, but still useful. Colby does not offer much in
terms of in-depth analysis or new insights for the future direction of end-of-
life law, ethics, or practice. His primary recommendation for individuals is
that they talk to their family members about what they want. His primary
recommendation for society is that we continue talking through these issues.
He does champion the hospice movement, but then, it's hard not to.
Yet, Colby does have a gift for pointing out or recalling details that
even those of us in the field should ponder more closely-such as the fact
that "[t]he public never saw a [photograph] of Karen Ann Quinlan after her
accident."' Instead, the public saw-and we still see today when the case is
discussed-her black and white high school yearbook photo.65 Sketch artists
58. Id. at 36-37.
59. Id. at 39-41.
60. Id. at 81.
61. See COLBY, supra note 14, at 74.
62. See id. at 66.
63. Id. at 103.
64. Id. at 71.
65. Id.
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for newspapers at the time drew her as a "Sleeping Beauty., 66 In contrast,
when the public saw pictures of Nancy Cruzan and Terri Schiavo, they saw
the young women after their vegetative state had persisted for several years.
It was only then that the public could truly begin to grapple with what the
condition meant. To me, the reminder of this part of Karen's story makes me
think about the significance of the face in human relationships and wonder
what more we might learn about it.
Colby also brings up the issue of hand-feeding and whether it might be
rejected on the basis of autonomy. 67 For example, what should caregivers do
if someone's living will states that, in the event of advanced dementia, care-
givers are not to "place food or water in my mouth. Instead, place it on my
bed table. If I feed myself, I live another day; if I do not, I will die and that
is fine? ' 68 The issue of hand-feeding is ripe for serious consideration, not
only for what it might reveal about patients' rights to reject hand-feeding, but
what it might reveal about tube feeding as well. Again, Colby does not
tackle these issues because that is not the book's aim; but he does raise them.
Generally, the book is a highly readable, informative distillation of the
history and current status of end-of-life law and ethics, with a sharp eye on
where the issues remain thorny and unresolved. Moreover, the book is com-
passionate. Colby writes with clear awareness of the anguish health care
providers and families experience when faced with decisions at the end of
life. Colby is no hero trying to ride in with all the answers, but he is a good
lawyer and a good writer. It is those qualities that make this volume one
well worth reading.
66. COLBY, supra note 14, at 71.
67. Id. at 135.
68. William A. Hensel, My Living Will: A Piece of My Mind, 275(8) JAMA 588 (1996).
In justifying his reasoning, Colby quotes Dr. William Hensel's essay. COLBY, supra note 14,
at 133.
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THE HURRICANE THIS TIME'
She-
She was named, by those who do not see;
The counterclockwise motion of shout and dance-
the release of all that ails both you and me.
She-
She was blamed for her power and might;
Swelled up from generations living in despair-
Over-flowing with no evidence of planning or insight.
She-
She was gendered by the historical design of many,
Marginalized in an Utopian "color-blind" society
Starving for an intersectional existence in the so-called land of plenty.
* J.D., Southern University Law Center, Baton Rouge, LA; LL.M., Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, Washington, D.C. This article is written in memory of my grandmother
Queen Ann Terry and dedicated to the life and journey of Ms. Milvirtha Hendricks amongst
the countless other stories of forced movement-both during and after Hurricane Katrina-
that were not televised. I would like to thank thie administration, faculty, staff and my first
year class (Sections C and F) at Barry University School of Law for their support and encour-
agement. I would also like to thank my research assistant Nicole V. Johnson for her work
ethic. I am grateful for the opportunity to have served on the panel entitled, Hurricane
Katrina: What Have We Learnt? alongside Olympia Duhart and Rachel Van Cleave at the
2006 Society of American Law Teachers (SALT) Conference. Special thanks to Reginald Oh
and Arthur Lee Harris, Esq. for their insightful comments; the Nova Law Review editorial
board for their support; and my family for their patience.
1. An original, previously unpublished poem written by the author.
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She-
She was called the culprit who wreaked havoc on land to both property
and man,
But the water rose and then the levee broke-
Now who will STAND?
Stand
Stand in the shadow of righteousness
Stand UP
Stand UP;
Swell
Swell with the power of purpose
Swell UP
Swell UP;
Rise
Rise above the walls of silence
Rise UP
Rise UP;
STAND, SWELL and RISE with the
SPIRIT of our ancestors blowing
in the hurricane winds... THIS TIME
I. INTRODUCTION
As a native of Louisiana, born and raised in Shreveport, I attended col-
lege and law school in Baton Rouge. I, like so many others, experienced
Hurricane Katrina through the radio and news media. I watched in utter dis-
belief as the New Orleans Convention Center and the Superdome (home of
the "Bayou Classic," the rival football game between my alma mater, the
Southern University Jaguars and my husband's alma mater, the Grambling
State University Tigers)2 became overcrowded with people once again-not
attending a football game this time, but being watched nonetheless, as they
engaged in a struggle to survive amongst chaos, confusion, and despair.
New Orleans is the home of my family members, friends, and associ-
ates. It is the bed of Louisiana culture. I knew that New Orleans was located
below sea level and the levees were built to prevent that which occurred-
heavy flooding resulting in the loss of lives and property. I knew about the
construction of New Orleans' man-made levees as well as the possibility of
2. State Farm Bayou Classic, The History of the Bayou Classic,
http://www.statefarmbayouclassic.com/historytheevent.shtml (last visited June 14, 2007).
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watching the hand of God through natural acts of heavy thunderstorms,
floods, and hurricanes. However, as I watched the faces of the people, those
very familiar faces who looked a lot like myself, my mother, my father, my
brother, my sister, my grandmother, my grandfather, my uncle, my aunts, my
cousins, my husband, and my children, I was overcome with chaos, confu-
sion, and despair of a secondary nature (the helpless television-watching
kind). I called my uncle living in New Orleans-only to be relieved for him
to answer the phone and assure me that he was packing his car to leave New
Orleans and join his wife in Lake Charles to "wait the storm out." And then
I remembered a saying that I heard often when loved ones were departing
from one another. One person would say, "Alright, see you later," and the
response would be "Alright ... if the creek don't rise and the levee don't
break." Hearing this parting gesture as a child, I was often confused because
growing up in "North" Louisiana, I did not fully realize the constant threat
that my beloved New Orleans lived under, or more precisely, lived with. But
the elders knew, and it had become ingrained in their memory through ex-
perience and sustained in the oral tradition through expression. It is my be-
lief that the "saying," based on past knowledge, was more of a question of
"when" it would happen and not "if' it was possible.
In this article, I will address the disaster of Hurricane Katrina from a
Critical Race Feminist3 perspective by exploring collective identity.4 I will
suggest a critical analysis of Hurricane Katrina that requires the use of a
"her-storical lens"5 in order to see "who" and "what" the print and news me-
dia disseminated to the public during its onslaught when "[t]he past [came]
3. See Deleso Alford Washington, "Every Shut Eye, Ain't Sleep": Exploring the Impact
of Crack Cocaine Sentencing and the Illusion of Reproductive Rights for Black Women from a
Critical Race Feminist Perspective, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 123, 126-27
(2005).
[A] Critical Race Feminist Perspective is definitive, yet expansive. It is definitive in that its
genesis is rooted in critical legal studies and critical race theory .... The expansiveness of
CRF is evidenced by the utilization of critical race theorists' technique of storytelling and nar-
rative analysis to construct alternative social realities.
Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Foreword: Critical
Race Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187, 1207 (2004) (noting that "[s]everal
Critical Race Theorists have utilized narratives in their research, personal or otherwise, and
have urged legal theorists to incorporate narrative as a legitimate methodological tool");
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of
Race: Does the Fundamental Contradiction Have a Corollary? 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REV. 407
(1988).
4. See infra Part III.
5. See Washington, supra note 3, at 128 (explaining that "[t]he 'her-storical' lens en-
hances one's ability to see a continuum of race, class, and gender abuse from the past to the
present").
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back,"' 6 as it did in what is commonly referred to as the Great Flood of
1927. 7 Another example of a recurring "past" lies in the African American
particularized experience during the legally sanctioned U.S. slavery regime.'
This resulted in the dismantling of families and the ultimate search to reunite
with loved ones post-Civil War, as seen again during the aftermath of Hurri-
cane Katrina. 9 The familiar parting gesture mentioned earlier suggests a
desire to see one another again, but realistically acknowledges that the desire
is dependent upon circumstances of natural and man-made I° barricades,
which exemplify yet another saying post-Hurricane Katrina-"Past as Pro-
logue."ll
6. The Past Comes Back, in KATRINA: WHY IT BECAME A MAN-MADE DISASTER;
WHERE IT COULD HAPPEN NEXT 72 (National Geographic special ed.) (Chris Johns ed., 2005)
(referencing the "Great Flood of 1927 [heralded as] [o]ne of the worst natural disasters in U.S.
history... likely [to have] killed more than a thousand people, cost hundreds of millions of
dollars in damages, and displaced almost a million people-nearly one percent of the popula-
tion"). History documents that:
[s]ome of the destruction during the flood was man-made. Hoping to divert water from New
Orleans, engineers dynamited a hole in a levee .... The resulting gush of water invaded
marshlands below the city, displacing 10,000 people .... A human flood followed the one
caused by nature. African Americans began to migrate northward, never to return south.
Id at 72. See generally JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927
AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1997); Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total
Disaster and Total Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 251, 270
(2003) (asserting that the great flood of 1927 "led to a landmark piece of legislation, the 1928
Flood Control Act").
7. Friedman & Thompson, supra note 6, at 269; see also MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, Great
Migrations? in AFTER THE STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF
HURRICANE KATRINA 75 (David Dante Troutt ed., 2006) [hereinafter DYSON, Great Migra-
tions?].
8. See generally DYSON, Great Migrations? supra note 7, at 75; Bill Quigley & Maha
Zaki, The Significance of Race: Legislative Racial Discrimination in Louisiana, 1803-1865,
24 S.U. L. REv. 145 (1997) (detailing the status of enslaved Africans in Louisiana); Cheryl I.
Harris, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94 CAL. L. REv. 907 (2006) (reviewing
MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY
(2003)) [hereinafter Harris, Whitewashing Race].
9. KATRINA: STORIES OF RESCUE, RECOVERY AND REBUILDING IN THE EYE OF THE STORM
80-84 (Susan M. Moyer ed., 2005) (detailing the desperation of family members attempting to
locate each other post Hurricane Katrina-with the repeated question on missing evacuees
website being "Where are you?").
10. John P. Manard, Jr., et al., Katrina's Tort Litigation: An Imperfect Storm, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENv'T 31, 31 (2006) (quoting Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot's decla-
ration regarding the Great Flood of 1927, that "[t]his isn't a natural disaster. It's a man-made
disaster," referring to the Army Corps of Engineers, who had overall responsibility with re-
spect to the flood protection system's flawed river control policies).
11. See Symposium, Through the Eye of Katrina: The Past as Prologue? Univ. of S.
Ala., Dep't of History, http://www.southalabama.edu/history/katrina; Lower Ninth Ward
Neighborhood Snapshot, Greater New Orleans Community Data Center,
[Vol. 31
134
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss2/1
HURRICANE KA TRINA AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
II. HURRICANE KATRINA AND GEOGRAPHY
The Hurricane Katrina narrative will be recorded in history as one of
America's greatest televised natural tragedies. According to Critical Race
Feminist scholar, Adrien K. Wing, "narratives aid in exposing the reality of
racism and validate the experiences of people of color."' 2 As Professor L.
Darnell Weeden put it, "the news media [gave] us information and insight
into the tragedies behind Katrina during the critical first week of this disaster
by personifying an American failure."' 3 We, the public, the listening, watch-
ing, helping, praying, sitting, and vicariously experiencing audience, bore
witness to the Hurricane Katrina narrative culminating into a "barrage of
images in newspapers and on television [that] tested the nation's collective
sense of reality"14 to identify with the characters in the narrative as victims.
Despite this fact, during the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the news media as-
cribed a refugee's identity to the victims and thereby exercised its power to
control the level of connection that the viewing public could have with the
evacuees. 15
Michael Eric Dyson vividly describes the Hurricane Katrina narrative as
follows:
http://gnocdc.org/orleans/8/22/snapshot.html (last visited June 14, 2007) (Another example of
the "Past as Prologue" can be seen in September of 1965 when Hurricane Betsey struck New
Orleans leaving eighty percent of the Lower Ninth Ward district under water.). See generally
IVOR VAN HEERDEN & MIKE BRYAN, THE STORM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY DURING
HURRICANE KATRINA (2006).
12. See Adrien K. Wing & Christine A. Willis, From Theory to Praxis: Black Women,
Gangs and Critical Race Feminism, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (explaining that "[c]ritical
race feminism draws from critical legal studies the idea of deconstruction along with the criti-
cal analysis of the traditional legal canon").
13. L. Darnell Weeden, Hurricane Katrina: First Amendment Censorship and the News
Media, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 479, 480 (2006). This article provides a critical examination
of the role of the news media during Hurricane Katrina. Id.
14. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HuRRIcANE KATRINA AND THE
COLOR OF DISASTER 1 (2006) [hereinafter DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER]; Kathleen A.
Bergin, Witness, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 531, 535 (2006) (providing an eyewitness essay
which concludes that "race, sex, and class played a role in the government's failure to ade-
quately predict, prevent, and respond to this risk of sexualized violence during Katrina").
15. DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER, supra note 14, at 176 (suggesting that the me-
dia's act of framing the evacuees at first as refugees caused denunciations by black leaders
because it seemed to deny that black folk were citizens of the nation); see ADRIEN KATHERINE
WING, From Wrongs to Rights: Hurricane Katrina from a Global Prospective, in AFTER THE
STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA 134 (David
Dante Troutt ed., 2006) (explaining that under international law the evacuees were errone-
ously referred to as refugees because they did not flee outside their national boundaries).
Professor Wing cautions that the proper designation of the evacuees as 'internally displaced
persons"' is important since it has implications for what laws might apply. Id.
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[M]en and women wading chest-deep in water-when they
weren't floating or drowning in the toxic whirlpool the streets of
New Orleans had become. When the waters subsided, there were
dead bodies strewn on curbsides and wrapped in blankets by fel-
low sufferers, who provided the perished their only dignity. There
were unseemly collages of people silently dying from hunger and
thirst-and of folk writhing in pain, or quickly collapsing under
the weight of missed medicine for diabetes, high blood pressure, or
heart trouble. Photo snaps and film shots captured legions of men
and women huddling in groups or hugging comers, crying in wild-
eyed desperation for help, for any help, from somebody, anybody,
who would listen to their unanswered pleas.1
6
It is without a doubt that the print and televised news media played an
integral role in shaping the public sentiment as to the known and unknown
"geography" of New Orleans. ' 7 John P. Manard, Jr. et al. succinctly provide
context for the physical geography of New Orleans:
Much of New Orleans sits below sea level. It is bounded on the
south by the Mississippi River and on the north by Lake Pontchar-
train. To the east is marshland and then the Gulf of Mexico. Run-
ning in a north/south direction from the river to the lake, separat-
ing New Orleans into eastern and western sections, is the Industrial
Canal. The eastern portion of the city is surrounded by two sets of
levees and floodwalls (a northern area and a southern area), while
the western part of the city is surrounded by a separate set of lev-
ees and floodwalls. A "floodwall" in this context is generally what
would appear to a layman as a levee, topped with a concrete wall,
several feet tall. The concrete wall is poured on top of metal sheet
piling that is driven into the ground through the center of the un-
derlying levee. Radiating out to the east from the Industrial Canal
are two navigational waterways, the Intracoastal Waterway (sepa-
rates eastern New Orleans into northern and southern sections) and
the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. Thus, there were three separate
leveed pockets. Each flooded for a separate reason.'
8
The aforementioned geographical description of New Orleans is limited
to the confinements of a traditional understanding of geography in terms of
16. DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER, supra note 14, at 1.
17. See, e.g., Weeden, supra note 13, at 479-80 (detailing an "incredible symbol of ne-
glect" in the circumstances involving the death of ninety-one year-old, wheelchair bound,
Mrs. Ethel Mayo Freeman whose "lifeless body stayed in [the] wheelchair at the New Orleans
Convention Center for almost four days").
18. Manard, Jr. et al., supra note 10, at 34.
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locale. However, Critical Race Theory scholar, Reginald Oh, extends the
notion of geography "[t]o examine and deconstruct the 'spaces and places' of
a narrative" into a two-part inquiry: "First, a critical analysis examine[s] the
geographic scale or setting of a narrative."' 9 Oh suggests that this inquiry
poses the two questions: "[W]here does the story take place? . . . [W]here
else could [the story] have taken place?"20 Secondly, Oh proposes that "a
critical analysis could examine the movement of people within the spaces...
in which the narrative unfolds."'" According to Oh, the second inquiry fo-
cuses upon an understanding of the geographic significance of where people
are located because "people's location at any given time and place can help
to disrupt and deconstruct the plot of a legal narrative. 22 This inquiry essen-
tially asks in-depth questions about the "characters," such as: Where are
they from? "Where are they now? How did they get from there to here?, 23
In an effort to critically examine the Hurricane Katrina narrative and its
geography through the utilization of Oh's two-prong query, it should be
taken into account that the selected narratives of Hurricane Katrina dissemi-
nated by the print and news media served not only as attempts to tell the
story presented as seen by the news reporter/photographer/syndicated
writer/commentator, etc., but also invariably unpacked a historical legacy of
"how power operates through and in spaces and places."2' 4 For instance, by
critically examining the space that was heavily populated with black people
in New Orleans' Lower Ninth Ward, referred to as the "Lower Nine, '' 25 with
the degree of devastation sustained both pre- and post-Hurricane Katrina, the
reality of the connection between geographical location and race is signifi-
cant. The truth behind the post-Hurricane Katrina mantra echoed by the peo-
ple most affected, "It's the levees stupid" 26 sheds an undeniable light on the
19. Reginald Oh, Re-Mapping Equal Protection Jurisprudence: A Legal Geography of
Race and Affirnative Action, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 1305, 1316 (2004).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Oh, supra note 19, at 1315-16.
25. David Dante Troutt, Many Thousands Gone, Again, in AFTER THE STORM: BLACK
INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA 1, 12 (David Dante Troutt ed.
2006). Troutt categorizes the Lower Ninth as being symptomatic of the geographical isolation
on which concentrated poverty feeds. See id.
26. Interview with Mitchell F. Crusto, Professor of Law, Loyola University (New Or-
leans) (Jan. 3, 2007) (interview conducted during the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) 2007 Annual Meeting). For a visual depiction of the mantra, see
http://www.levees.org/downloads/commission.pdf (man holding a placard with the words,
"It's the levees stupid").
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man-made quality of the disaster. On July 10, 2006, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers 27 issued a nine-volume draft report consisting of 6,113 pages to
Congress which acknowledges that "the levees it built had flaws in their de-
sign, construction and maintenance of the 350-mile levee system."
28
The greatest impact of the "flaws" by the Army Corp of Engineers fall
squarely within an intersecting geographical location of "spaces and places"
which is overwhelmingly raced.29  According to Mollyann Brodie, Vice
President of Public Opinion and Media Research for the Kaiser Family
Foundation,30 "[w]hites were hit hard, too, but blacks were disproportion-
ately living in areas that were most flooded .... And even before Katrina
hit, there were gaps between blacks and whites."'" Democratic Party Chair-
man, Howard Dean, called for the nation to confront the "'ugly truth that
27. See History of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project,
Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Ann Mittal, Dir. Natural Res. & Env't, GAO) Mittal stated in part, the purpose and history of
the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Flood Control Project:
Congress first authorized construction of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane
Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965 to provide hurricane protection to areas around the lake in
the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and St. Charles. Although federally authorized, it
was a joint federal, state, and local effort with the federal government paying 70 percent of the
costs and the state and local interests paying 30 percent. The Corps was responsible for project de-
sign and construction and local interests were responsible for maintenance of levees and flood con-
trols.
Id.
28. Diane Grassi, New Orleans Remains Problematic for Army Corp of Engineers,
MICHNEWS.COM, July 20, 2006, http://www.michnews.com/artman/publish/article 13493.
shtml; Jeremy Caplan, Katrina Mea Culpa, TIME.COM, June 4, 2006, http://www.time.com/
printout/0,8816,1200756,00.html; John Schwartz, Army Corps Admits Flaw in New Orleans
Levees, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2006.
29. See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, Katrina Hit Blacks Harder Than Whites, Study Finds,
WASH. POST, May 10, 2007, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/09/AR2007050902556.html.
30. See generally, Giving Voice to the People of New Orleans: The Kaiser Post-Katrina
Baseline Survey, http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/pomr051007pkg.cfm (last visited June 14,
2007). The Kaiser Family Foundation study was conducted by:
a team of 41 interviewers [who] visited 456 randomly selected census areas, documented the
physical condition of nearly 17,000 housing locations and completed interviews with 1,504 ran-
domly chosen adults living in the four parishes between September and November 2006. The sur-
vey's margin of sampling error is plus or minus four percentage points.
Id.
31. Whoriskey, supra note 29 (quoting Mollyann Brodie, Vice President of Public Opin-
ion and Media Research, Kaiser Family Foundation); see also Michael Grunwald & Susan B.
Glasser, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2005, at A01, available at http://levees.org/re-
search/sources/Washingtonpostl.htm (noting that engineers at Louisiana State University's
Hurricane Center agree that 'Katrina's initial surge from the southeast overwhelmed flood-
walls along the New Orleans Industrial Canal, flooding the city's Lower Ninth Ward as well
as St. Bernard Parish).
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skin color, age, and economics played a deadly role in who survived [Hurri-
cane Katrina] and who did not.' 32 According to the Center for Popular Eco-
nomics (CPE) staff economist John J. Fitzgerald:
No other levee breach in the [United States] has caused such a
level of destruction or such an extensive evacuation. Flooding did
most of the damage that was done to life and property. The prin-
cipal victims of the flooding were the poor. Some rich folks lost
money, but the poor lost their lives and their homes. The skin
color of the victims is striking. They are almost all black and
brown folks. They are primarily African-American. New Orleans,
like the rest of the South, has continued to color-code its poor.33
The answer to Oh's inquiry of "where else could it have taken place?
34
will depend on the audiences' inclination to imagine a "color-blind ' 35 frame.
A "color-blind" frame would allow one to deny the undeniable sea of black
faces clamoring to survive, waiting for somebody to see that assistance was
required. Oh's second inquiry, which explores the movement of the people
as the narrative unfolds, would benefit from the use of "her-storical lens"36
32. Dean: Race Played Role in Katrina Toll, MSNBC.coM, Sept. 8, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9247380/print/l/displaymode/1098 (quoting Howard Dean).
33. John J. Fitzgerald, Race, Class and Katrina, ECON-ATROCITY BULLETIN, Sept. 14,
2005 (on file with Nova Law Review).
The statistics on New Orleans are informative. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in
2004, New Orleans' population was 20.0% white and 67.9% black. Additionally, New Or-
leans has a poverty rate of 38 0/o-among the highest in the United States. The 2000 census re-
vealed that 27% of New Orleans households, amounting to approximately 120,000 people,
were without privately owned transportation.
Id.
34. Oh, supra note 19, at 1316.
35. See CHERYL 1. HARRIS & DEVON W. CARBADO, Loot or Find Fact or Frame? in
AFTER THE STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA
87, 91 (David Dante Troutt ed., 2006) (defining color-blindness as the belief that "race is not a
factor in how we make sense of the world"). For an in depth discussion of the "colorblind"
framework and the idea of race and racial framing, see Harris, Whitewashing Race, supra note
8; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF RACE 3-16
(1998); see generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Race Talk: Patricia J. Williams' Seeing a Color-
Bind Future: The Paradox of Race, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 183 (2000); see also Rhonda
V. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race Consciousness and
Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2003); Neil Gotanda, Failure
of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135 (1996).
36. Washington supra note 3; see also Pamela Bridgewater, Introduction to a Symposium
Celebrating the Twentieth Anniversary of the Feminism and Legal Theory Project, 13 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 4 (2005) (noting that the concept of "her-storical lens" [is] a
feminist device which views historical moments).
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as a tool to critically examine the often overlooked issue of black women's
lives' both pre- and post-Katrina.
From a Critical Race Feminist perspective, I will add another inquiry
that will be addressed in Part IV: Do outsiders (those who reside in a "space
and place" other than the character in the narrative) "see" the collective iden-
tity of the character or identify with the symbol surrounding the character?
More precisely put, as to the Hurricane Katrina narrative with a "her-
storical lens", did the media "see" the elderly black woman photographed
with the American flag quilt over her head and shoulders? 37 This inquiry
suggests that there is a need to construct an alternative social reality in order
to adequately address a legacy of movement at the behest of the government.
III. IDENTITY AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
The contextualization of identity38 and collective identity 39 are para-
mount when critically examining the Hurricane Katrina narrative. Professor
Wendy B. Scott put it best when she surmised that:
Clearly Hurricane Katrina was an act of God in nature and by law.
But not only did Hurricane Katrina give God a stage, it revealed
the multiple failures of man-failure to build adequate levee pro-
tection for a city, and a region, that is anywhere from'6-12 feet be-
low sea level in a sinking swamp; failure to provide a way of es-
cape during the evacuation for the most vulnerable of our citizens,
37. See photograph by Eric Gay, AP, World Wide Photos, on the jacket of AFTER THE
STORM: BLACK INTELLECTuALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA (David Dante
Troutt ed., 2006); see also photograph by Alan Chin, GAMMA, Jonathan Alter, The Other
America, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 42. The photograph's caption reads, "Left Behind:
An elderly woman awaits evacuation. TV dislikes images of the poor, but they were omni-
present during the coverage of Katrina." Id.
38. See generally Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the
Constitutional Rhetoric of White Innocence, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 477, 502 (2006) (observ-
ing that "a claim of personal Whiteness is tantamount to a claim of being innocent of Black-
ness"); Martha Minnow, Not Only For Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV.
647, 669 (1996) (noting that "[p]ersonal testimony about oppression displaces analysis of
social structures that produce and maintain it."); Angela P. Harris, Foreward: The Unbear-
able Lightness ofIdentity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 207, 210 (1996) (noting that "identity
is always contextual" as identified by Mary Coombs' as a general proposition about identity).
39. See generally Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., The Woody Allen Blues: "Identity Poli-
tics '" Race, and the Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 511 (1999) (exploring whether "the racial politics of
the country-a belief in a notion of community, citizen and law .. despite ... best efforts,
[includes] Black people inside ... definitions of citizenship").
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the poor, the elderly, the children and the differently-abled; and
failure to respect the dignity and safety of those in distress.40
The identity of the most vulnerable during Hurricane Katrina revealed
that issues of "space," "place," and multiple intersections of being, including
race, class, gender, and age, are determinative in evaluating the degree to
which one experiences the narrative. 41 The tendency to self-identify with a
group that is viewed as similar and to disassociate with a group viewed as
otherwise is well-established. For example, the highly contested "finding" of
food by a white couple and the "looting" of food by a black male were pre-
sented as facts to a narrative, 42 but historically linked to perceptions of race
and pathology. 43 The viewer's notion of "citizens" surviving during a na-
tional disaster is contextual at best. A Critical Race Feminist approach man-
dates a critique of the other side of commentary that is unspoken, particularly
as to the fate of black women and their bodies during Hurricane Katrina. As
Kathleen A. Bergin points out, "[g]overnment officials inexcusably failed to
anticipate and prevent hurricane related sexual violence throughout the
evacuation and sheltering process"' against black women and girls histori-
cally not given the benefit of "victim" status.45 Cheryl I. Harris and Devon
W. Carbado remind us of both the historical and "her-storical" identities that
no doubt set the stage for "[t]he frames of law and order and black criminal-
ity [which] influenced both the exaggeration (overreporting) and the margin-
alization (underreporting) of violent crimes" perpetuated against black
women. 46 The utilization of a "her-storical lens" will aid the audience to see
the unspoken as it relates to the "who" and "what" the print and news media
disseminated to the public during the wake and aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina.
IV. IDENTITY AND SYMBOLS
The devastating images of people and destruction during the wake of
Hurricane Katrina were seemingly limitless. However, there is a photograph
40. Wendy B. Scott, Lecture, From an Act of God to the Failure of Man: Hurricane
Katrina and the Economic Recovery of New Orleans, 51 VILL. L. REV. 581, 581 (2006).
41. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Distancing Rural Poverty, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
3, 4 (2006) (examining how rural poverty is often discriminated against in light of America's
tendency to focus on the urban rather than the rural poverty).
42. HARRIs & CARBADO, supra note 35, at 89.
43. See Bassett, supra note 40, at 4.
44. Bergin, supra note 14, at 554.
45. HARRIS & CARBADO, supra note 35, at 100.
46. Id. at 101.
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of an elderly black woman tightly gripping an American flag quilt around her
arms. 7 I witnessed this photograph in magazines and on television. It will
be explored in light of the notion of collective identity and the media's act of
imputing identity.
From a Critical Race Feminist perspective, I tend to see multiple inter-
sections of being first, and then experience the whole message. However,
the Associated Press photographer captured a being-and their collective
identity-as clothed in the symbol of an American flag quilt.48 According to
Kenji Yoshino:
Symbols are "socially rooted and socially supported" in a way that
individual stories are not; they are by their nature aggregations of
desires and meanings that exist within a community .... Many
symbols, such as the American flag, derive their ability to draw to-
gether communities of adherents precisely because they do not
force believers to articulate what it is about the symbol that draws
them together. Such an articulation doubtless would fracture an
otherwise unified community, for the over-determined signifier of
the flag accommodates both the nationalism of the xenophobe
(America is not like other countries) and the pluralism of the lib-
eral (America is like all other countries).49
The Hurricane Katrina narrative of a black elderly woman draped with
an American flag quilt effectively silenced her collective identity and spoke
volumes to the power of a nationally recognized symbol woven tightly in the
psyche of all things American that inherently stand for "freedom" and "jus-
tice." 50 However, through the utilization of a "her-storical lens", the "space"
and "place" of Ms. Milvirtha Hendricks' narrative are explored beyond the
47. Pellom McDaniels III, Caught in the Act: Seeing Photography as a Window to Real-
ity, 1 HYPHENATION 1, 32 (2006), available at http://www.emory.edu/HypheNation/Caught
%20in%20the%20Act.pdf.
48. See id.
49. See Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scru-
tiny for Gays, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 1753, 1770 (1996) (citations omitted).
50. See Michelle Burford, The Tale of a Photograph, ESSENCE, Dec. 2006, at 142 (photo-
graph of Ms. Milvirtha Hendricks by Associated Press photographer). The column reads,
"The Tale of a Photograph: We all saw the photo of the elderly woman draped in an Ameri-
can flag .... [W]e tell the story behind the picture." Id. See also Culp, Jr., supra note 39, at
514 (noting that "when we speak of an American identity definitionally, we cannot describe in
law and social policy such an identity in a way that includes the 'other"').
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photograph captured by the Associated Press photographer as she, among
others, waited for justice outside of the New Orleans Convention Center.5'
Her story: Ms. Milvirtha Hendricks moved to New Orleans from Mis-
sissippi in 1945 with her now deceased husband. 2 She is the mother of
seven children, three of which resided in New Orleans before Hurricane
Katrina. 3 During Hurricane Katrina, Ms. Hendricks and her daughter, Bev-
erly, fled from her home in the Lower Ninth Ward to her son's two-story
house in East New Orleans.14 On August 30, 2005, a Coast Guard boat re-
moved Ms. Hendricks, her sister Vivian, and daughter Beverly from the
house as they pushed through contaminated water to reach dry ground.5
After a brief stay in a shelter, they were moved to the Convention Center. 6
Ms. Hendricks' daughter Beverly draped the American flag-printed quilt
around her mother's frail arms, and the news media memorialized Ms.
Hendricks' narrative.17 Ms. Hendricks' daughter, Terry, saw her mother's
photo on CNN.
51
As of December 2006, Ms. Hendricks has no memory of the hurricane
due to a "downward spiral toward dementia." 59 She now has moved to
Texas to live with her daughter.60
Ms. Hendricks' Hurricane Katrina narrative has no end. She is quoted
as saying, "'I really don't know why this happened, but every day I thank
God for taking care of me. It's only because of Him that I made it through
alive. '61
Ms. Milvirtha Hendricks is a testament to faith beyond facts or memory.
She embodies a collective identity of black women whose geographical
"space" and "place" has been navigated by an African American history of
migration, both voluntary and forced-one that cannot be captured in a photo
while draped in a symbol of freedom and justice after experiencing the truth
of this Nation's failure to timely exercise either-once again.
51. See id.; see also Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363 (1992) (arguing
for the adoption of policies based on what the author refers to as "Racial Realism" which
requires the acknowledgment that black people will never gain full equality in this country).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Burford, supra note 50.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Burford, supra note 50.
61. Id.
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In conclusion, there is an obligation to see the disaster of Hurricane
Katrina through a "her-storical lens" so that history shall not be re-cast and
memories co-opted by symbols. It is up to those willing to stand up, rise,
and swell with the moral conscience necessary to impact the lives of those
devastated by the storm; those who will remain resilient in seeking true jus-
tice for the Katrina victims and not a mere symbolic representation.62
I hope that this article serves as a necessary step in acknowledging the
importance of analyzing narratives from a Critical Race Feminist perspective
in order to emphasize an alternative social reality beyond symbolism which
purports to convey messages of freedom and justice without "seeing" the
collective identity deeply embedded in our historical and her-storical lega-
cies.
62. See generally Mitchell F. Crusto, The Katrina Fund: Repairing Breaches in Gulf
Coast Insurance Levees, 43 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 329 (2006) (arguing for a "Katrina Homeown-
ers Compensation Fund to be modeled after the September 11 th Fund, which would constitute
a federal bailout program to compensate uninsured and under-insured homeowners"); Cain
Burdeau, Army Corps Hit With New Katrina Lawsuit, FOXNEWS.coM, Feb. 8, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2007Feb08/0,4670,KatrinaFloodLawsuit,00.html (Federal
Judge allowed a team of trial lawyers led by Joseph Bruno to proceed charging the Corps
liable for the flooding of eastern New Orleans and suburban St. Bernard Parish by waters from
the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet, a navigation channel known locally as Mr. Go.).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law has historically treated women differently than men.' One area
in which women continue to receive preferential treatment is capital punish-
ment.2 Even though women commit one out of eight homicides,3 only 2.1%
of them receive the death penalty at trial, and only 1.4% are currently on
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter; B.A., 2004, Political Science, University of Florida. The author would like to thank her
family and friends for their tremendous support and encouragement. In addition, she ex-
presses her gratitude to the members of Nova Law Review and the law school faculty, espe-
cially Dean linda f. harrison (lowercase preferred), and Professors Olympia Duhart, and
Stephanie Aleong for their wisdom and guidance.
1. See, e.g., Sheila J. Kuehl, Why a Women's Law Journal / Law Center Experience:
Episode XVI The Sequel / The Movie /Film at 11:00, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 11, 12 (1991).
2. Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women on the Cusp
of the 21st Century, 26 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 581, 582 (2000). See also Andrea Shapiro, Un-
equal Before the Law: Men, Women and the Death Penalty, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 427, 431 (2000). Joan Howarth characterizes capital jurisprudence as a "hidden battle-
ground of gender." Joan Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task
Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1345, 1347 (1994).
3. Rapaport, supra note 2, at 582.
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death row.4  Further, only 1.1% of female death row inmates are actually
executed.5 In addition, of the 157 death sentences imposed on women since
1973, only forty-nine of them remain in effect.6 On the other hand, 1018
men have been executed since 1976, and there are currently 3309 men on
death row.7 Because women on death row receive preferential treatment to
the detriment and, ultimately, the demise of male death row inmates, capital
punishment should be abolished!
This article will address the death penalty of female offenders in terms
of Martha Chamallas's three stages of feminist legal theory. Part II of this
article will define the three stages of feminist legal theory: the Equality
Stage, the Difference Stage, and the Diversity Stage. Part III will analyze the
death penalty for women according to the three theories in order to determine
whether capital punishment is compatible with feminist legal theory. This
section will reveal that the three stages of feminist legal theory do not en-
tirely correlate with the pattern of female executions. In addition, Part III
will offer suggestions as to why feminist legal theory can or cannot explain
the disparities in capital sentencing. Part IV is a comparative analysis of the
death penalty utilizing equal rights and discrimination law with respect to
women's equality within the three stages. Part V will discuss the possible
comeback of the Equality Stage as a result of the recent female executions.
4. Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders, January 1, 1973, Through
June 30, 2006 3, http://www.law.onu.edu/facultystaff/faculty profiles/FemDeath-
June2006.pdf [hereinafter Streib, Death Penalty]. Murderers rarely receive death sentences
and capital punishment has been on the decline since 1999. See Rapaport, supra note 2, at
582; see also Death Penalty Information Center, Facts About the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
5. Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 9. Mitigating factors such as the defendant's
background, character, and past criminal history result in the female defendant's clemency
from execution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(5), (8) (2000).
6. Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 9. This means that 59% of women who re-
ceived death sentences after the death penalty was reinstated had their sentences commuted or
reversed by the judiciary. Rapaport, supra note 2, at 584. However, at the end of 1998, about
one third of all death row inmates receiving death sentences between 1973-98 had their sen-
tences reversed by the courts. Id.
7. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A.: SUMMER
2006, 1, 10, http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSASummer_2006.pdf
[hereinafter DEATH Row U.S.A.].
8. Capital punishment also discriminates against blacks and often captures the innocent.
Death Penalty Information Center, History of the Death Penalty, Part II,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 15&did=411 (last visited Mar. 29, 2007)
[hereinafter History of the Death Penalty, Part II]. Amnesty International is also an advocate
of abolishing the death penalty. Amnesty International, The Death Penalty,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-index-eng [hereinafter Amnesty International, The
Death Penalty] (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
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Finally, Part VI will summarize and conclude that the death penalty should
be abolished due to its disparate effect of punishing more death-eligible men
than death-eligible women.
II. DEFINING THE THREE STAGES OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
Chamallas based her feminist legal theory stages-the Equality Stage of
the 1970s, the Difference Stage of the 1980s, and the Diversity Stage of the
1990s-on Patricia A. Cain's demarcation lines.9 The three stages of femi-
nist legal theory are used to "make sense of the diverse and sometimes con-
tradictory arguments of feminist scholarship."' 0 In the Equality Stage, femi-
nist legal theorists saw women and men as similar beings; thus, feminist
theorists advocated that women should be subjected to and protected by the
same laws as men." In contrast, feminist theorists in the Difference Stage
emphasized the differences between women and men, thereby advocating for
particularized treatment of the two sexes."i Finally, the Diversity Stage saw
women, as a group, as having distinct and unique personalities. 3 This stage
emerged because certain groups of women, such as women of color and les-
bians, were being discriminated against.'4
III. INTEGRATING THE THREE STAGES WITH FEMALE DEATH SENTENCES
Currently, there are forty-nine women on death row in the United
States.' 5 Since 1976, 1018 male executions occurred, 16 whereas only eleven
9. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION To FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 15 n.1 (2d ed.
2003). Stage One occurred in the late 1960s and it advocated women's equality---"that
women should be treated the same as men." Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence:
Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 199 (1989-90). Stage Two of Cain's
feminist theory highlighted the differences between men and women. Id. at 199-200.
Women were seen as having a "different voice" and laws should reflect women's dissimilari-
ties. Id. at 200. Stage Three is the Postmodernist theory. Id. at 204. Postmodern feminist
theory reflects the idea that every person has a "subjective, concrete, and particular" view of
life marked by personal experiences. Id.
10. CHAMALLAS, supra note 9, at 16.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 17.
13. Id. at 19.
14. See id.
15. Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 9.
16. DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 10.
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women were executed.' 7  Even though women commit death-eligible
crimes, " judges, jurors, and governors spare their lives for various reasons. 9
Because the gender gap is devastatingly prevalent in capital punishment, it is
difficult to reconcile the number of female executions with the three stages
of feminist legal theory. 20 The subsequent sections will explain the com-
patibility of feminist legal theory with capital punishment.
A. The Equality Stage
For the purposes of this article, the Equality Stage will incorporate the
executions of the 1960s and the 1970s because the women's movement of
the 1960s also emphasized the equality of women.2' Another reason these
two decades are grouped together is because executions were at an all-time
low due to the abolishment of capital punishment during this time period.22
The Equality Stage saw few executions for both men and women. 23 Al-
though both men and women sat on death row in the 1960s and 1970s,24 only
one female execution occurred during the 1960s, 25 and no female executions
17. Death Penalty Information Center, Women and the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=230&scid=24#facts (last visited Mar. 29,
2007).
18. Melinda E. O'Neil, Note, The Gender Gap Argument: Exploring the Disparity of
Sentencing Women to Death, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213, 218-19
(1999). When women kill, they often kill their loved ones, including their children. Streib,
Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 10; Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: Women, the
Death Penalty and Commutation, 11 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 283, 301 (1996). However, states
often characterize capital crimes as felony murder or homicide by and against strangers, as
opposed to domestic homicide. Victor L. Streib, Rare and Inconsistent: The Death Penalty
for Women, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 609, 615 (2006) [hereinafter Streib, Rare and Inconsis-
tent]. Therefore, female murderers rarely receive death sentences because states do not con-
sider domestic homicide as deserving of capital punishment. Id.
19. See O'Neil, supra note 18, at 218-19. Decision-makers mitigate female death sen-
tences because they believe that more women than men are capable of rehabilitation, they
view women as "childlike" and victims of abuse, and women often do not have violent pasts.
Id. at 218, 232; Rapaport, supra note 2, at 583.
20. See generally Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 7-8.
21. See Cain, supra note 9, at 198.
22. History of the Death Penalty, Part II, supra note 8.
23. See Samuel R. Gross, Still Unfair, Still Arbitrary--But Do We Care? 26 OHIO N.U. L.
REv. 517, 519 (2000).
24. See Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 4. Approximately twenty-two death sen-
tences were imposed on women in the 1970s. Id.
25. Id. at 7-8. California executed Elizabeth Ann Duncan on August 8, 1962 for con-
spiracy to commit murder. Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the U.S. 1608-
1987: The Espy File, Executions by Date, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ESPYdate.pdf
602 (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Executions in the U.S.].
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took place in the 1970s.26 In contrast, 192 men were executed in the 1960s
and three men were executed during the 1970s.f Relatively speaking, very
few executions occurred during this time period because public opinion on
the death penalty shifted towards disapproval.28 During this stage, the
United States Supreme Court vigorously faced the constitutionality of the
death penalty:
The 1960s and 1970s saw several challenges to the imposition of
the death penalty, including challenges involving disproportional-
ity of the punishment to the crime committed, the state of mind of
the defendant at the time of the crime, the age of the offender, the
mental capacity of the offender, and the race of the offender.
29
Moreover, the judicial invalidation of the death penalty took place in
1972 with the United States Supreme Court's decision of Furman v. Geor-
gia.3" Although the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, no executions,
male or female, occurred that year.3 The first execution after the reinstate-
ment of the death penalty took place in 1977.32
Chamallas characterizes the Equality Stage as emphasizing the similar-
ity of women and men.33 Legal feminists during this period maintained that
laws protecting women only served to "restrict women's lives to the home
and family. 34 Women gained much ground in the political arena during this
time. 35 Nonetheless, in terms of capital punishment, decision-makers did not
see women and men as equals during the Equality Stage, as only one female
was executed for her capital crime. 36 Theoretically speaking, equality theo-
26. See Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 7-8.
27. See Executions in the U.S., supra note 25, at 596-604.
28. See Gross, supra note 23, at 517. "The last execution in this period was in 1967; and
there were none from 1968 until 1977." Id at 519. However, public approval of the death
penalty increased in the late 1970s. Id at 521.
29. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 439.
30. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). Although the United States Supreme Court found
that many states' death penalty statutes violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, the Court left the door open for states to rewrite their death penalty
statutes to comply with the Furman decision. See History of the Death Penalty, Part II, supra
note 8.
31. History of the Death Penalty, Part II, supra note 8; Executions in the U.S., supra note
25, at 604.
32. History of the Death Penalty, Part II, supra note 8. Utah executed Gary Gilmore on
January 17, 1977. DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 7, at 12.
33. CHAMALLAS, supra note 9, at 16.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 17.
36. See Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 7-8.
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ists would have liked to see comparable treatment of women and men for
similar crimes.3" Ultimately, however, the gender gap prevented the equal
treatment of women and men.38 Nonetheless, the constitutional challenges
that arose in the 1960s and 1970s, causing the number of overall executions
to drop, helps to reconcile the fact that only one female execution took place
during this period."
B. The Difference Stage
In contrast to the Equality Stage, legal feminists during the Difference
Stage embraced the differences between women and men.4" In the 1980s,
difference theorists analyzed gender differences in terms of "cultural atti-
tudes, ideology, socialization, [and] organizational structures."'4  Accord-
ingly, since women were thought to value human relationships and possess
positive values such as compassion and understanding,42 in theory, female
executions during the Difference Stage should have been the lowest out of
the three stages. However, the number of female executions in the Differ-
ence Stage is the same as in the Equality Stage-one female execution.43
Nonetheless, the sole female execution complements the feminist legal the-
ory espoused during this time." In all likelihood, the female execution of
the Equality Stage matches the single female execution of the Difference
Stage due to the overall sentiment towards capital punishment during the
Equality Stage. 45 As such, feminist legal theory can draw a parallel with
capital punishment after all.
C. The Diversity Stage
Because the Diversity Stage highlights the differences amongst women,
the number of female executions during the 1990s should theoretically fall
37. See generally CHAMALLAS, supra note 9, at 16.
38. See generally id. at 17.
39. See Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 7-8.
40. CHAMALLAS, supra note 9, at 17-18.
41. Id. at 18. Chamallas states that in order for women to be treated as equals, we should
change social norms by accounting for the differences between men and women. Id.
42. Id. at 19.
43. See Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 8. North Carolina executed Velma
Barfield in 1984 for murder. Executions in the U.S., supra note 25, at 605. One hundred and
seventeen males were executed during this timeframe. See DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 7,
at 12-14.
44. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 9, at 17-18.
45. See History of the Death Penalty, Part II, supra note 8.
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between the number of female executions during the Equality Stage and the
number during the Difference Stage.46 However, since the number of female
executions during the Equality and Difference Stages is despairingly low, the
two female executions that did occur during the Diversity Stage merely equal
the total amount of executions that took place during the previous two peri-
ods combined. 4"
In theory, the Diversity theorists would have liked for capital decision-
makers to see the differences amongst women instead of viewing all women
as a "weaker, submissive, dependent, and more passive sex."48 Capital pun-
ishment may have turned out differently if the decision-makers recognized
that not all women possess the same character traits. 49 For example, after
serving ten years of her twenty-year sentence for murdering her eleven-
month-old daughter, the parole board released Guinevere Garcia from
prison.5° However, after her release, to obtain money for alcohol, she went
to her ex-husband's house with a .357 Magnum and killed him.5" The jury
sentenced Garcia to death, but Jim Edgar, the governor of Illinois, granted
Garcia clemency because he did not think that Garcia was the "worst of the
worst., 52  Although Governor Edgar denied granting clemency to Garcia
based on her gender, Garcia was as death-eligible as any other felony mur-
derer with a violent criminal history. 3
Between 1973 and 1999, 129 women were sentenced to death, but only
two executions occurred during the Diversity Stage.5 4  Then again, more
women received capital sentences during this stage than the previous
stages.5 5 In addition, the public disapproval of capital punishment during the
Equality Stage most likely caused the lack of correspondence of executions
with feminist legal theory for this time period.56 Although the two execu-
tions do not entirely correlate with the Diversity theory, the fact that more
46. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 9, at 19-20.
47. In 1998, Florida executed Judias Buenoano and Texas executed Karla Faye Tucker.
Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 7-8.
48. O'Neil, supra note 18, at 218.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 219.
51. Id.; see Schmall, supra note 18, at 295.
52. O'Neil, supra note 18, at 219-20.
53. See id. Guin Garcia most likely escaped death because the governor sympathized
with her tumultuous past. See Schmall, supra note 18, at 289. As an infant, Guin saw her
mother commit suicide. Id. at 293-94. As a child, her uncle raped her, and as a teenager,
Guin became a pregnant drug addict. Id. at 294.
54. Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 4, 7.
55. Id. at 4. During the 1980s, fifty-one women received death sentences, whereas dur-
ing the 1990s fifty-six women received death sentences. Id.
56. See generally id.
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executions occurred in this stage than in the previous stages may indicate
that female executions are becoming less deplorable. "
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
During the latter part of the Equality Stage, the women's movement
won a big battle in the courts with the judicial recognition of sexual harass-
ment.58 In addition, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibited employers
from engaging in pay discrimination on the basis of sex, also occurred during
this stage.59 Like the 1960s and 1970s, the women's movement in the 1980s
flourished. 6' During the 1980s, the National Organization for Women ve-
hemently sought ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment and fell only
six votes short of ratification. 6' Further, in 1981 Congress decided to cele-
brate women's history by establishing the National Women's History Week,
which later expanded to the National Women's History Month in 1987.62 In
addition, the Difference Stage saw an increase of women in undergraduate
and graduate studies. 63 The 1990s saw the enactment of the Family Medical
Leave Act, which allows most federal employees up to twelve weeks of un-
paid leave for the birth or care of a child, or the care of the employee, parent,
child, or spouse with a serious health condition. 4 The dramatic increase in
women's equality and success in education, the workplace, and politics dem-
onstrates that women are no longer the weaker of the two sexes, eliminating
the need for their preferential treatment under the law.65 The sections that
follow discuss landmark cases regarding the equality of women involving
equal rights and discrimination law.
57. See id. at 7-8.
58. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D.D.C. 1976) (mem.), rev'don other
grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Julianne Scott, Pragmatisim, Feminist Theory, and
the Reconceptualization of Sexual Harassment, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 203, 215 (1999).
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
60. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Chronology of the Equal Rights Amendment, 1923-1996,
http://www.now.org/issues/economic/cea/history.html#1980 (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
61. Id.
62. Clara Cobb, Celebrating Women and Their Contributions, DAILY TOREADOR, Mar. 1,
2005.
63. In 1984, women accounted for 49% of all undergraduate and masters degrees and
approximately 33% of all doctoral degrees. Women's International Center, Women's History
in America Presented by Women's International Center, http://www.wic.org/misc/history.htm
(last visited Mar. 29, 2007). In addition, in the mid-1980s, more women than men were col-
lege students. Id.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 6382(a)(I)(A)-(D) (2000).
65. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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A. Equal Protection
The major equal protection case from the Equality Stage is Reed v.
Reed.66 In 1967, Richard Reed, an adopted minor, died intestate. Both of
his parents, who were separated at the time, sought competing petitions to be
appointed as the administrator and administratrix of his estate.6s Although
both parents were equally entitled to administer their son's estate, a state law
enumerated a preference for males over females in the event that both par-
ents shared equal entitlement.69 The United States Supreme Court struck
down the Idaho statute as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment because
"giv[ing] a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of
the other ... is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbid-
den by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment., 70 For
the first time ever, the Court "struck down a sex-based [statute] on the
ground that it denied a woman equal protection of the laws.'
Next, Kirchberg v. Feenstra72 is the leading equal rights case from the
Difference Stage. In Kirchberg, a husband and wife owned a home together;
however, the husband executed a mortgage on the home without his wife's
knowledge to pay for legal services after the wife filed a criminal complaint
against him. 7' The complaint alleged that he molested their minor child. 7' A
Louisiana statute gave husbands "the unilateral right to dispose of [jointly
owned community property] without his spouse's consent., 75 The wife chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute but the District Court
upheld the statute's validity. 76 During the appeal, the Louisiana Legislature
revised the statute, but it was not to take effect until the new year.77 There-
fore, the Court still faced the question of whether the statute violated the
United States Constitution. 78 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the statute explicitly discriminated against women.79 Since the State did
66. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
67. Id. at 71.
68. Id. at 71-72.
69. Id. at 73.
70. Id. at 76.
71. Shanti Hubbard, ACLU's Women's Rights Project: Annual Report 2005, ix, avail-
able at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/wrpannualreport2005.pdf.
72. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
73. Id. at 456-57.
74. Id. at 456.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 458.
77. Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 458.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 459.
2007]
153
: Nova Law Review 31, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LAW REVIEW
not show that the regulation furthered any substantial governmental interest,
the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.80
Finally, during the Diversity Stage, Justice Ginsburg issued a landmark
ruling in United States v. Virginia (VM/). 81 In this case, a female high school
student sought admission to the state-funded Virginia Military Institute
(VMI), a prestigious all-male school which sought to produce "citizen-
soldiers" and prepare men for "leadership in civilian life and in military ser-
vice."82 Graduates of VMI often became national leaders in the military and
in politics. 83 However, VMI never responded to the 347 female applications
it received within the two years prior to the lawsuit.84 VMI claimed that its
rigorous training, constant regulation of behavior and living conditions, and
adversative methods were unsuitable for women. 85 The District Court ruled
against the United States and in favor of VMI. 86 The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit disagreed and ordered VMI to either start admitting
women into its school, become a private institution, or start a comparable
school for women.87 VMI chose to institute a parallel program for women
on a separate campus, called the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership
(VWIL).88 However, VWIL seriously lacked the prestige and benefits that
VMI offered.89 When the case reached the United States Supreme Court,
Justice Ginsburg noted that the real issue was whether the unique opportunity
afforded only to men at VMI violated the Equal Protection Clause.9" Justice
Ginsburg argued that VWIL's program was in no position to afford women
the same type of opportunities and advantages that men received at VMI.9
Thus, she held that VMI unconstitutionally denied women equal protection
of the laws. 92
Notwithstanding the great strides that the women's movement made be-
tween the 1960s and the 1990s with regard to obtaining equal protection of
the laws, sex-based discrimination continued to occur in the area of capital
80. See id. at 459-61.
81. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
82. Id. at 520, 523.
83. Id. at 520.
84. Id. at 523.
85. Id. at 525.
86. VM, 518 U.S. at 524.
87. Id. at 525-26.
88. Id. at 526.
89. Id. at 526, 529.
90. Id. at 530-31.
91. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 551-53.
92. See id. at 558.
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punishment during this time. 93 At one point in time, sparing women's lives
from execution may have been understandable due to the status of women
and society's perception of them.94 However, today women and men are, for
the most part, regarded as equals.95 Therefore, female death row inmates
should not be permitted to escape death because of their gender.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has disapproved of exe-
cuting the insane96 and the mentally retarded, 97 indicating a shift in the
Court's outlook on capital punishment. Back in 1989, Justice O'Connor held
in Penry v. Lynaugh98 that there was a lack of national consensus to ban the
executions of mentally retarded death row inmates. 99 However, after the
Penry decision, many state legislatures took action and exempted the men-
tally retarded from execution.'00 In 2002, prompted by the increase in legis-
lative action regarding this issue, the United States Supreme Court found, in
Atkins v. Virginia,'0 ' that a national consensus against executing the mentally
retarded existed.0 2 Therefore, the Court provided the mentally retarded with
a categorical exemption from the death penalty.'0 3 The apparent change in
the Court's viewpoint regarding the death penalty warrants a revisited look at
the disparate impact of capital punishment on male death row inmates. Be-
cause the Court found in Atkins yet another flaw with capital punishment,, °4
it should also find that the death penalty's effect of disparately and dispro-
portionately impacting males is unconstitutional and therefore should abolish
capital punishment.
B. Gender Discrimination
Another area of the law in which the women's movement improved
greatly during the three stages of feminist legal theory is sex discrimination.
The Equality Stage saw a great victory for the women's movement in the
93. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 440.
94. Id. at 462 n.268.
95. See id. at 462-63.
96. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,409-10 (1986).
97. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
98. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
99. Id. at 334. However, in 1988, the federal government prohibited the execution of the
mentally retarded. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314.
100. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314. States such as Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky, Georgia,
Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, New Mexico, Indiana, New York, and Kansas enacted
statutes exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty. Id.
101. Id. at 304.
102. Id. at 316.
103. Id. at 318.
104. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19.
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decision of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.'°5 In Phillips, a female job
applicant filed a sex discrimination suit after the defendant told her that the
company did not accept "applications from women with pre-school-aged
children."' 6 However, the defendant accepted applications from men with
pre-school-aged children. 0 7 The United States Supreme Court held that hav-
ing two different hiring policies on the basis of sex violated Section 703(a) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.108 In addition, Justice Marshall, in the concur-
ring opinion, expressed his concern that employers could assert that different
parenting roles would make one sex more or less qualified for the job than
another, under the "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception
to the Act.'0 9 Justice Marshall argued that employers should only consider
gender-neutral employment qualifications with respect to performance char-
acteristics. 110
Next, the leading gender discrimination case from the Difference Stage
is Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson."' In Vinson, a female bank em-
ployee brought a sexual harassment suit against the bank and her supervisor
after the supervisor "made repeated demands ... for sexual favors, . . . fon-
dled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's rest-
room, .. . exposed himself to her, and. . . forcibly raped her on several occa-
sions." ' 12 Because the female employee was afraid that she would lose her
job, she consented to sexual relations with her supervisor, but ended it after
she entered into a relationship with another man. ' The District Court found
that the female employee's relations with her supervisor were voluntary and
irrelevant of her employment at the bank. "4 In contrast, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the female employee
had a valid claim for sexual harassment based on a hostile working environ-
ment. "5 The United States Supreme Court held that the supervisor's actions
were sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile working envi-
ronment." 6 As a result of this decision, the Court broadened the definition
105. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
106. Id. at 543.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 544.
109. See id. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
110. Phillip, 400 U.S. at 547.
111. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
112. Id. at 60.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 61.
115. Id. at 62.
116. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
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of sexual harassment to include hostile working environment in addition to
quid pro quo. 117
Finally, the primary gender discrimination case for the Diversity Stage
is International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 118 In Johnson
Controls, Inc., female employees of a battery manufacturing plant challenged
the employer's discriminatory policy of barring all women, except those
whose infertility was medically documented, from jobs that involved actual
or potential lead exposure exceeding the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration standard. 19 Occupational lead exposure leads to certain
health risks, including harm to a fetus. 120 The United States Supreme Court
held that the employer's policy was "facially discriminatory because it re-
quire[d] only a female employee to produce proof that she [was] not capable
of reproducing."' 2' Additionally, the Court argued that the employer's pol-
icy did not fall within the BFOQ exception to Title VII because parents
should make decisions regarding the welfare of their children, not employ-
ers. 122
The women's movement was very successful in the area of gender dis-
crimination during the three stages of feminist legal theory. 123 The United
States Supreme Court struck down a state statute 124 and an employer's dis-
criminatory work policy as violative of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.121 In
addition, the Court recognized that a hostile working environment constitutes
sexual harassment. 126 Nonetheless, discriminatory practices still occurred
with regards to capital punishment. 127 Therefore, the death penalty should be
brought to an end because it results in the deaths of many more male capital
murderers than female, due to the unequal sentencing and execution practices
of judges, jurors, and governors who grant clemency. 28
117. See id. at 65, 67.
118. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
119. Id. at 191-92.
120. Id. at 190.
121. Id. at 198.
122. Id. at 206.
123. See generally CHAMALLAS, supra note 9.
124. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam).
125. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 198.
126. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
127. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 431.
128. See id. at 470.
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V. THE REEMERGENCE OF THE EQUALITY STAGE
The new millennium saw a vast increase in the number of female execu-
tions. '29 Since 2000, five states have executed eight women.130 The number
of female executions in the last six years doubles the total amount of execu-
tions that occurred between 1960 and 1990.' In 2001, three women were
executed-the highest number of female executions in any year since
1953.132 Since 2000, twenty-eight female inmates received death sen-
tences. 133 In addition, governors are denying clemency to women without
any damage to their political reputations. 1
34
When applying the feminist legal theories to the recent executions, the
eight female executions appear to fall within the confines of the Equality
Stage-where men and women should be treated equally. 135 Although the
increase in female executions is not a cause for celebration, it seems to be an
improvement in terms of gender equality. However, this may mean that the
country has experienced a shift in sentiment towards executing females.
136
Since it appears as though society is unsettlingly becoming complacent with
executing men and women while bias still prevails in the system, the overall
increase in executions is a cause for concern. 1
37
VI. CONCLUSION
During the three stages of feminist legal theory, women gained tremen-
dous ground in the areas of equal protection and gender discrimination
law. 138 Nevertheless, capital punishment remained permeated with gender
bias during that period. 139 The relatively high number of female executions
during recent times suggests that capital punishment's discriminatory effects
may be diluting; however, this ultimately means that the United States seems
to be at ease with capital punishment. 40
129. See Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 9.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 7-9.
132. Streib, Rare and Inconsistent, supra note 18, at 623.
133. Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 4.
134. See, e.g., Rapaport, supra note 2, at 581-82. Governor George Bush denied clem-
ency to Karla Faye Tucker in 1998 without jeopardizing his bid for the 2000 presidential
election. Id.
135. CHAMALLAS, supra note 9, at 16.
136. See Rapaport, supra note 2, at 582.
137. See id.
138. See generally CHAMALLAS, supra note 9.
139. See Streib, Rare and Inconsistent, supra note 18 at 613-15.
140. See generally Streib, Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 7-9.
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In contrast, more and more countries are finding that the death penalty
is cruel and unusual.'14  The leaders of many countries are following the
trend to put an end to capital punishment. 142 Currently, 129 countries do not
exercise capital punishment. 143 Additionally, Amnesty International abhors
capital punishment: "[It] is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading pun-
ishment. It violates the right to life. It is irrevocable and can be inflicted on
the innocent. It has never been shown to deter crime more effectively than
other punishments."' 44 In June 2006, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of
the Philippines signed a law abolishing capital punishment in her country. 45
Similarly, eighty-eight countries including France, Germany, Italy, Canada,
and Ireland have legally abolished the death penalty for any crime. 146 Be-
cause sex-based discrimination continues to occur in capital punishment,
sentencing and executing a disproportionate amount of males over females,
the United States should follow the lead of many other countries and abolish
the death penalty.
141. See Amnesty International, The Death Penalty, supra note 8.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Legislation Is Enacted Ending Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2006, at A16.
146. Amnesty International, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to October 1, 2006, a primary residential parent' in Florida re-
quired court approval for the relocation and modification of custody under
old section 61.13(2)(d).' Section 61.13001, titled "Parental Relocation with
a Child" replaced section 61.13(2)(d) on October 1, 2006.' A primary resi-
dential parent, including domestic violence victims, must follow the re-
quirements of section 61.13001 if they intend to relocate with their children.4
* Patricia McKenzie is a J.D. Candidate, May 2007, at the Shepard Broad Law Center,
Nova Southeastern University, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. She earned her B.S. in Criminal
Justice from Georgia State University in 1997. Ms. McKenzie wishes to thank her mom
Marlene Davy, Inez "Mammy" Hyde, and Professor Jane E. Cross for their support and en-
couragement. She would also like to thank the 2006 Goodwin Lecture Series Professors and
Fellows for their inspiration. Special thanks to Professor Tim Arcaro for his guidance with
this project. This article was written in honor of Kaylynn Nicole McCarthy, for her great
sacrifices!
1. According to Florida's statute titled "Parental Relocation with a Child," a "primary
residential parent . . . [is] a person so designated by court order or by an express written
agreement that is subject to court enforcement or ... the person seeking to relocate with a
child." FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(1)(f) (2006).
2. Id. § 61.13(2)(d) (2005) (amended 2006).
3. Id. § 61.13001 (2006); Echezarreta v. Echezarreta, 944 So.2d 1169, 1169-70 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
4. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(2)(a), (3) (2006). "If the primary residential parent and the
other parent ... entitled to visitation with the child agree to the relocation," or "[u]nless an
agreement has been entered as described in subsection (2), a parent who is entitled to primary
residence of the child shall notify the other parent .... of a proposed relocation of the child's
principal residence." Id.
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An issue that arises is whether section 61.13001 will provide timely and
effective relief to domestic violence victims5 seeking to relocate, in order to
protect themselves and their children. First, this note highlights national and
local domestic violence statistics and the effect of domestic violence on chil-
dren. Second, this note discusses the evolution of custody determinations
and Florida's most recent standards for determining custody on relocation.
Third, this note evaluates the language and possible application of Florida's
new relocation statute to a hypothetical. Finally, this note recommends a
more practical approach for domestic violence victims seeking to relocate
with their children.
Domestic violence in the United States is the leading cause of injury to
women. 6 "In 2001, women accounted for 85 percent of the victims of inti-
mate partner violence."7 Even if women develop the courage to divorce their
spouses to escape these abusive relationships, the abusers stalk and continue
to threaten or intimidate them.8 One finding suggests that "[80] percent of
women who are stalked by former husbands are physically assaulted by that
partner and 30 percent are sexually assaulted by that partner." 9
In 2005, Florida reported 120,386 incidents of domestic violence.' 1 Of
those reported incidents, approximately 54% were committed by a spouse or
co-habitant." Simple assaults 2 represented 75% of the total number of inci-
dents, and of those, 57.5% were committed by a spouse or co-habitant. 3
5. One court defined a domestic violence victim as a person who was physically harmed
or was threatened with imminent harm from another person. Farrell v. Marquez, 747 So. 2d
413, 414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
6. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 255 (2003) (citing
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 631 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
7. Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Facts on Domestic Violence,
http://www.endabuse.org/resources/facts/DomesticViolence.pdf (last visited May 15, 2007).
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Statewide Domestic Violence, 1992-2005, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/fsac/Crime_
Trends/download/pdf/dv offensesstatewide.pdf (last visited May 15, 2007).
11. See Domestic Violence Victim Totals by Offense, 1992-2005,
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/fsac/CrimeTrends/download/pdf/I 992_2005dvvictimoffense.
pdf (last visited May 15, 2007) (of a total of 120,386 reported offenses in 2005, 29,181 were
committed by a spouse and 36,000 by a co-habitant).
12. Assault is defined as "an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to
the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which
creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent." FLA. STAT.
§ 784.011 (2006). "[S]imple assault is a necessarily lesser included offense of aggravated
assault." Cannon v. State, 456 So. 2d 513, 514 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
13. See Domestic Violence Victim Totals by Offense, supra note 11 (citing 90,455 re-
ported simple assaults in 2005, of which 23,166 were committed by a spouse and 28,857 by a
co-habitant).
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There were 21,676 aggravated assaults14 reported and 46.4% were commit-
ted by a spouse or co-habitant. 5
In addition, there were 254 incidents of aggravated stalking,1 6 of which
55.5% were committed by a spouse or co-habitant. ' 7 A spouse or co-habitant
committed 45% of all simple stalking incidents and 48.8% of all incidents of
threat or intimidation.' 8 There were 176 criminal homicides and 51.7% were
committed by a spouse or co-habitant. 9
The effects on children are more devastating. There are children under
the age of twelve in more than half of the households where female victims
face intimate violence.2" "Between 3.3 and 10 million children witness some
form of domestic violence annually."'" "[Fifty] percent of the men who fre-
quently assault[] their wives also frequently abuse their children., 22 Further,
"[c]hildren who are exposed to domestic violence are more likely to exhibit
behavioral and physical health problems including depression, anxiety, and
violence towards peers. 23
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of Custody
In the 1800s, the single criterion for determining who got custody of a
child was the sex of the parent. 24 The paternal preference rule was a rebut-
table presumption in favor of the father.25 The child was believed to be the
14. Aggravated assault is defined as "assault [w]ith a deadly weapon without intent to
kill, or [w]ith an intent to commit a felony." FLA. STAT. § 784.021(1).
15. See Domestic Violence Victim Totals by Offense, supra note 11.
16. For aggravated stalking, the defendant must "knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follow[] [or] harass[] the victim," and the defendant must do so in violation of
either an injunction for protection against repeat violence, an injunction for protection against
domestic violence, or any other court imposed prohibition of conduct toward the victim or her
property. FLA. STAT. § 784.048(4).
17. See Domestic Violence Victim Totals by Offense, supra note 11.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Facts on Domestic Violence, supra note 7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Facts on Children and Domestic Violence,
http://www.endabuse.org/resources/facts/Children.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
24. Melissa M. Wyer et al., The Legal Context of Child Custody Evaluations, in PSY-
CHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 6-7
(Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987).
25. Id. at 7.
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property of the father.26 Therefore, "the father had exclusive rights to the
child ... based on his obligation to protect and financially support the mi-
nor."
27
In 1881, Justice Brewer, and then Justice Cardozo in 1925, rejected the
right of the parent as primary." In Finlay v. Finlay,29 Justice Cardozo wrote
that the judge "is to put himself in the position of a wise, affectionate, and
careful parent and make provision for the child accordingly."" °  Subse-
quently, the maternal preference rule developed and the burden of proof then
rested on the father to prove the mother was unfit.3 So long as the mother
was fit to be the parent, she was the best provider of attention, devotion, and
love during the period of nurture.32 Mothers frequently got children of ten-
der age and minor girls of any age, while fathers got custody of adolescent
boys.3"
Today, most jurisdictions have abolished a presumption in favor of ei-
ther parent in a custody determination.34 Many, including Florida, now use
some version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act's (UMDA) "best
interests of the child" factors for custody determinations.35
On making custody determinations, judges are faced with finding the
least detrimental alternative, on a case-by-case basis.36 In addition, judges
exercise great discretion in custody determinations because of limited evi-
dence and also because the legislature provides little guidance on how to use
26. Id
27. Id. at 6-7.
28. Id. at 7.
29. 148 N.E. 624 (N.Y. 1925).
30. Id. at 626. (citations omitted).
31. Wyer et al., supra note 24, at 7.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 8-9.
35. Id. at 10. Section 402 of the UMDA states that in determining the best interests of
the child:
The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his rela-
tionship to the child.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998).
36. Wyer et al., supra note 24, at 9.
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each factor or what weight to give each factor.37 In addition, these decisions
may be appealed only on grounds of abuse of discretion.38
B. Custody Determinations in Florida
A child custody determination is a "judgment, decree, or other order of
a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, residential care, or
visitation with respect to a child.,, 39 The court's jurisdiction is invoked if the
child resides in the state for at least six months prior to the filing or proceed-
ing,4° if the home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction, or if no other
state has jurisdiction. 4' These custody determinations include modifications
of custody.42
A modification is a child custody determination4 3 that changes or re-
places the initial custody arrangement." So long as it concerns the same
child it is called a modification.45 Florida courts have continuing jurisdiction
over the initial determination until the child or the parents have severed their
connections with the state, until there is a lack of substantial evidence of "the
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships" available in
Florida, or until the parents and the child are no longer residents of Florida. 6
A primary residential parent's relocation may be restricted by statute or
by settlement agreement.47 Relocation determinations are usually treated as
modifications.4" "In a relocation case ... courts are guided by explicit and
implicit ideas of the appropriate roles for men and women. 49 Usually, these
ideals are not reflective of post-divorce reality,5" perhaps because the "best
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10.
39. FLA. STAT. § 61.503(3) (2006).
40. Id. § 61.514(1)(a). "'Child custody proceeding' means a proceeding in which legal
custody, physical custody, residential care, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.
The term includes a proceeding for divorce ... and protection from domestic violence ... 
Id. § 61.503(4).
41. Id. § 61.514 (1)(a)-(b).
42. Id. § 61.503(3).
43. FLA. STAT. § 61.503(1 1). "'Initial determination' means the first child custody de-
termination concerning a particular child." Id. § 61.503(8).
44. Id. § 61.503 (11).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 61.515(l)(a).
47. Katherine C. Sheehan, Note, Post-Divorce Child Custody and Family Relocation, 9
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 135, 136-37 (1986).
48. See id. at 137.
49. Id. at 136.
50. Id. at 143.
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interests of the child" are also used to determine whether to modify cus-
tody. "
Prior to October 1, 2006, Florida courts made determinations for modi-
fication on relocation based on section 61.13(2)(d) of the Florida Statutes,
which stated in pertinent part: "No presumption shall arise in favor of or
against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move
the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact
and access with the secondary residential parent."52
The statute also delineated certain factors that courts must consider be-
fore approving relocation. 3 These factors were adopted by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Mize v. Mize.54 The Court held that judges should con-
sider and weigh factors such as:
1) Whether the move would be likely to improve the general
quality of life for both the primary residential spouse and the chil-
dren;
2) Whether the motive for seeking the move is for the express
purpose of defeating visitation;
3) Whether the custodial parent, once out of the jurisdiction,
will be likely to comply with any substitute visitation arrange-
ments;
4) Whether the substitute visitation will be adequate to foster
a continuing meaningful relationship between the child or children
and the noncustodial parent;
5) Whether the cost of transportation is financially affordable
by one or both of the parents; [and]
6) Whether the move is in the best interests of the child. 5
Additionally, in 2005, the Supreme Court of Florida approved the "sub-
stantial change" test. 6 The party seeking modification of the custody ar-
rangement must show "(1) that the circumstances have substantially and ma-
terially changed since the original custody determination, and (2) that the
51. Id. at 137.
52. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(d) (2005) (amended 2006).
53. Id. § 61.13(2)(d)(1)-(6). In 1993, the Supreme Court of Florida rendered a decision
that adopted these same factors from a prior lower court decision. Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d
417, 420 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(d) (1997).
54. 621 So. 2d at 417.
55. Id. at 420 (quoting Hill v. Hill, 548 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
56. Bazan v. Gambone, 924 So. 2d 952, 955 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Wade v.
Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. 2005), overruled on other grounds, Briscoe v. Briscoe,
927 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
[Vol. 31
165
: Nova Law Review 31, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
CUSTODY, RELOCATION, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
child's best interests justify changing custody." 57 All requests for modifica-
tion, whether adopted by a court after agreement or those established during
a hearing for custody, were subject to the "substantial change" test.5"
Domestic violence complicates these determinations.59 Even more
complicated is that on occasion, custody determinations may be made in a
domestic violence proceeding. 60 As the following case demonstrates, a me-
chanical application of the law will not be effective with domestic violence
cases.
In the case of O'Neill v. Stone,6 1 custody of the unmarried couple's
child was awarded to the mother in a proceeding on "a ... petition for in-
junction for protection against domestic violence. 62  O'Neill, the mother,
then relocated to New Jersey.63 In response, Stone, the father, "filed an
emergency motion seeking the return and temporary custody of the child."'
Stone obtained a pick-up order but O'Neill immediately retained counsel and
filed a motion to set aside that order.65 During that hearing, the trial court
refused to hear testimony regarding domestic violence and ordered the child
returned to Florida.66 The Second District Court of Appeal held that the trial
court abused its discretion by not hearing the testimony on domestic vio-
lence.67  In addition, the appellate court opined that the trial court should
have considered the relocation issue and the factors under old section
61.13(2)(d) at the time O'Neill motioned to set aside the pick-up order.68
Florida has a strong public policy against domestic violence.69  "It is
now widely recognized that domestic violence 'attacks are often repeated
57. Id. (citing Wade, 903 So. 2d at 931 n.2).
58. Id. at 955-56.
59. See O'Neill v. Stone, 721 So. 2d 393, 395 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
60. See id. at 394 (custody order directed after mother filed "a standardized petition for
injunction for protection against domestic violence pursuant to section 741.30").
61. Id. at 393.
62. Id. at 394.
63. Id.
64. O'Neill, 721 So. 2d at 394.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 394-95 (the trial court refused testimony because of insufficient time and did
not allow Robin O'Neill's former employer, babysitter, and sister to testify at the hearing).
67. Id. at 396. "We hasten to add that our reversal should not be read as approval for a
custodial parent to disobey visitation orders." Id. The court disapproved of the domestic
violence proceeding being used in this manner--only for temporary custody and support
orders. See O'Neill, 721 So. 2d at 396.
68. Id. at 395-96. These factors would include any evidence of domestic violence at
which time the trial court would have been compelled to consider the testimony of O'Neill's
former employer, babysitter, and sister. See id
69. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1052-53 (Fla. 1999), superseded by statute,
FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005).
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over time, and escape from the home is rarely possible without the threat of
great personal violence or death."' 7 The executive branch of the govern-
ment of Florida "established a task force on domestic violence, whose pur-
pose is the issuance of reports and recommendations which document 'the
extent of our awareness, and the responsiveness of our resources to battered
women and their families.'' So does that mean the relocation statute in-
corporates the grave concerns of the state?
III. DISCUSSION
A. "Parental Relocation with a Child"
Florida's new statute on parental relocation is a very detailed statute.
Outfitted with its own list of definitions, this statute makes clear the proce-
dure for relocating with a child. However, domestic violence victims may
not find timely or effective relief under this statute.
This new statute is codified under Chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes.72
The purposes delineated in Chapter 61 include the promotion of "amicable
settlement of disputes that arise between parties to a marriage and [t]o miti-
gate the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the proc-
ess of legal dissolution of marriage."73  How does that apply to someone
seeking relief from domestic violence, who seeks to escape violence with
their child?
Section 61.13001 defines the primary residential parent of the child as
"the person seeking to relocate with a child," absent a court order or an
agreement designating one parent as the primary residential parent."4 Under
this section, "'change of residential address' means the relocation of a child
to a principal residence more than [fifty] miles away from his or her principal
place of residence at the time of the entry of the last order establishing...
custody."75 Relocation is defined in this section as a change of residence for
sixty consecutive days.76
The statute indicates that the first method of relocation is by agree-
ment.77 The primary residential parent may relocate if he or she has reached
70. Id. at 1053 (quoting State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1997)).
71. Id. at 1055 (quoting Executive Office of the Governor, The Governor's Task Force
on Domestic Violence, The First Report (January 31, 1994)).
72. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.001-61.45 (2006).
73. Id. § 61.001(2)(b), (c).
74. Id. § 61.13001(1)(f).
75. Id. § 61.13001(1)(a).
76. Id. § 61.13001(1)(h).
77. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(2)(a).
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an agreement with the secondary residential parent.78 This agreement must
define "the visitation rights [of] the nonrelocating parent," "any transporta-
tion arrangements related to the visitation," and the nonrelocating parent
must have signed the agreement.79 The parties must get court approval of the
agreement, and a hearing will only be held if requested."
If there is no agreement for relocation between the parents, then the pri-
mary residential parent who wants to relocate must give "Notice of Intent to
Relocate" to the other parent. 81 The Notice must include a description of the
intended new residence, new home telephone number, the intended date of
relocation, specific reasons for the relocation, and a proposed revised visita-
tion schedule.8 2 "The mailing address of the parent .. seeking to relocate"
must be included and the contents are not privileged. 83 The parent seeking to
relocate must also prepare a "Certificate of Filing Notice of Intent to Relo-
cate."84 In addition, the relocating parent must also provide any changes in
address, phone numbers, or any other information required. 5
Furthermore, pursuant to the statute, each Notice must include an "ob-
jection clause". 6 If no objection is filed within thirty days, the relocation is
presumed to be "in the best interest of the child., 87 However, if an objection
is timely filed, the parent seeking to relocate with the child has the burden of
proving the relocation is in the best interests of the child, among other
things. 8 Under this statute, there is no presumption in favor of either parent
for modification due to relocation. 89  The statute then requires that courts
78. Id. This statute also requires consent from "every other person entitled to visitation
with the child." Id.
79. Id. § 61.13001(2)(a)(1)-(3).
80. Id. § 61.13001(2)(b).
81. FLA. STAT. §61.13001(3). This section also requires that "every other person entitled
to visitation with the child" be informed of the proposed relocation. Id.
82. Id. § 61.13001(3)(a)(1), (3)-(6).
83. Id. § 61.13001(3)(a)(8).
84. Id. § 61.13001(3)(c).
85. See Fla. STAT. § 61.13001(3)(d).
86. Id. § 61.13001(3)(a)(7). This statement must appear in the notice:
AN OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSED RELOCATION MUST BE MADE IN WRITING,
FILED WITH THE COURT, AND SERVED ON THE PARENT OR OTHER PERSON
SEEKING TO RELOCATE WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THIS NOTICE OF
INTENT TO RELOCATE. IF YOU FAIL TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE RELOCATION,
THE RELOCATION WILL BE ALLOWED, UNLESS IT IS NOT IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE AND WITHOUT A
HEARING.
Id.
87. Id. § 61.13001(3)(e).
88. See id.
89. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7). This section was incorporated from section 61.13(2)(d) of
the 2005 version of the Florida Statutes.
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determine custody based on: 1) the nature and quality of the relationship
with the primary residential parent; 2) the age, developmental stage, and
needs of the child; 3) the likely impact of relocation; 4) the maintenance of
continuing contact with the other parent; 5) the child's preference,9" 6) the
reasons for and against relocation; 7) career opportunities available to the
objecting parent or relocating parent; 8) a history of domestic violence;9 and
9) "[a]ny other factor affecting the best interest of the [child]. 92
If the relocating parent fails to file a Notice before relocating, the relo-
cating parent is subject to contempt and may be compelled to return the
child.93 In addition, the court will consider the failure to timely file the No-
tice, along with the unauthorized removal of the child from the jurisdiction,
as factors in determining whether to approve relocation. 94 The court will
also consider the unauthorized removal when it determines whether to
change primary residential custody or to modify visitation.95 Moreover, the
relocating parent may be ordered to "pay reasonable expenses and attorney's
fees" for the objecting parent. 96
B. Interpretation and Analysis
There are some critical factors that will affect the interpretation of sec-
tion 61.13001 of the Florida Statutes.97 Even though one parent is the pri-
mary residential parent, family law seeks to keep the child in contact with
both parents as much as possible. 98 But "when women who are victims of
90. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7)(a)-(k) (2006). The courts will take into consideration the
child's preference depending on the age and maturity of the child. Id. § 61.13001(7)(d).
91. Id. As defined in the 2005 version of the Florida Statutes, "'Domestic Violence'
means any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual bat-
tery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offence
resulting in physical injury or death of one family or household member by another family or
household member." Id. § 741.28(2) (2005). Subsection 3 defines "'Family or household
member' [as] spouses, former spouses, [or] persons related by blood or marriage." Id. §
741.28(3).
92. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7) (2006).
93. Id. § 61.13001(3)(f).
94. Id. § 61.13001(3)(e)-(f)(1).
95. See id. § 61.13001(3)(f(2).
96. Id. § 61.13001(3)(f)(4).
97. See Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam), superseded by stat-
ute, FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(d) (1997).
98. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (1989)).
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domestic violence separate from ... their abusive partners," they are faced
with an unexpected one-sided application of the law.99
Domestic violence victims may need welfare assistance and may have
to separate from their children for a while.' Such circumstances may cost
them custody of their children, as domestic violence victims are sometimes
labeled "bad mother[s]" and may face criminal charges for failure to protect
their children.'0 ' These women may also have to defend themselves in cus-
tody proceedings against their abusers. 102 In addition, if a domestic violence
victim escapes with her children and flees the jurisdiction, she may have a
defense to the criminal charge of custodial interference.' 
03
It is [now] a defense that... [t]he defendant was the victim of an
act of domestic violence or had reasonable cause to believe that he
or she was about to become the victim of an act of domestic vio-
lence ... and the defendant [believed] ... that the action was nec-
essary in order for the defendant to escape from, or protect himself
or herself from, the domestic violence or to preserve the minor...
from exposure to the domestic violence. 104
The legislature intends for Chapter 61, "Dissolution of Marriage; Sup-
port; Custody", to be liberally construed.'05 A liberal interpretation of a stat-
ute commands an expansive interpretation of the words.'0 6 This also indi-
cates that the legislature intended that judges exercise great discretion in de-
termining the meaning of the statute. 1
07
One recent case states, in a footnote, that under section 61.13001, "the
relocation of children is always open to judicial scrutiny."10 8 This case im-
99. Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare
"Reform " Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 743-44 (1998).
100. See id. at 744.
101. See id.
102. See id.at 745.
103. See FLA. STAT. § 787.03(2), (4)(b) (2006).
In the absence of a court order determining rights to custody... any parent of the minor...
who has custody [of the child] and who takes, detains, conceals, or entices away that minor...
with malicious intent to deprive another person of his or her right to custody of the minor...
commits a felony of the third degree....
Id. at § 787.03(2).
104. Id. § 787.03(4)(b).
105. Id. § 61.001(1).
106. See RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 55 (2002).
107. See id.
108. Echezarreta v. Echezarreta, 944 So.2d 1169, 1169-70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
In this case, the Third District Court of Appeals did not decide the relocation issue under
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plies that trial courts may exercise great discretion in custody and relocation
cases. '09 Another case explains that appellate review of those decisions is
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.1 ' Abuse of discretion
"means that '[i]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action
taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be
no finding of an abuse of discretion."""... Also, "the test of reasonableness
requires [a determination of] whether there is 'logic and justification' for
the" trial court's finding. 1
2
Consider the following hypothetical. 113 T.F. wants to relocate with her
twenty-month-old daughter, K.F., because of abuse T.F. experienced from
her former husband, F.H.'" Prior to their separation, F.H. reportedly had a
"history of harassment, physical harm and [an] uncontrollable temper."" 5
There were two main reports of violence experienced by T.F.116 The first
occurred on Mothers' Day in 1994.117 Family members arrived at the cou-
ple's house that day and met F.H. running out of the house, saying that they
had "better get in the house before he tore off his wife's head."" 8 F.H. later
admitted to his sister-in-law that "he hit his wife again."' ' F.H. also partici-
pated in the Family Violence Intervention Program, but the violence did not
stop. 120
The second incident occurred in October 1994.121 This time F.H. threw
T.F. on the floor and "kick[ed] her in the chest, ribs and legs."' 122 T.F. man-
aged to call the police and fled the house out of fear for her safety and the
safety of K.F. 123 T.F. is now the primary residential parent of her daugh-
section 61.13001 because the settlement agreement incorporated the previous statute section
61.13(2)(d). Id. at 1170.
109. See id.
110. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 922 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
111. Id. (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980)).
112. Id. at 267 (quoting Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203). In this case, the court found that
the trial court abused its discretion by placing the child with the mother who was proven to be
an alcoholic. Id. at 268.
113. This hypothetical is based upon the case of Ford v. Ford. 700 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
114. See id. at 192-93.
115. Id. at 192.
116. Id. at 193.
117. Id.
118. Ford, 700 So. 2d at 193.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Ford, 700 So. 2d at 193.
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ter, 124 but F.H. continues to harass, stalk and attempt to abuse T.F. with every
opportunity. T.F. wishes to relocate to a neighboring state to ensure that she
and K.F. are safe.
Is section 61.13001 the appropriate statute for analysis of this hypo-
thetical? The title of Section 61.13001 is helpful for determining the legisla-
tive intent at the time it was enacted. 125 This statute is entitled "Parental Re-
location with a Child."' 126  The statute goes on to define relocation and
change of residence address. 127 In addition, the statute's main focus is on the
child. 128 Each section of the statute concerns the child or holds the child as
the subject. 129 The primary residential parent is the parent seeking to relo-
cate with the child or the one so designated by a court. 130 It is fair to deduce
then, that T.F. must comply with the provisions in section 61.13001, if she
intends to relocate with K.F.
Will T.F. find timely and effective relief under section 61.13001? The
problem presented above is complicated further because the primary residen-
tial parent is also a domestic violence victim. Let's consider the possibility
of agreement, whether there are any issues with the magnitude of disclosure
required under the statute, and whether the application of subsection 7(j) is
sufficient for timely and effective relief under the statute.
First, T.F. is unlikely to reach an agreement for relocation with F.H. An
agreement to relocate may promote amicable settlement between the parties,
which is the purpose of Chapter 61. However, even with a liberal construc-
tion, and based on a plain reading"' of the statute, T.F. will only provoke
F.H. to heightened physical abuse if she attempts to reach an agreement for
relocation. 132 This section fails for domestic violence victims because
124. Id. at 197. The appellate court reversed the trial court decision and made the mother
the primary residential parent of the child. See id. The mother appealed from the settlement
agreement made a part of the final judgment and decree of dissolution on the initial custody
determination. See id. at 192.
125. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 106, at 99. "Courts... will generally use an act's
title as an aid in resolving an ambiguity in the act's text," but here it is used as a starting point
and in conjunction with the text to reveal when this statute is applicable. Id.
126. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001 (2006).
127. Id. § 61.13001(1)(a), (h).
128. See id. §61.13001.
129. See generally id.
130. Id. §61.13001(l)(f).
131. Here, "the plain meaning is merely the first consideration in dealing with legislative
intent, and it will control unless a convincing argument is made that the legislature intended
otherwise based on the other methods of statutory interpretation." BROWN & BROWN, supra
note 106, at 42.
132. See generally FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(2).
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"[d]omestic violence is about power and control." 13 3 If T.F. moves to a
neighboring state, F.H. will have less control over her. The likely effect of
an attempted agreement is heightened abuse. 134 The facts suggest that the
abuse in the past has been unprovoked. 135 Any attempt to reach an agree-
ment for relocation may provoke F.H., which could result in more harm to
T.F. and K.F.
T.F. may consider serving a "Notice of Intent to Relocate" on F.H.1
36
However, the Notice requires disclosure of address, phone number, descrip-
tion of the intended new residence, and specific location. 137 This document
must also have the date of intended move and specific reasons for the
move.'38 T.F. seeks to protect herself from harm and to protect the couple's
child from the effects of domestic violence. Service of the Notice in this
instance is also likely to result in heightened abuse. In addition, F.H. will
know her intended location once he receives the Notice. This is very likely
to defeat the purpose of her relocating. F.H. has previously arranged for her
vehicle to be repossessed in the middle of the night. "' His behavior indi-
cates that he is persistent and determined. F.H. is likely to follow T.F. to her
new location and continue harassing and abusing her.
Perhaps the statute provides some relief for T.F. with regard to disclo-
sure of her location. Section 61.13001(4) states, "[i]f the parent ... is enti-
tled to prevent disclosure of location information under any public records
exemption applicable to that person, the court may enter any order necessary
to modify the disclosure requirements of this section in compliance with the
public records exemption."'' 40 In this case, the applicable public records ex-
emption is found in section 741.465, titled "Public Records Exemption for
the Address Confidentiality Program for Victims of Domestic Violence."''
section 741.401 reveals that the legislature recognizes the need for domestic
violence victims to "establish new addresses in order to prevent their [abus-
ers] from finding them."'' 42 The purpose of the exemption is to enable ad-
133. The National Center for Victims of Crime, Domestic Violence,
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentlD=32347 (last
visited May 15, 2007).
134. See id.
135. See Ford v. Ford, 700 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
136. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(3)(a).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Ford, 700 So. 2d at 194.
140. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(4).
141. Id. § 741.465.
142. Id. § 741.401. It is titled "Legislative Findings; purpose" and is related to Florida
Statutes sections 741.401-.409. Id.
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dress confidentiality, and allow state and local law enforcement to work with
the attorney general's office to protect the identity and location of partici-
pants. 143
Only on a showing of a valid arrest warrant, court order, or cancellation
of certification will the participant's address, telephone number, and social
security number be revealed.'44 There are no application fees to become a
participant and the attorney general is required to certify the exemption once
a properly completed application is filed.'45 The applicant then becomes a
participant for four years. 146 The certified address can be a school address,
work address, or residential address. 147 However, certification may be can-
celled by a change of name or residential address, or if forwarded mail from
the attorney general is returned as undeliverable from the certified address. ' 4
8
This is a problem for T.F. because if she applies for certification now, it
will be for her current address. The statute is unclear, but it seems to suggest
that if relocation is granted to her, after she moves, the certification will be
cancelled and the new address will then be available to the public, including
F.H. 149 That seems to defeat the purpose of keeping the records confidential,
so that F.H. is not able to find T.F.
For T.F., the time to get certification and wait for an objection to the re-
location notice could be months. 150 The statute on the confidentiality pro-
gram does not indicate how long it will take a victim to obtain certifica-
tion. "' However, assuming that T.F. is a program participant, she still has to
wait thirty days from the date of filing to see if F.H. will object to the reloca-
tion. 152 F.H. could inflict more harm to T.F. during these waiting periods.
Assuming T.F. passes the disclosure hurdle or decides to take her
chances, F.H. now files a timely objection to T.F.'s intended move. Section
61.13001 fails again, because once an objection is filed, T.F. must "initiate
court proceedings to obtain court permission to relocate."' 53  F.H. is now
aware of T.F.'s intentions, which makes it more likely that F.H. will either
threaten or try to harm her in an attempt to change her mind. He may even
143. See id.
144. FLA. STAT. § 741.465(1).
145. Id. § 741.403(2), (3).
146. Id. §741.403(3) (2006).
147. Id. § 741.402(1).
148. Id. § 741.404(2).
149. See FLA. STAT. § 741.404(2).
150. Id. §§ 741.401-.409.
151. Id. §§ 741.401-.409.
152. See id. § 61.13001(5).
153. Id. § 61.13001(3)(e).
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try a different approach. For example, he may apologize profusely as in the
"honeymoon" phase of the cycle of violence. '54
In addition, T.F. may have to defend herself later at the hearing, to de-
termine custody on relocation.'55 Most women end up on the defensive at
these hearings, despite the abuse they have experienced because of their "un-
fit" image due to the abuse. 156 In addition, the statute indicates that T.F. has
the burden of proof to show that relocation is in the best interest of the
child. '57 F.H. will not want to lose control, so he will fight for custody and is
likely to do everything to destroy T.F.'s image before the court, as he tried
before when alleging T.F. was withholding visitation privileges. '58
At the hearing, the court is likely to apply the factors delineated in the
relocation statute.' 59 The court will consider evidence of a "history... of
domestic violence. ' 60 However, this factor raises many questions. It pro-
vides hope to parent victims, but is silent as to what types of evidence may
be introduced and how much weight will be attributed to this factor in the
court's determination.' 6' History is defined as a "chronological record of
significant events."' 162 So what comes in as support for T.F.'s position? The
courts are unpredictable in this area, or in custody determinations, for that
matter. 1
63
This is not good for T.F., who seeks timely and effective relief from
abuse. However, this decision rests in the hands of judges who have so
154. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 65 (1979). The cycle of violence
typically has three phases. See id. at 55-70. The first is the tension building phase, where the
victim is nervous and needs to watch her moves while the abuser is getting angry and commu-
nication breaks down. See id. at 56-59. The second stage is the incident. See id. at 59-65.
This is where the abuser acts out on the victim and commits a crime of domestic violence. Id.
The third stage is the honeymoon phase. WALKER, supra at 65-70. During this phase, the
abuser seeks pity or apologizes profusely to pull the victim back into the relationship. Id. at
65-66. Next, there is often calm before the tension building phase begins again. See id. at 70.
Here, the abuser may not act against the victim and may behave like there was no abuse. See
id.
155. See Murphy, supra note 99, at 745.
156. See id.
157. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(8) (2006).
158. See Ford v. Ford, 700 So. 2d 191, 196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
159. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7)-(8). Failure by T.F. to comply with procedures "may be
taken into account by the court in any initial or post-judgment action seeking a determination
or modification of the designation of the primary residential parent or of the residence, cus-
tody, or visitation with the child." Id. § 61.13001(3)(0.
160. See id. § 61.13001(7)0).
161. See id.
162. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 573 (1988).
163. See generally PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS, supra note 24, at
4-5.
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much discretion that they are likely to weigh the factors differently depend-
ing on the circuit or county.' 64 It is likely that based on the "best interest of
the child" language in the statute, 165 and if the statute is to be read with other
provisions in Chapter 61,166 then the abuse from F.H. towards T.F. will be
considered and perhaps heavily weighed by the court.
Another issue with the application of the factors included in section
61.13001 is the "substantial change" test. 167 The Supreme Court of Florida
adopted the "substantial change" test in addition to the factors codified in
section 61.13(2)(d) and now, with minimal revisions, in section 61.13001.68
This test allows the trial court to modify custody if the party seeking the
modification can show "(1) that the circumstances have substantially and
materially changed since the original custody determination, and (2) that the
child's best interests justify changing custody."' 69
F.H., in this case, would have to prove that T.F.'s circumstances have
"substantially and materially changed" and that her relocation would not be
in the best interest of K.F. 170 If the goal is shared parenting, then the presid-
ing judge will be attentive as to how the relocation will affect the child.'7
The complication, and perhaps the flaw, lies with the focus of the statute.
Since the focus of section 61.13001 is the child, 72 the domestic violence
victim runs the risk of being seen as unstable. She may be required to keep
moving to get away from her abusive ex-spouse. She may be forced to
change jobs often, because the ex-spouse creates problems for her while at
work. If the focus is on the victim first, or contemporaneous with the child's
interests, then the analysis will change.
164. See id.
165. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(3)(e).
166. BROwN & BROWN, supra note 106, at 89. "[A]ny language in the statute is to be read
in light of the whole statute, not just a portion of it." Id.
167. Bazan v. Gambone, 924 So. 2d 952, 955 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
168. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7).
169. Bazan, 924 So. 2d at 955 (citing Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 931 n.2 (Fla.
2005), overruled on other grounds, Briscoe v. Briscoe, 927 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2006)).
170. See id.
171. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7).
172. See generally id. § 61.13001.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Florida's "Parental Relocation with a Child" statute focuses on the best
interest of the child. '73 In addition, the statute furthers the purpose of Chap-
ter 61, which promotes amicable resolutions and shared parenting.'74 Section
61.13001(2), when read together with section 61.001(2), for internal consis-
tency,175 reveals that the goal of the agreement section and the thirty-day
objection period is to allow for parents to amicably settle their issues outside
of court.176 For most parents, the new relocation statute helps them save on
attorney fees and costs, allowing the parents more autonomy in the decisions
concerning where their children will live. So long as the parents are able to
reach an agreement, whether initially or after a Notice of Intent to Relocate
has been served on the other parent, they may be said to have autonomy.
The focus on the parents is misplaced for domestic violence victims,
however. The child's best interest remains paramount. However, the parent
victim must be considered as a priority either before the child or with the
child. 177 One court emphasizes that a child "[w]atching, hearing, or even
later learning of a parent being abused by a partner threatens a child's sense
of stability and security .... In order to minimize the risk of long term dam-
age, the safety and security of a child's environment needs to be restored."
7 8
A survey of jurisdictions in the United States reveals that some states
consider the safety and well-being of both the parent and the child in their
custody determinations. 17' Alabama and Arkansas have gone so far as to
enact a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental, and not in the best inter-
est of the child, to be placed in sole or joint, legal, or physical custody with
the perpetrator of domestic violence.' Florida's domestic violence statute,
in section 741.2902, explains that the safety of the child and the parent are
173. See id.
174. Id. § 61.001(2)(b)-(c).
175. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 106, at 86. "[A]n interpretation that produces internal
consistency in the statute is to be favored over an interpretation that produces internal incon-
sistencies." Id. at 86-87.
176. See FLA. STAT. §§ 61.001, .13001(3), (7).
177. See id § 61.13001(7)0).
178. D.R. v. Dep't. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 898 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
179. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-132 (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(a)
(West 2004) (discussing the health, safety, and welfare of the child); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-
215(a)(1) (1987).
180. ALA. CODE § 30-1-131 (LexisNexis 2006) (determination raises rebuttable presump-
tion that custody with perpetrator detrimental to child); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-215(2)(c)
(1987).
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paramount in domestic violence proceedings."'8 These proceedings allow for
the determination of temporary custody arrangements. 8  It is unclear
whether the courts should have the same focus in a determination concerning
relocation.
Further, Florida has a criminal penalty in place for anyone who inter-
feres with custody. 183 Even though proof of domestic violence is now a de-
fense to this crime,1 84 without clear relief in the relocation statute, the victim
parent may feel trapped because of the possibility of punishment. Other ju-
risdictions have enacted a remedy instead, which states that if one parent is
absent from the jurisdiction, or relocates because of an act of domestic vio-
lence, and that parent was not the perpetrator of the violence, the absence or
relocation without court approval shall not be a factor that weighs against the
relocating party in determining custody or visitation. 1
85
A remedy for the loopholes in Florida's relocation statute would be to
include the following provisions:
(a) The safety and well-being of each child and each parent is para-
mount to all other factors. '86
(b) Upon a finding of domestic violence, there is a rebuttable presump-
tion that it is detrimental, and not in the best interest of the child, to be placed
in sole, joint, legal or physical custody with the perpetrator of domestic vio-
lence. 187 The standard of proof for an act of domestic violence is by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 1
88
(c) No presumption applies if both parents have committed an act of
domestic violence against each other.' 89
(d) A finding of domestic violence constitutes a substantial change in
circumstances that warrants a custody determination in favor of the victim or
the victim's parent who is not the perpetrator. 190
181. FLA. STAT. § 741.2902(l) (2006).
182. Id. § 741.2902(2)(d), (e).
183. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
184. FLA. STAT. § 787.03(4)(b).
185. E.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-132(b) (LexisNexis 2006); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-
403.03(I) (2000 & Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-15-215(2)(b) (1987).
186. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-132(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(a)
(West 2004) (using the language of the "health, safety, and welfare of the child," which is
currently missing from the Florida relocation statute); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-215(a) (1)
(1987).
187. ALA. CODE § 30-1-131 (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that determination raises rebut-
table presumption that custody with perpetrator detrimental to child); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-
215(c) (1987).
188. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-215(c) (1987).
189. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(D) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
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(e) If one parent is absent from the jurisdiction or relocates because of
an act of domestic violence, and that parent was not the perpetrator of the
violence, the absence or relocation without court approval shall not be a fac-
tor that weighs against the relocating party in determining custody or visita-
tion. " In addition, because of those acts of violence, the relocating parent
may not be subject to the criminal statute for "Interference of Custody" so
long as they are able to satisfy the standard of proof. 1
92
(f) The court may review evidence from any of the following sources:
"l)[flindings from another court of competent jurisdiction; 2) [p]olice re-
ports; 3) [m]edical reports; 4) [c]hild protective services records; 5)
[d]omestic violence shelter records; 6) [s]chool records; [and] 7) [w]itness
testimony."' 93
These provisions should be incorporated into Chapter 61 of the Florida
Statutes, in particular to section 61.13001, to ensure that parent victims are
clear on what they may do to escape violence and protect themselves and
their children. The above provisions alone may not provide the absolute
remedy. However, if accurately incorporated and applied by the courts,
these provisions may provide timely and effective relief to domestic violence
victims who are primary residential parents relocating for safety. At the very
least, it should be clear to judges what types of evidence parties can consider
to prove that domestic violence exists during a custody, modification, or re-
location hearing.
190. ALA. CODE §30-3-134 (LexisNexis 2006). "In every proceeding in which there is at
issue the modification of an order for custody or visitation of a child, a finding that domestic
or family violence has occurred since the last custody determination constitutes a finding of
change in circumstances." Id.
191. ALA. CODE § 30-3-132(b) (LexisNexis 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-403.03(1)
(2000 & Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b) (2005) ("If a party is absent or
relocates with or without the children because of an act of domestic violence, the absence or
relocation shall not be a factor that weighs against the party in determining custody or visita-
tion."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-215(b) (1987).
192. See FLA. STAT. § 787.03(4)(b) (2006).
193. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(C)(1)-(7) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence is an epidemic that defies classifications of race,
ethnicity, age, class, and religion. It spans state lines, oceans, and interna-
tional boundaries. Unfortunately, the cure for this external disease is un-
known and out of reach, as many of those who suffer from it deny or hide
their symptoms. In recent years, the legal world has done much to combat
domestic violence by enacting statutes and case law to protect those who are
victimized by abuse and even those who finally find the courage to turn on
their attackers and end the violence forever.
* J.D. Candidate May 2008, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern Univer-
sity. Sara M. Sandler received her B.A. from the University of Florida majoring in Criminol-
ogy. The author would like to thank her father, Alan L. Sandier, for his never-ending encour-
agement and guidance. She would also like to thank her family and friends for their support
as well as the Law Center and the Nova Law Review staff for all of their hard work and com-
mitment in editing this article.
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The federal government has begun to do its part in the battle against
domestic violence. As part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
Congress enacted sections 2261 and 922 of Title 18 of the United States
Code.' Section 2262(a)(1) makes it illegal for persons with an order of pro-
tection against them to cross state lines with the intent to threaten, harass, or
commit violence against whomever the order protects.' Section 2262(a)(2)
further makes it a crime for persons with an order of protection against them
to use force, coercion, or fraud to induce the protected person to cross state
lines in order to cause violence against the protected person. This statute
undoubtedly applies to an intimate partner.4 Thus, a battered woman who is
able to obtain an order of protection against her batterer would gain further
protection through federal law. Section 922(d)(8) prohibits the sale and pos-
session of firearms or ammunition to people with a restraining order against
them.5 This prevents them from threatening, harassing, stalking, or assault-
ing an intimate partner6 and thus provides further federal protection to a bat-
tered woman.
Individual states are also beginning to take a stand on punishing those
who commit violence against their spouse or significant other. Currently,
"[a]ll [fifty] states now have statutes that make spousal abuse a crime."7
Further, Maryland,8 Missouri, 9 and South Carolina 0 have actually enacted
1. Douglas A. Orr, Weiand v. State and Battered Spouse Syndrome: The Toothless
Tigress Can Now Roar, 74 FLA. B.J. 14, 16 (June 2000).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) (2000).
3. Id § 2262(a)(2).
4. Orr, supra note 1, at 16.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(8).
6. Id. This section of the United States Code, however, only applies to restraining or-
ders that have been received following a hearing where actual notice was received, where
there was an opportunity to participate, and when either: 1) there has been a finding of a
credible threat to the safety of the intimate partner; or 2) the terms of the restraining order
"explicitly prohibit[] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such
intimate partner." Id. § 922(d)(8)(A)-(B).
7. Orr, supra note 1, at 16.
8. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2006). When the
defendant claims that they suffer from Battered Woman's Syndrome, the Maryland statute
permits "[e]xpert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome" in order to explain "the defen-
dant's motive or state of mind, or both, at the time of the. .. alleged offense." Id
9. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033(2) (West 1999). This statute authorizes Missouri courts to
appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to perform an examination of the accused once the ac-
cused files a written notice of his or her intent to introduce evidence of Battered Woman's
Syndrome. Id Though the statute does not explicitly allow for the testimony of the expert
witness, Missouri courts have interpreted the statute to mean that as long as a there is "a prima
facie showing of the elements of self-defense" expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syn-
drome is admissible. See State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596, 599-600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
[Vol. 31
181
: Nova Law Review 31, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
2007] BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME: SETTING A STANDARD 377
statutes authorizing the use of expert testimony regarding Battered Woman's
Syndrome. Florida has enacted tougher laws for abusers, such as section
741.2901(3), which requires that a defendant arrested for domestic violence
remain in custody until his or her first appearance, and that when determin-
ing bail, the court must take into consideration the safety of the victim. "
Though this may seem minimal, it provides a cooling off period for both the
abuser and the victim, which significantly reduces the amount of potential
violence after arrest. The Florida judiciary has also reorganized itself so that
there are now eight domestic violence courts. 2 Furthermore, over half of the
judicial circuits have incorporated a domestic violence task force. 13 In addi-
tion, "Florida judges, both circuit and county, receive education and training
that specifically address domestic violence related issues."' 4
Thus, it is clear that both state and federal governments are beginning to
adopt changes to encourage the awareness and prevention of domestic vio-
lence. However, "it is believed that most incidents of physical abuse of
women by their mates are never reported to authorities."' 5  Unfortunately,
there is not much that can be done to encourage women to take legal action
against their abusers. Nor is there much that can be done to permanently get
rid of this terrible problem faced all over the world due to its inherent nature
to remain a private matter. However, there is something that can be done
legally to help those victims who are forced to resort to extreme measures to
protect their lives. Currently, Florida allows for the use of expert testimony
on Battered Woman's Syndrome as part of a self-defense claim to murder. 6
This has helped numerous battered women defendants explain to the jury
why they chose to kill their abuser instead of leave him. However, expert
testimony, if used to testify specifically regarding the individual defendant,
as opposed to Battered Woman's Syndrome in general, is based solely on the
testimony of the defendant.' 7 Thus, Florida falls short in establishing a stan-
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170(B) (2003). The South Carolina statute explicitly states
that expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome should "not be considered a new scien-
tific technique the reliability of which is unproven." Id. (emphasis added).
11. FLA. STAT. § 741.2901 (2006).
12. Orr, supra note 1, at 16.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Jimmie E. Tinsley, Criminal Law: The Battered Woman Defense, 34 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS 2D § 2 (1983).
16. See Rogers v. State, 616 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
17. See State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172, 176-77 (Fla. 1993). The Court held that if a
defendant chooses to present expert testimony based on the facts of her specific case, then the
State may also have its own expert examine the defendant. Id. The court does not mention an
opportunity for either expert to take into account evidence or testimony other than the defen-
dant's. Id. Thus, the experts' determination as to whether the woman suffers from Battered
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dard for the jury to relate the actual evidence presented at trial with determin-
ing whether the defendant does in fact suffer from Battered Woman's Syn-
drome and whether she should be allowed to use the syndrome as part of her
self-defense claim.
This article will begin by giving a brief overview of Battered Woman's
Syndrome as developed by Dr. Lenore E. Walker and its emergence into the
courtrooms. It will summarize the psychological theory of learned helpless-
ness 18 and the "cycle theory of violence,"19 as well as give a general depic-
tion of the battered woman, as described by Dr. Walker.2" The third part of
this article will give a history of Battered Woman's Syndrome in the court-
room by explaining its legal use as an impaired mental capacity defense and
the more recent use of Battered Woman's Syndrome in conjunction with a
self-defense argument. This note will more specifically discuss the defini-
tion of "imminent" as it pertains to the legal definition of self-defense and as
it pertains to the battered woman. Next, this article will discuss Florida cases
that have addressed Battered Woman's Syndrome and their effect on expert
testimony as well as their impact on the duty to retreat. The fifth section of
this note will suggest what Florida can do to set a standard for the use of
Battered Woman's Syndrome in the courtroom by setting up a three-pronged
test, based on the length of abuse, the severity of abuse, and the battered
woman's opportunity to flee, to be used to determine whether a woman
should be allowed to incorporate Battered Woman's Syndrome into her de-
fense. Finally, this article will conclude by discussing the impact the three-
pronged test would have on using Battered Woman's Syndrome in conjunc-
tion with a self-defense argument, its impact on expert testimony regarding
Battered Woman's Syndrome, and the impact the test would have on Florida
courts.
Woman's Syndrome is based only on the accused's account of the relationship. This leaves
ample room for a defendant to exaggerate, or possibly lie altogether, about the facts of her
allegedly abusive relationship.
18. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 42-54(1979).
19. See id at 55-70.
20. Id. at 31.
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II. DEFINING BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME
Despite the reference to a "constellation of medical and psychological
conditions,"'" Battered Woman's Syndrome is a type of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, not a form of mental illness.22 There are four general char-
acteristics of Battered Woman's Syndrome:
1) The woman believes that the violence was her fault, 2) The
woman has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence
elsewhere, 3) The woman fears for her life and/or her children's
lives, and 4) The woman has an irrational belief that the abuser is
omnipresent and omniscient.
23
Dr. Walker describes nine common characteristics of a battered woman
including: low self-esteem; a belief in the "feminine sex-role stereotype;"
accepting responsibility for her abuser's actions; suffering from severe stress
reactions; and a belief that no one is able to help her get out of her abusive
situation.2 4 Certain characteristics, like low self-esteem and the belief in a
stereotypical female role, make it easier to fall into an abusive relationship,
while characteristics such as accepting responsibility and a belief that no one
can help, make it easy to remain in an abusive relationship. Taken as a
whole, such qualities push a battered woman into what Dr. Walker describes
as "learned helplessness," and from there, the battered woman experiences
an endless cycle of violence.25
A. Learned Helplessness
Learned helplessness stems from the principle of the learning theory,
which is based on the way a person reacts to the outcomes of his or her vol-
untary responses to his or her environment.2 6 For example, if a voluntary
response changes the circumstances of a situation or creates a positive out-
come, a person is likely to repeat that response, which is known as rein-
forcement." Once a person expects that a certain response will produce a
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004).
22. Judge Jay B. Rosman, The Battered Women Syndrome in Florida: Junk Science or
Admissible Evidence? 15 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 807,810 (2003).
23. 1d. (quoting WALKER, supra note 18, at 95-96).
24. WALKER, supra note 18, at 31.
25. Id. at 43.
26. Id. at 44.
27. Id.
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specific outcome and that outcome is in fact achieved, that person feels as
though he or she has control over that situation.28 However, when a person
expects a certain outcome to occur through a certain response and that out-
come does not occur, a person often needs an explanation as to why his or
her expected outcome was not achieved.29 If no explanation can be offered,
after time, the person assumes he or she has no control over the outcome and
learns what types of things he or she does and does not have control over in
his or her environment. 3  According to the learning theory, once a person
realizes that they are not in control of certain situations, they will lose moti-
vation to respond to those situations, even if they are later able to make
changes that will affect the outcome.3' Applying the learning theory to bat-
tered women, learned helplessness is the theory to which some victims of
recurring abuse will eventually succumb.32 This is based on the notion that
they cannot change their abusive situation and instead become subservient in
order to reduce incidents of violence.33
There are three basic components to the learned helplessness theory:
"information about what will happen; thinking or cognitive representation
about what will happen, . . . and behavior toward what does happen. ' 34 It is
the second component that leads to emotional disturbances, as this is where a
person develops their expectations and beliefs as to what outcomes should
occur.35 The key difference between those who react with the learned help-
lessness response and those who do not stems from the person's actual be-
liefs and expectations as to what they have control over.36 If a person does
not have control over a situation, but believes that he or she does have con-
trol, that person's behavior will not be affected. 37 However, if a person does
in fact have control, but believes that he or she does not, they will respond
with a learned helplessness reaction.3 8 Thus, once a battered woman be-
lieves she has no control over her abusive situation, she becomes "help-
less. '" 39 She allows what she believes to be out of her control to actually be-
28. Id.
29. WALKER, supra note 18, at 45.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Erin M. Masson, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Evidence of Bat-
tered- Woman Syndrome on Issue of Self-Defense, 58 A.L.R.5Tm 749,762 (1998).
33. Id. at 762-63.
34. WALKER, supra note 18, at 47.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. WALKER, supra note 18, at 47.
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come out of her control, and learns to expect the abuse as a way of life, over
which she has no influence.4 °
B. Cycle Theory of Violence
Through her studies, Dr. Walker found that "[b]attered women are not
constantly being abused, nor is their abuse inflicted at totally random
times. 41 Instead, she found that there was a "definite battering cycle" con-
sisting of three distinct phases: the tension-building phase, the acute batter-
ing incident, and the contrition phase. 42 The tension building phase is "a
gradual escalation of tension during which the batterer displays hostility and
dissatisfaction and the woman attempts to placate him. 43 The woman re-
sorts to denial and "rationalizes that perhaps she did deserve the abuse," and
she will begin to minimize the incident because she knows her batterer is
capable of doing much worse. 44 During the acute battering incident, "the
batterer explodes into uncontrollable rage [which is] often out of proportion
to the situation., 45 The trigger for this phase is rarely because of any act by
the battered woman; instead, it is usually an outside event or the man's inter-
nal state.46 There are times, however, when the woman will provoke this
second phase because she knows it is inevitable and cannot tolerate her anxi-
ety and terror in waiting for the explosion to occur.47 Further, she knows that
once phase two is over, the third phase of peace will occur. 48 This third
phase, the contrition phase, is characterized by remorse and promises by the
batterer to end the abuse.49 This phase may also be considered the "honey-
moon" phase due to the calm, loving respite.5" Of course, despite numerous
promises that the abuse will never again occur, it is inevitable that the cycle
will begin anew.51 This cycle has helped to explain how battered women
become victims, how they succumb to learned helplessness behavior, and,
more importantly, why they continue to remain in their abusive relation-
40. WALKER, supra note 18, at 47.
41. Id. at 55.
42. Id.
43. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 368 (2d ed. 2002).
44. WALKER, supra note 18, at 56-57.
45. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 43, at 368.
46. WALKER, supra note 18, at 60.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 43, at 368.
50. Rosman, supra note 22, at 809.
51. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 43, at 368.
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ships.5 Before she can be labeled a "battered woman," a woman must ex-
perience at least two complete battering cycles.13 Dr. Walker has been un-
able to estimate the length of each phase or the amount of time it takes to
complete an entire cycle, although she has found that certain events and life
stages can have an influence on their timing. 4
III. A HISTORY OF BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME IN THE COURTS
Murders committed by battered women are often divided into three
categories: confrontational homicides, non-confrontational homicides, and
solicited homicides. 51 Most cases fall under the first category, confronta-
tional homicides, in which the battered woman kills her abuser during a bat-
tering incident.16 The main legal issues in these cases are whether to allow
expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome, and whether the defen-
dant is able to introduce evidence of past abuse.57 In non-confrontational
homicides, where the victim typically attacks her abuser while he is asleep,
the legal issues that arise are whether there is an entitlement to a self-defense
argument, and whether Battered Woman's Syndrome can be used to explain
how there was an imminent threat to the woman, despite her victim being
asleep. 58 In the few cases that fall under solicited homicide, the defendant
tries to prove that, due to Battered Woman's Syndrome, responding to the
abuse by hiring a person to kill her abuser was reasonable under the circum-
stances. 9
It is important to point out that Battered Woman's Syndrome is not a
recognized defense, and simply proving that a woman was abused by her
victim is not grounds for an acquittal. 61 "Rather, proof that a criminal defen-
dant was a battered woman is introduced on the theory that such proof is
relevant to some other recognized defense."' 6' In general, there are four dif-
ferent uses for Battered Woman's Syndrome as evidence to a recognized
defense, primarily self-defense, in a murder trial. The first use of Battered
Woman's Syndrome is to give credibility to the defendant by "assist[ing] the
jury in objectively analyzing the defendant's claim of self-defense by dispel-
52. WALKER, supra note 18, at 55.
53. Rosman, supra note 22, at 809.
54. WALKER, supra note 18, at 55.
55. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 240-41 (3d ed. 2001).
56. Id. at 240.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 240-41.
59. Id. at 241.
60. Tinsley, supra note 15, § 3.
61. Id.
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ling many of the commonly held misconceptions about battered women. 6 2
The second reason Battered Woman's Syndrome is introduced at trial is to
prove the defendant honestly believed she was defending herself against im-
minent death or great bodily harm.63 The third use of Battered Woman's
Syndrome at trial is to prove reasonableness in that the killing of the abuser
by the woman was necessary.'M Finally, Battered Woman's Syndrome is
used to explain the real dangers faced by battered women in their abusive
relationships. 65
A. Impaired Mental Capacity
Traditionally, a battered woman who killed her abuser relied on an im-
paired mental capacity defense.66 Reliance was usually placed on insanity,
diminished capacity, or heat of passion.6 7 Insanity constituted a total defense
and diminished capacity and heat of passion both reduced the degree of the
crime.68 When using these impaired mental capacity defenses, reliance is
placed on Battered Woman's Syndrome as evidence to prove the effect this
syndrome had on the woman's mental state at the time of the alleged mur-
der.69 When insanity is used as a defense, the burden of proof varies based
on jurisdiction."y Once evidence of insanity has been presented by the de-
fense, some jurisdictions require the prosecution to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant does not suffer from this impaired mental ca-
pacity, while other jurisdictions only require the defendant to prove insanity
by a preponderance of the evidence.71 Of course, using an impaired mental
capacity for such cases has received a great amount of criticism.72  Many
complain that concluding that a woman must be insane to kill her abuser
reflects a sexual bias.7 3 Others note that the defense is not appropriate since
the mental capacity of the woman at the time of the offense is not really im-
paired.74 Still others realize that while this type of defense "may lead to an
62. Id. § I (quoting People v. Jaspar, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 475 (Ct. App. 2002)).
63. Id. (citing Jaspar, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475).
64. Id.
65. Tinsley, supra note 15, § 1 (citing Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1054 (Fla.
1999)).
66. Id. § 3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Tinsley, supra note 15, § 3.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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acquittal or conviction on a lesser charge, it might also result in the woman's
confinement in a mental institution."75 Needless to say, the impaired mental
capacity defenses for women who suffer from Battered Woman's Syndrome
are slowly beginning to find their way out of court. In recent years, the trend
has been to use self-defense as the defense in cases in which a battered
woman kills her batterer.76
B. As Part of a Self-Defense Argument
The use of expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome appears to
be the most necessary part of a self-defense claim.77 "[T]he syndrome is
used to assist the jury in determining whether the woman acted in self-
defense with respect to the elements of imminency and reasonableness. 78 In
other words, evidence of the syndrome is used to show whether it was rea-
sonable that she believed death or serious injury was imminent. 79  When
using a self-defense argument, evidence of the abusive relationship between
the defendant and the victim is introduced in order to show that the defen-
dant's decision to resort to deadly force was appropriate, given her circum-
stances and the history of violence she experienced.o
While the courts have not yet accepted the premise that the law of
self-defense is any different when the defendant is a battered
woman, it is clear that some juries have acquitted battered woman
defendants in cases in which traditional self-defense was techni-
cally not established .... It has been suggested that such verdicts
are examples of jury nullification, and that such repeated instances
of jury nullification indicate that the law as it presently exists is
not in accordance with current social views.8'
If this theory is true, juries, through either acquitting or convicting bat-
tered women of lesser charges, are expressing their disapproval with the cur-
rent unavailability of a separate defense for battered women. The foresee-
able consequences could be devastating to the justice system. If all a woman
would have to do in order to avoid a conviction for murder is prove that she
75. Tinsley, supra note 15, § 3.
76. See id.
77. See id § 6.
78. Danielle R. Dubin, A Woman's Cry for Help: Why the United States Should Apply
Germany's Model of Self-Defense for the Battered Woman, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 235,
239 (1995).
79. See Tinsley, supra note 15, § 6.
80. Id.§3.
81. Id.
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suffered from Battered Woman's Syndrome, it would be very difficult to
ever convict an abused woman based on the current standards used for the
syndrome.
In Florida, deadly force may be used if one "reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to
himself or herself.""s One of the main obstacles for women using a Battered
Woman's Syndrome claim is proof that they were faced with an imminent
danger that required them to resort to deadly force in self-defense.8 3 "[I]t
must be shown why the defendant perceived danger in a situation in which a
person other than a battered woman would not have perceived danger." 84
1. Defining "Imminent"
Imminent danger is "[a]n immediate, real threat to one's safety that jus-
tifies the use of force in self-defense."85 Case law and legislation make it
mandatory that the defendant reasonably believe his or her attacker's unlaw-
ful violence is almost immediately impending.86 "However, the question of
whether there should be an imminence-of-attack requirement and, if so, how
it should be characterized, is most dramatically presented in the context of a
homicide by a battered [woman]. 87
The imminent danger ... requirement[] ha[s] been developed in
the context of a single, violent encounter between two men. The
rationale is that one man is not justified in using deadly force on
another unless necessary to protect the first man from a danger
which immediately threatens. This stereotypical model is inappro-
priate when assessing whether a battered woman reasonably per-
ceived imminent danger and the need to resort to deadly force. It
is important that the defense case be presented in such a manner as
to focus the jury's attention on the situation as viewed from the
88woman's perspective.
82. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
83. Tinsley, supra note 15, § 4.
84. Id.
85. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 421 (8th ed. 2004).
86. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 409 (2003).
87. Id. at 410.
88. Tinsley, supra note 15, § 4 (citations omitted).
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2. "Imminent" to the Battered Woman
To the battered woman, "imminent" takes on a different meaning. Once
the woman has experienced the tension-growing atmosphere that phase one
provides and then suffers through the acute battering of phase two, 9 "she
develops a constant fear of serious bodily harm that she perceives as immi-
nent partially because of the unpredictability of her [partner's] rage. 90 A
battered woman becomes sensitive to indications of an impending attack
from her abuser, whether it is a trivial comment or action made by the man
that might suggest an attack is coming.91 Though she has experienced vio-
lence at the hands of her abuser on numerous prior occasions, this time is
different.91 Dr. Walker notes what, in her experience, makes the battered
woman finally take action:
Several factors were common to all these cases. First, each
woman stated that she was convinced the batterer was going to kill
her. Violent assault had taken place previously in all of these
cases. In the final incident, however, something different was
noted by these women which convinced them that the batterer
really was going to kill them this time. In each case, the woman
stated that she did not intend to kill her batterer, only to stop him
from killing her .... All reported being terrified of their batterers.
To them, the men were omnipotent; the women felt they had no
place to hide. No matter where they went, the batterer would fol-
low. In each case, the batterer's violence was extraordinarily bru-
tal. In the end, these women had to resort to the most extreme
kind of force-use of a lethal weapon-in order to prevent the bat-
terers from killing them.93
Thus, to the battered woman, despite having experienced the abuse,
perhaps even equal in severity of abuse in the past, something made it differ-
ent this time. Explaining this mindset is vital, especially for those women
who kill in a non-confrontational homicide. 94 It is important "to present the
facts to the jury in such a way as to enable it to see the situation as it pre-
sented itself to the defendant at the time she ... killed her husband." 95 It is
also important to point out to the jury the number of differences between the
89. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
90. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 43, at 369.
91. Tinsley, supra note 15, § 4.
92. See WALKER, supra note 18, at 220.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. See DRESSLER, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
95. Tinsley, supra note 15, § 6.
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behavior of a battered woman and the behavior of a non-battered woman in
order to show how and why a battered woman would perceive an imminent
attack, whereas a non-battered woman would not."
IV. FLORIDA COURTS AND BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME
There are few Florida cases that address Battered Woman's Syn-
drome;9 7 nonetheless, their rulings have opened numerous doors for the de-
fense of battered women who kill their abusers. Most of the cases addressing
Battered Woman's Syndrome involve the use of expert testimony at trial.98
However, the landmark Florida case in the use of Battered Woman's Syn-
drome as a defense concerned the duty to retreat. 99 The duty to retreat has
often prevented many battered women from establishing a complete self-
defense claim.'00 Taken as a whole, these cases have begun to develop case
law regarding Battered Woman's Syndrome as part of a self-defense claim.
However, they stop short of giving any real standard as to how such a branch
of self-defense should be applied.
A. Florida on Expert Testimony
"Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is
to be determined on the basis of whether it will assist the trier of fact.'' ° 1 If
the issue at trial is one that an average layperson "would be capable of form-
ing a correct judgment, expert testimony is not admissible."'0 2  However,
"[i]f the triers of fact have a general knowledge of a matter, but an expert's
testimony would aid their understanding of the issue, it would be admissi-
ble." '03 In Florida, the law on expert testimony reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
96. Id.
97. State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993); Gonzalez-Valdes v. State, 834 So. 2d
933 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (per curiam); Williams v. State, 779 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam); Humble v. State, 652 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995); Rogers v. State, 616 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
98. See id.
99. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999).
100. See State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982) (overruled by Weiand, 732 So. 2d at
1044).
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 law revision council's note (West 1999).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form
of an opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be
applied to evidence at trial. 10'
One of the first Florida cases to examine the use of expert testimony on
Battered Woman's Syndrome was Hawthorne v. State (Hawthorne I).105 In
this case, the court was to determine if Dr. Lenore Walker was entitled to
serve as an expert witness offering testimony as to whether the defendant
suffered from Battered Woman's Syndrome in relation to a self-defense
claim. '06 The court found "that jurors would not ordinarily understand 'why
a person suffering from [B]attered [W]oman's [S]yndrome would not leave
her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear increased ag-
gression against herself."" 7 However, the court held the following:
[T]here has been no determination [in the lower court] as to the
adequacy of Dr. Walker's qualifications or the extent to which her
methodology is generally accepted indicating that the subject mat-
ter can support a reasonable expert opinion. Our determination
that this expert testimony would provide the jury with an interpre-
tation of the facts not ordinarily available to them is subject to the
trial court determining that Dr. Walker is qualified and that the
subject is sufficiently developed and can support an expert opin-
ion. 108
On remand, the lower court concluded that the "depth of study in this
field has not yet reached the point where an expert witness can give testi-
mony with any degree of assurance that the state of the art will support an
expert opinion."' 9 Thus, after determining that the lower court did not abuse
its discretion, the First District Court of Appeal held that Dr. Walker's testi-
mony was not admissible. 0
The Hawthorne decisions were overturned over a decade later in Rogers
v. State,1 ' where the court, in a landmark decision, held:
104. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2006).
105. 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam), abrogated by Rogers v.
State, 616 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
106. Id. at 805.
107. Id. at 806 (quoting Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981)).
108. Id.
109. Hawthorne v. State (Hawthorne II), 470 So. 2d 770, 773 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985), abrogated by Rogers, 616 So. 2d at 1098.
110. Id.at773-74.
111. 616 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), overruled on other ground by State v.
Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993).
[Vol. 31
193
: Nova Law Review 31, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
2007] BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME: SETTING A STANDARD 389
Because the scientific principles underlying expert testimony
relative to the [B]attered [W]oman's [S]yndrome are now firmly
established and widely accepted in the psychological community,
we conclude that the syndrome has now gained general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community as a matter of law .... We
hold that expert testimony regarding [B]attered [W]oman's
[S]yndrome is henceforth admissible .... There will be no further
need for a case-by-case determination as to whether the state of the
art of scientific knowledge relative to the [B]attered [W]oman's
[S]yndrome is sufficiently developed to permit a reasonable opin-
ion by an expert. 11
2
By taking the discretion away from judges as far as determining
whether the scientific knowledge on Battered Woman's Syndrome had been
sufficiently developed "to permit a reasonable opinion to be given by an ex-
pert,""' 3 the Rogers court flung open the door for experts like Dr. Walker to
explain why battered women kill their abusers despite having remained in the
abusive relationship." 4 Such testimony is pertinent to aiding in self-defense
arguments often used in such cases, in that the testimony helps to explain the
reasonableness, in the mind of the battered woman, of killing her batterer. "5
The testimony also helps to explain how a woman came to be a battered
woman and what the significance of adding such a descriptive term means.
Though extraordinary, the court's decision in Rogers seemed to leave
the use of expert opinion on Battered Woman's Syndrome extremely broad
and set no limits to its use." 6 Looking to fix this problem, the Supreme
Court of Florida found itself narrowing down the use of such expert opinion
in State v. Hickson, 117 where the court decided to tackle the question:
"[w]hat can an expert testify to when a defendant relies on [B]attered
[Woman's] [S]yndrome evidence to support a claim of self-defense?"'" 8 The
Hickson court also addressed whether a defendant claiming Battered
Woman's Syndrome should have to submit to an examination by an expert
from the adverse side.' The court found itself trying to reconcile the rights
of both parties without sacrificing justice. 20
112. Id.at1100.
113. Id. at 1098.
114. See id.
115. DRESSLER, supra note 55, at 241 (discussing evidence of Battered Woman's Syn-
drome used to show that killing the batterer was reasonable).
116. See Rogers, 616 So. 2d at 1098.
117. 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993).
118. Id. at 173.
119. Id. at 175.
120. See id. at 176.
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When defendants take the stand, they waive their privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.' Thus, the court's main concern was that
defendants would be able to use expert testimony to relay the facts of the
case in lieu of testifying themselves and being subjected to the prosecution's
questions and possible self-incrimination. 2 However, the court also needed
to satisfy the use of expert opinion on Battered Woman's Syndrome so that
the jury would be able to understand the plight of the battered woman. 23 In
response to these concerns, the Hickson court gave a defendant using Bat-
tered Woman's Syndrome to support a claim of self-defense the following
two options: "1) having her expert testify directly about her case, in which
instance the [S]tate may have her examined by its expert, or 2) both sides
may present the testimony of experts who have not examined the defendant
and who will not testify about the facts of her case."'' 24 The first option al-
lows for an expert to give testimony about the specific facts of the case, relat-
ing Battered Woman's Syndrome directly to the defendant and her abusive
relationship.'25 However, it also allows for the State to have the defendant
examined by its own expert who would be able to testify to the specifics of
the case as well. 6 The second option allows the expert obtained by the de-
fense to only testify about Battered Woman's Syndrome in general and the
characteristics of a battered spouse. 27 The expert would not be allowed to
examine the defendant and thus could not relate such characteristics to the
defendant, only allowing for hypothetical situations to be addressed. 28 The
court felt that these options "protect[ed] the rights and interests of both the
defendant and the [S]tate.' 9 Thus far, it appears as though the Supreme
Court of Florida maintains this solution, as this case has not been overturned
or questioned.
The remaining Florida cases addressing Battered Woman's Syndrome
do not really add much to the case law regarding its use. They simply follow
the precedent established in Rogers and Hickson while tightening up the nuts
and bolts in the use of expert testimony concerning Battered Woman's Syn-
drome. The First District Court of Appeal helped to specify who could not
121. Id.
122. Hickson, 630 So. 2d at 176.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Hickson, 630 So. 2d at 175-76.
128. Id. at 176-77.
129. Id. at 175-76.
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testify about Battered Woman's Syndrome in Humble v. State.130 Here, the
court held the following:
[A woman with seventeen] years experience working in the field
of domestic violence, operating shelters and domestic-violence
programs, and has . .. taught numerous workshops on spouse
abuse ... lack[ed] .. .academic training in the disciplines of psy-
chology or mental health, or clinical experience involving the
study, treatment, or diagnosis of [B]attered [Woman's]
[S]yndrome render[ing] her unqualified to describe the syndrome
to the jury.' 31
The Humble court made it clear that it would take a lot more than ex-
perience to testify about Battered Woman's Syndrome. 3 1 One must be aca-
demically trained in psychology or mental health or have actual clinical ex-
perience involving battered women; operating programs to aid battered
women or teaching classes on domestic abuse is not enough to entitle a per-
son to be labeled an "expert" on Battered Woman's Syndrome. 131
The Second District Court of Appeal, in Williams v. State, 34 further
found a way to limit not only the use of expert testimony pertaining to Bat-
tered Woman's Syndrome, but the use of Battered Woman's Syndrome in
general. 35 The defendant had been convicted of sexual battery due to his
girlfriend's use of an expert witness to prove that she suffered from Battered
Woman's Syndrome. 3 6 Therefore, according to the expert, she lacked the
ability to give consent to sexual intercourse.3 3 The court reversed the con-
viction for sexual battery and held that the State would have to prove a scien-
tific basis to support a claim that "[B]attered [Woman's] [S]yndrome robs a
person of the ability to consent" and that "[s]uch a conclusion would seem to
convert all sexual relations engaged in by a person suffering from this syn-
drome into criminal acts by their partner."'' 38 Thus, the Williams court held
that testimony regarding Battered Woman's Syndrome cannot be used to
prove that a woman lacked the ability to consent in a case based on forced
sexual intercourse. 1
39
130. 652 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
131. Id. at 1213-14.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 779 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam).
135. See generally id.
136. Id. at 314-15.
137. Id. at 315.
138. Id. at 316.
139. Williams, 779 So. 2d at 316.
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The most recent Florida case to address expert testimony on Battered
Woman's Syndrome, Gonzalez- Valdes v. State, 140 proves exactly why expert
testimony can be dangerous and reaffirms the reasoning followed in Hick-
son."14 In this case, the defendant sought the use of a Battered Woman's
Syndrome expert to aid in establishing a self-defense claim to murder.'42
The expert testified that the defendant did in fact suffer from Battered
Woman's Syndrome. 143 However, the expert based this opinion solely on
meetings with the defendant and her own testimony as to the events sur-
rounding the "abusive" relationship and subsequent shooting.144 The prose-
cution introduced the victim's brother who testified that he had never seen
the victim hit the defendant. 145 The prosecution also brought as a witness the
victim's ex-wife who had been married to the victim for twenty-nine years
and testified that during that entire time, the victim had "never raised his
hand to her." 46 The appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the testimony of the victim's brother and ex-wife
and subsequently upheld the defendant's conviction for second-degree mur-
der. 147
The Gonzalez-Valdes case proves just how important it is that expert
testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome is somehow offset, whether
through another expert on the syndrome, or a witnesses proving that the party
claiming Battered Woman's Syndrome did not in fact suffer from it. 148 This
is one of the main problems with allowing Battered Woman's Syndrome to
be used-expert opinions are based solely on the testimony of those seeking
to be deemed a battered woman. In the majority of cases, the abuser has
been killed and cannot share his side of the story, and therefore, others must
be brought in to at least attempt to prove he was not abusive. This seems to
be the perfect case to affirm the Hickson court's reasoning.
140. 834 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (per curiam).
141. See id.
142. See id. at 935.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Gonzalez- Valdes, 834 So. 2d at 935.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
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B. Florida on the Duty to Retreat: Weiand v. State
The duty to retreat stems from the use of force in defending oneself or
another person.'49 In Florida, the applicable law is the "Use of Force in De-
fense of Person" which reads as follows:
A person is justified in using force, except deadly force, against
another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes
that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or an-
other against the other's imminent use of unlawful force. How-
ever, a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not
have a duty to retreat if:
(1) He or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary
to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or her-
self or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible
felony .... 150
In sum, there is no duty to retreat, even when using deadly force, if
there is a reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary in order to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm.'5 ' Further, Florida recognizes the
"castle doctrine," which does not impose a duty to retreat when one is in his
or her own home. 152 Often, the problem that arose from this statute and the
"castle doctrine" involved cases of domestic violence where both the abuser
and victim resided in the same residence.'53 How should the duty to retreat
apply to a woman being beaten or in fear of being beaten when she has fi-
nally found the courage to defend herself? The case of Weiand v. State'54
addressed this exact question. 5 5 To be more specific, the Court posed the
following question: "Should the law impose a duty to retreat from the resi-
dence before a defendant may justifiably resort to deadly force in self-
defense against a co-occupant, if that force is necessary to prevent death or
great bodily harm?" 1
56
The facts of Weiand are typical of any case in which a claim of Battered
Woman's Syndrome is alleged. 17 The defendant "shot her husband during a
violent argument in the apartment where the two [lived] together with their
149. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2006).
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Orr, supra note 1, at 14.
153. See, e.g., Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 1999).
154. Id. at 1044.
155. See id. at 1047.
156. Id. (emphasis omitted).
157. See, e.g., State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993).
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seven-week-old daughter."' 58 The defendant presented evidence of Battered
Woman's Syndrome to support her claim of self-defense and presented ex-
pert testimony to prove that because she suffered from the syndrome, she
truly believed her husband was going to seriously hurt or kill her. '59 Florida
case law has established that when deadly force is necessary to prevent death
or great bodily harm, a person does not need to retreat when in their own
home before resorting to the use of such force. 60 However, the prosecution,
in Weiand, relied on State v. Bobbitt"6' which held that:
the privilege not to retreat, premised on the maxim that every
man's home is his castle which he is entitled to protect from inva-
sion, does not apply here where both [the abused] and her husband
had equal rights to be in the "castle" and neither had the legal right
to eject the other. 162
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, reversed its decision in Bob-
bitt, noting that it was among the "minority of jurisdictions that refused to
extend the privilege of nonretreat . . . [when] the aggressor was a co-
occupant."' 63 The court concluded that "there is no duty to retreat from the
residence before resorting to deadly force against a co-occupant or invitee if
necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm, although there is a limited
duty to retreat within the residence to the extent reasonably possible."'"
One of the reasons the court decided to overturn Bobbitt was because of
the recent advancements in understanding "the plight of victims of domestic
violence," and the public "policy reasons for not imposing [the] duty to re-
treat from [one's home] when ... resort[ing] to deadly force in self-defense
against a co-occupant."' 165  The court recognized numerous studies which
indicated that a time of retreat is often the most dangerous time for a battered
woman because the violence during retreat tends to increase dramatically.'66
158. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1048.
159. See id.
160. See Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1965), overruled by State v. Bobbitt,
415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), and Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1044.
[W]hen one is violently assaulted in his own house or immediately surrounding premises, he is
not obliged to retreat but may stand his ground and use such force as prudence and caution
would dictate as necessary to avoid death or great bodily harm. When in his home he has "re-
treated to the wall."
Hedges, 172 So. 2d at 827 (citing Pell v. State, 122 So. 110, 116 (Fla. 1929)).
161. 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), overruled by Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1044.
162. Id. at 726.
163. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1051.
164. Id. at 1058.
165. Id. at 1051.
166. Id. at 1053.
[Vol. 31
199
: Nova Law Review 31, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
2007] BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME: SETTING A STANDARD 395
In concluding its public policy argument, the court found that "retaining a
duty to retreat from the home 'clearly penalizes spouses, and particularly
wives, in defending themselves from an aggressor spouse."",
16 7
The Weiand court was also concerned that a jury instruction on the duty
to retreat would "reinforce, legitimize, and strengthen myths and stereotypes
about domestic violence," particularly that an abused woman can leave an
abusive relationship whenever she wants. 16 ' To allow for "a jury instruction
[which] suggested retreat [as] an option ... would ... undermine" the Bat-
tered Woman's Syndrome expert's opinion on a battered woman's feelings
of helplessness and fear of imminent harm. 169 The court did, however, retain
"a limited duty to retreat within the residence to the extent reasonably possi-
ble," but still did not require that one flee the residence. 70 Thus, by answer-
ing its proposed question in the negative, the Weiand court was able to not
only settle the confusion in how to apply both the duty to retreat and the cas-
tle doctrine simultaneously, but was also able to protect battered women who
found themselves without an ability to retreat and who were compelled to
use deadly force against a co-occupant in order to prevent a possible deadly
attack.
V. HOW TO DETERMINE A BATTERED WOMAN'S DEFENSE: A THREE-
PRONGED TEST
The problem in Florida, as well as in many other states, is that although
the courts have made significant progress in the use of Battered Woman's
Syndrome at trial, they have failed to aid the fact finders in determining
when Battered Woman's Syndrome should be accepted as part of the de-
fense. There is no legal standard established in Florida to guide a jury in
determining whether Battered Woman's Syndrome can make up for the fac-
tors a defendant lacks when she uses self-defense to explain why she killed
her batterer. 17' As of now, it is all extremely discretionary, meaning that the
potential for establishing any precedent in such cases is minimal, at best.
72
This is even more so because battered women cases are all truly unique; each
abusive relationship examined will have lasted a different amount of time,
the severity in the abuse will range greatly, and each woman's ability to get
167. Id. at 1054 (quoting State v. Rippie, 419 So. 2d 1087, 1087 (Fla. 1982) (Overton, J.,
dissenting)).
168. Orr, supra note 1, at 16.
169. Id.
170. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1058.
171. See generally Orr, supra note 1, at 14-16 (discussing the legal status of the Battered
Woman's Syndrome in Florida).
172. See id. at 15.
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herself out of the relationship will vary. Thus, I propose a three-pronged test
to assist the fact finder in deciding whether or not Battered Woman's Syn-
drome can be applied to the defense.
This test would consist of determining the length of abuse, the severity
of abuse, and the opportunity to flee. Each element must be substantially
met in order for the syndrome to be applicable; however, each element is
intentionally vague due to the lack of research available regarding any spe-
cific data to indicate the amount of time or severity of abuse necessary to
establish a "battered woman." Though expert testimony brought by both the
prosecution and the defense does assist the jury in understanding what Bat-
tered Woman's Syndrome is and how it may or may not apply to the defen-
dant, the experts are making their decision based strictly on what the battered
woman claims to have happened. Thus, they are most likely not taking into
account evidence that the other side has to offer, which makes their opinion
skewed.'73 By giving the jury a guideline, they can combine both the expert
testimony and the evidence presented at trial to determine whether the defen-
dant is in fact entitled to the use of Battered Woman's Syndrome as a part of
a self-defense claim.
A. Length ofAbuse
Determining what accounts as "long enough" to enable a person to
claim she suffers from Battered Woman's Syndrome is difficult. Even Dr.
Walker has been unable to determine a specific amount of time that abuse
must last in order to conclude that a woman is suffering from Battered
Woman's Syndrome. 174 However, according to studies comparing battered
women who killed versus battered women who did not resort to killing their
abuser, the frequency at which abuse occurs and the severity of the abuse,
173. See Gonzalez-Valdes v. State, 834 So. 2d 933, 934-35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(per curiam). Defendant used a self-defense claim for the shooting of her boyfriend, claiming
to have Battered Woman's Syndrome. Id. An expert testified that she did in fact suffer from
the syndrome. Id. at 935. However, the expert's opinion was based solely on meetings with
Defendant and Defendant's statements of abuse. Id. Later, at trial, testimony fiom victim's
brother and ex-wife proved that the victim never raised a hand to Defendant and that the vic-
tim had no history of abusing his ex-wife in any way. Id.
174. See WALKER, supra note 18, at 55.
Battered women are not constantly being abused, nor is their abuse inflicted at totally random
times.... So far, I have been unable to estimate how long a couple will remain in any one
phase [of the cycle theory of violence], nor can I predict how long a couple will take to com-
plete a cycle.
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both physical and psychological, increase over time.'75 As the abusive rela-
tionships progressed, the battered women who killed their batterers reported
that they "became convinced that their partners either could or would kill
them, based on the severity and frequency of violence, verbal threats to kill,
and an apparent diminution of concern by the abusers for the harm they were
inflicting."' 76 Thus, when a jury considers whether a woman does in fact
suffer from Battered Woman's Syndrome, the length of the abusive relation-
ship can serve as an indicator of how severe the abuse became before the
battered woman fatally ended it. If an abusive relationship lasted only a few
months to a year, chances are the abuse did not escalate to that suffered by a
woman who experienced a ten- or fifteen-year abusive relationship. 77
B. Severity ofAbuse
Abuse can come in many ranges. Minor assaults may include "a slap in
the face, a smack on the rear end, a pinch on the cheek or arm, a playful
punch, and hair pulling."'7 8 Though these may seem inconsequential, if re-
ceived regularly and without respect to the woman's welfare, Dr. Walker
considers these actions battering behavior.' 79 Further, these are the exact
types of minimal attacks that lead to major physical assaults. 8 ' For exam-
ple, hitting or lightly punching a woman the first time, makes the second
time easier, the third time even easier, until it eventually escalates to uncon-
trollable behavior.'' "Major physical [attacks] include[]: slaps and punches
to the face and head; kicking, stomping, and punching all over the body;
choking to the point of consciousness loss; pushing and throwing across a
room, down the stairs, or against objects.., stabbing and mutilation . .. "",2
It is important to consider, aside from the physical violence, the terror in-
flicted on the battered woman as well. 8 3  "Batterers reportedly would
frighten their women with terrorizing descriptions of how they would torture
175. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 68-69 (1987) ("The frequency
with which abusive incidents occurred increased over time, with [forty] percent of women in
the homicide group reporting that violent incidents occurred more than once a week by the
end of the relationship.").
176. Id. at 68-69.
177. Id.
178. WALKER, supra note 18, at 79.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See WALKER, supra note 18, at 75.
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them. They often backed up these descriptions through the use of guns,
knives, and other weapons in their abusiveness." ''
Thus, when a jury considers the severity of abuse inflicted on women
attempting to prove that they suffered from Battered Woman's Syndrome, it
is important that they take into account both the physical and psychological
effects of abuse. Though minor versus major physical violence is rather ap-
parent, perhaps a good standard to judge the culmination of severity would
be similar to a "shocks the conscience" standard."5 This would be benefi-
cial since the range of abuse is so great and unique to each individual case. It
would be unfair to label specific abuse "severe" and hold more minor abu-
sive incidents to not be severe enough to establish Battered Woman's Syn-
drome.
C. Opportunity to Flee
It is almost unbelievable that a woman would stay with a man who
abused her so severely that she was forced to kill him in order to finally get
away. Most women, those who have been fortunate enough to either not
experience an abusive relationship or those who saw the warning signs and
escaped early, cannot fathom what could possibly encourage these battered
women to remain with their batterer. This is precisely why expert testimony
regarding Battered Woman's Syndrome is so vital to the court system.
Studies show that women who retreat from the residence when at-
tacked by their co-occupant spouse or boyfriend may, in fact, in-
crease the danger of harm to themselves due to the possibility of
attack after [their] separation.... Experts in the field explain that
separation or retreat can be the most dangerous time in the rela-
tionship for the victims of domestic violence .... 1 86
Another main reason many women stay in their abusive relationships is
due to the extreme change in circumstances that often occurs after an intense
violent episode.8 7 This is referred to as phase three of the cycle theory of
violence. 188 In this stage, the batterer begins to behave in a loving manner,
begs for forgiveness, and promises never to beat his partner again. 89 He will
184. Id.
185. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952) (Black, J., concurring) (compares
"shocks the conscience" to running counter to the "decencies of civilized conduct").
186. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1053 (Fla. 1999).
187. WALKER, supra note 18, at 65.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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recruit others to plead his case, usually his mother, father, and siblings-
whoever he can get to work on the woman's guilt-telling her that she is all
he has.' 90 Although everyone acknowledges that the batterer is at fault, "the
battered woman [is] held responsible for the consequences of any punish-
ment he receive[s]."' 9' What adds to the ability to persuade the woman to
remain in the relationship are her traditional values, a very common trait
among battered women. 92 She wants to believe that this time he really does
mean it, and since she realizes he needs help and believes she is the only one
who can help him, she convinces herself that this is what love is.' 93 More-
over, this period further pushes away anyone who may have been willing to
assist the battered woman: "Helpers of battered women become exasperated
at this point, since the women will usually drop charges, back down on sepa-
ration or divorce, and generally try to patch things up until the next acute
incident."' 94 Thus, phase three only reinforces a battered woman's refusal to
leave. '95
Beyond the fear that more violence will result upon leaving, and the
phase three period of a misguided hope for change, there are other factors
which keep an abused woman in an abusive relationship. Women are more
likely "to be the peacekeepers in [a] relationship[];" they feel they are re-
sponsible for making the relationship work,' 96 and thus they remain with a
feeling of obligation to their mate.197 Further, prior threats that the batterer
will kill himself or his children, threats to run away with the children, a lost
self-esteem, the adverse economic consequences of leaving, and the loss of
"psychological energy to leave," are more reasons why a battered woman
remains in her abusive relationship. 9 8 It is also important to recognize that
an abused woman may have nowhere to go. 99 It is very possible that the
abuser may have isolated the woman from her family and friends, forcing her
to stay in the relationship since she has no one else to turn to.200
Thus, it is very important that a jury fully understand why a battered
woman may not leave. This is perhaps the most important of the three ele-
ments, as it best establishes the woman's lack of reasonable ability to retreat.
190. Id. at 66-67.
191. Id.
192. WALKER, supra note 18, at 67.
193. See id. at 66-68.
194. Id. at 68.
195. See id. at 69.
196. Rosman, supra note 22, at 809.
197. See id
198. Id.
199. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1054 (Fla. 1999).
200. See id.
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If a woman had an opportunity to flee, if she was financially capable or had
family or friends who were willing to help her get away from her abuser, it is
more likely she could have escaped. Further, when there are no children
involved, a woman has a better chance of absconding. The jury should take
these factors into account when determining whether the woman had a de-
cent opportunity to flee. Other evidence to consider might be proof that she
had attempted to leave on a prior occasion, and was either unable to or had
escaped but returned and consequently suffered some sort of physical or
emotional abuse from her abuser.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, Battered Woman's Syndrome is not going to be cured
anytime soon, if at all. Since the concept is relatively new in the psychologi-
cal field and extremely new to the legal world, there is still a great deal of
information still being learned about the syndrome, its causes, and its effects.
Until Battered Woman's Syndrome is more developed, it is important that
Florida courts come up with a standard to apply to women attempting to use
Battered Woman's Syndrome as part of a self-defense claim. Though expert
testimony is vital to the jury understanding Battered Woman's Syndrome, it
should not be used as the sole determinant when looking to apply the syn-
drome. By combining the expert opinion with the evidence presented at trial,
the jury essentially will be evaluating the testimony of the defendant-the
battered woman-along with evidence that will either corroborate her suffer-
ing from Battered Woman's Syndrome or prove that she was not. Though
the members of the jury do not come close to qualifying as experts on Bat-
tered Woman's Syndrome, it is their duty to determine whether a defendant's
self-defense claim may be used for justifiable homicide. Since Battered
Woman's Syndrome seeks to explain how a battered woman may meet the
elements of self-defense, it will essentially be up to the jury to determine
whether she does in fact suffer from the syndrome. Thus, it is extremely
significant that the jury has a standard to decide this.
By incorporating this three-pronged test into self-defense claims using
Battered Woman's Syndrome, the court will be able to begin establishing a
precedent for such cases. Further, it will give defense attorneys an indication
of when the use of the Battered Woman's Syndrome would be appropriate as
part of a self-defense argument. It would also take away from the unreliabil-
ity of the expert's opinion, which is based solely on the testimony of the de-
fendant. °1 However, it is important to recognize that the purpose of this
201. See Gonzalez-Valdes v. State, 834 So. 2d 933, 935 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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standard is in no way meant to undermine the use of expert testimony regard-
ing Battered Woman's Syndrome. Such testimony is vital to giving the jury
an understanding of the syndrome, its effects on the battered woman, and her
perception of the situation at the time she chose to murder her abuser. The
case law regarding Battered Woman's Syndrome should remain in effect.2"2
However, the three-pronged standard should be added to the already estab-
lished precedent in order to give justice to both sets of victims: the defen-
dant and the abuser she murdered.
202. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1044 (finding a privilege of non-retreat from one's own
residence before resorting to deadly force against a co-occupant if necessary to prevent death
or great bodily harm); State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993). Hickson established two
options for a defendant's use of expert testimony regarding Battered Woman's Syndrome
when that defendant claims to be suffering from Battered Woman's Syndrome. See id. at 176.
The defendant can choose to either have the "expert testify directly about [their] case" and
thus be subjected to opposing counsel's expert, or have an expert present general information
regarding the syndrome, not directly related to the defendant. See id.; see also Rogers v.
State, 616 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding the general acceptance of
Battered Woman's Syndrome in the scientific community and thus establishing admissibility
of expert testimony without a case-by-case determination).
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